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ABSTRACT
This dissertation involves an examination of the
effects and implications of three modes of citationality:
hearsay, testimony and conference. As a term coined by
Jacques Derrida, citationality involves the
problematization of questions related to borders and limits
and to the attempt to re-present the originary event
thought to lie beyond the performance of citational acts of
bearing witness.
In chapter one I situate my project theoretically
through an examination of the principles of deconstruction.
In particular, Jacques Derrida's work on the metaphysical
concepts of presence and speech, in terms of repeatability
or iterability, bears heavily on my study. As a function of
iterability, citationality refers to the potential inherent
in every element, textual, linguistic, or otherwise, to be
disseminated and cited in a plurality of contexts and to
assume a new and different meaning. It is from this
perspective,

from the possibility of citation, of exceeding

limits and escaping regulation, that I conduct my analysis
of what I call "hearsay," "testimony," and "conference" in
certain twentieth century texts.
Chapters two through four focus on an application of
the previously mentioned modes of citationality in the
texts of Marguerite Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques
Derrida, respectively. In chapter two, I examine Marguerite
vi
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Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle in which a reliance on hearsay
impedes textual closure while generating a multiplicity of
other texts that cite and re-cite one another. In chapter
three, I analyze several rScits by Maurice Blanchot in
terms of testimony. These texts reveal the problematic in
attempting to access and re-present that which has already
been present and result in an effect of mise-en-abfme of
citations. Chapter four involves a reading of several
polylogues by Jacques Derrida as instances of conference.
Their insistence on a plurality of voices enables a
deconstruction of the logos of restitution.
While chapters two through four are devoted to a
narrow application of a practice of citationality, chapter
five marks the expansion of my topic. In this chapter, I
situate previously raised questions of citationality in
contemporary contexts with political and cultural
implications.

vii
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation involves an examination of the
concept of citationality, a term coined by Jacques Derrida
through his extensive work on the deconstruction of
fundamental elements of the Western metaphysical tradition.
What is to be gained from my study of hearsay, testimony
and conference is a discussion of citational modes that
problematize questions of borders, of accessing and re
presenting the "true event" that precedes the performance
of these acts of bearing witness. This project therefore
raises questions pertaining to speech and presence as well
as origin through an analysis of the texts of Marguerite
Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida.
In the first chapter I establish the theoretical
framework that informs this study. Since my work on
hearsay, testimony and conference has grown out of Jacques
Derrida's reworking of logocentric concepts, a presentation
of the basic principles of deconstruction, as relates to
citationality, constitutes the majority of this chapter.
In the first section of this chapter,

I will provide a

synopsis of Antoine Compagnon's comprehensive study of the
citation while revealing how his approach proves too
limiting for my project.

In La Seconde main, ou le travail

de la citation, Compagnon insists that citation functions
within a closed system where the citation, or foreign
textual element, is safely inserted in the host text,
1
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protected by quotation marks which prohibit contact and
thus contamination between texts. He declares cases of
citation void of quotation marks as out of control and
capricious. However, it is my contention that all citation
has the potential to escape attempts at control and
regulation, as my analyses of various functions of
citationality will show.
With the evident limitations of Compagnon's study, I
turn to Derrida's work on the iterability, or
repeatability, of signs which emphasizes the graphic
qualities common to all forms of language that enable their
potential citation and re-citation. This, of course,
necessarily entails an overview of what Derrida considers
to constitute the Western metaphysical tradition. I will
commence with an explication of Plato's and Aristotle's
privileging of the phone,

followed by an overview of

Ferdinand de Saussure's work on the sign and John Austin's
definition of the performative as a component of speech act
theory, two further instances of the insistence of speech
over writing that bear heavily on my discussion of
citationality.1 These sections prove to be an indispensable
step toward achieving an understanding of the concepts
informing my project.
Chapters two through four constitute a narrow
application of my practice of citationality in the works of
Marguerite Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida.
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Through my analysis of their texts, I have found that
different functions of citationality are in operation. In
chapter two, for example,

I focus on hearsay in the series

of texts by Marguerite Duras that are collectively known as
the Lol V. Stein cycle, which includes three novels and
three films.2 Although numerous critics have already
published a considerable amount of work on Duras' various
literary endeavors in general, and this cycle in
particular, none have explicitly addressed the reliance and
insistence on hearsay as a function of citationality in her
texts. Many critics, in fact, have employed psychoanalytic
and feminist approaches to discuss issues such as feminine
writing and voicing and autobiography. Sharon Willis,

for

example, has such a perspective evident in her discussion
of the Lol V. Stein cycle as does Susan Cohen.3 Certainly,
Jacques Lacan's well-known essay "Hommage a Marguerite
Duras" is an excellent example of this approach to Duras'
work.4 Trista Selous is one critic who contests the
essentialist feminist perspective in her treatment of Duras
opting instead to examine gender issues in a nonessentialist manner.5 These critics are but a few who have
worked on the Lol V. Stein cycle and are fairly
representative of the types of studies that have been
undertaken to date.
Although these contributions are undeniably important
to the field of Duras studies, my project marks a departure
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from this approach, since I have chosen to explore the
effects of the citational mode of hearsay in the Lol V.
Stein cycle. This cycle of texts proves an interesting
choice for a discussion of hearsay considering the way in
which these texts are woven together. In other words, one
text generates, in its wake, another text and each text is
replete with echoes, or rumors and gossip, of the other
texts in the cycle. I contend in fact that there is a
gradual radicalization of hearsay throughout the cycle. The
textual effects produced by such a movement call into
question presumed notions regarding narrative authority.
Following my treatment of hearsay in chapter two, I
proceed to discuss testimony as found in the recits written
by Maurice Blanchot: La Folie du jour, L'arret de mort and
L'instant de ma mort.6 Relatively few studies have been
done on at all on Blanchot's works, in particular these
short narratives, or recits.

In fact, the majority of the

criticism on Blanchot focuses on the implications of his
theoretical and philosophical writings, especially L 'espace
litteraire and L'ecriture du desastre.7 Emmanuel Levinas,
Roger Laporte, Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva are among
those who have worked on his theoretical texts. Of course,
Jacques Derrida stands as the notable exception since he
has indeed treated Blanchot's recits such as La Folie du
jour, L'arret de mort, and L'instant de ma mort in "Living
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On: Borderlines,"

"Pas" and Demeure: Fiction et temoignage,

respectively.
While referring to Derrida's important work on
Blanchot,

I will offer a fresh approach to Blanchot's

recits by exploring the impact of citational practices in
these narratives.

I will treat the texts not in terms of

hearsay, as I did for the unique situation of the Lol V.
Stein cycle, but rather in terms of testimony owing to the
first-person narrative voice common to these recits. Like
hearsay, testimony produces textual effects that call into
question the possibility of re-presenting the event being
related. Again, textual progression becomes impossible and
the recit necessarily remains merely the possibility of re
citing .
For chapter four,

I will explore conference as a

function of citationality, as found in three plurivocal
texts,

"Restitutions," Feu la cendre and Droit de regards

by Jacques Derrida. My decision to discuss Derrida's
polylogues holds interesting implications for my project.
Since Derrida's work on iterability and citationality
provides the theoretical framework for my study, which
thereby allows the texts of Duras and Blanchot to become
objects of analysis, my discussion of Derrida's polylogues
enables them, in their turn, to also become objects of
reading. This maneuver effectively folds Derrida into my
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practice of citationality in that his work helps to
establish my practice while also becoming part of it.8
Most critical attention granted to Derrida's writings
involves discussions of his philosophical perspectives
concerning deconstruction. Geoffrey Bennington, Jonathan
Culler, Rodolphe Gasche and David Wills, to name but a few,
have each written considerably on the issues raised by
deconstruction. Yet, the lack of work on Derrida's
polylogic writing practice as evidenced in "Restitutions,"
"Droit de regards" and Feu la. cendre demonstrates the need
for such a study of conference.
Since conference involves a discussion or an exchange
of comments, there is obviously a plurality of voices. This
marks a significant departure from the texts of Duras and
Blanchot. In Jacques Derrida's so-called polylogues, the
disunity of narrative voice and, even more importantly, the
undecidability of the number and gender of those very
voices creates a response to the problems of citationality
as seen in the cases of hearsay and testimony. This is
accomplished through the deconstruction of the logos of
restitution, presence and origin.
While chapters two through four involve the narrow
application of three modes of citationality in the texts of
Duras, Blanchot and Derrida, chapter five expands my
examination of citationality to briefly touch on other
textual forms of bearing witness, including Latin American
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testimonio, Holocaust survivors' testimonies,

President

Clinton's impeachment and talk shows. By enlarging the
scope of my project and situating it the context of
cultural studies, I am able to address relevant,
contemporary political and sociological issues affected by
the questions I have previously raised in terms of
citationality.
Notes
1. Aristotle, Poetics, translated by Leon Golden
(Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1981); J. L.
Austin, How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962); Plato, The
Republic, translated by B. Jowett (New York and London:
Doubleday, 198 9); Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de
linguistique generale (Paris: Payot, 1973).
2. Generally, the Lol V. Stein cycle consists of the novels
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Le Vice-Consul and L'amour.
The films of the series are India Song, Son Nom de Venise
dans Calcutta desert and La Femme du Ganges. The latter of
these films was never released for distribution and is
rarely seen. Since I have not had the opportunity to view
this film, I have eliminated it from my discussion of
Marguerite Duras.
3. Susan Cohen, Women and Discourse in the Fiction of
Marguerite Duras (Amherst: University of Massachusetts,
1993); Sharon Willis, Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
4. Jacques Lacan, "Hommage a Marguerite Duras, du
Ravissement de Lol V. Stein," in Marguerite Duras, ed.
Marguerite Duras, Joel Farges and Franqois Barat (Paris:
Albatros, 1979).
5. Trista Selous, The Other Woman: Feminism and Femininity
in the Work of Marguerite Duras (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1988).
6. Maurice Blanchot, La folie du jour (Paris: Fata Morgana,
1973), L'arret de mort (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), L'instant
de ma mort (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1994).
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7. Maurice Blanchot, L'ecriture du desastre (Paris:
Gallimard, 1980), L'espace litteraire (Paris: Gallimard,
1955) .
8. This practice is similar to what Jacques Derrida
describes as the "re-trait" in "La loi du genre," from
Parages (Paris: Galilee, 1986).
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CHAPTER ONE
CITATION AND CITATIONALITY
Introduction
Citationality is a term I borrow from Jacques Derrida
to invoke the radicalized quotational practices inherent in
certain twentieth century texts in which there is a
problematization of textual borders, or, in other words, a
collapse of internal boundaries. Derrida has devoted much
attention to what he calls the law of iterability and many
of his texts address, in one way or another,

its effects as

a condition of generalized writing.
In this chapter,

I will trace the work of Ferdinand de

Saussure and J. L. Austin, among others, as well as
Derrida's readings and critiques of them, which remain
indispensable to my conceptualization of citationality.
For, it is citationality that emerges from the iterability
or repeatability that, according to Derrida, conditions all
language. This view in turn stems from Derrida's insistence
on the generalization of writing, that is, the extension of
the rules that condition language, in the conventional
sense, to encompass the oral, the written,

indeed all forms

of utterance. This movement toward a generalization of the
conditions governing writing entails a deconstruction of
the system that has subjugated writing,

in the strict

sense, and of the negative terms associated with it such as
absence.
9
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What I aim to show in this chapter is that Derrida's
movement toward a generalization of writing enables and
even evokes my discussion of traditionally oral modes of
communication as subgenres of citationality. Through this
discussion, I will raise questions of presence and absence,
property and authority as well as origin and copy. I will
explore how the graphematization of all language and signs
problematizes the presumedly rigid borders between speech
and writing, producing in its wake textually destabilizing
effects.
Since Antoine Compagnon has worked extensively on
citation,

I will commence with his definition of this term

and his explanation of its functioning in terms of
semiotics. I hope to demonstrate why such a definition
proves insufficient for my project. Having disclosed the
limitations of Compagnon's model of citation,

I will

subsequently turn to Derrida's notion of citationality
which holds numerous possibilities for my project since it
allows the calling into question of the limits imposed on
writing, not only textually, but also linguistically and
philosophically. This obviously necessitates an exploration
of Saussure's theory of signs and Derrida's critique of it,
particularly in De la grammatologie. This deconstruction of
positive and negative values imposed, respectively, on
speech and writing leads in its turn to a reading of speech
act theory as promulgated first by J. L. Austin and
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subsequently by his successor John Searle. At this juncture
in the chapter, Derrida's critical responses to speech act
theory and the status of the performative, as seen in
"Signature Eveneraent Contexte" and "Limited Inc a b c..."
in particular, are crucial to the development of an
understanding of iterability and citationality.
From such a Derridean perspective, citational modes of
communication raise questions of property, authority and
origin, in addition to a reconsideration of conventional
assumptions regarding speech and writing. In this project I
will explore how these issues, which stem from quotational
practices where there are no quotation marks to delineate
host text from cited text, function in a variety of textual
forms. This condition of citationality produces effects of
textual destabilization in the selected works by Marguerite
Duras and Maurice Blanchot. Subsequent to my discussion of
those writers,

I will then turn to the polylogues of

Jacques Derrida which reveal the emergence of a discourse
differing considerably from the hearsay and testimony found
to inhabit the Duras and Blanchot texts, in that the
polylogues are not necessarily a textual manifestation of
citationality but rather a response to it.
Citation
In La Dissemination, Derrida writes,

"tout commence

dans le pli de la citation."1 As the locus of product and
production and the repeated utterance and the utterance of
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that repetition, this fold does indeed mark the ultimate
point of departure for my project. For it is along that
very crease that issues I wish to address become
problematized. The question of origin emerges with the
inability to distinguish it from its citation/repetition,
from its source, thereby rendering this problem of origin
endemic.

If we can consider the functioning of this fold in

much the same way as Derrida's notion of the hymen,2 than
we can treat it as a parergonal structure, a boundary on
which citation resides that is neither internal nor
external but both at once. Citation is within and without
host text and, obviously, we can challenge the usage of
such terms as host text and cited text as the borderlines
between them become blurred. Citation is a mark of origin,
of its source, yet citation is also the mark of difference,
of differing and of being deferred from its origin. Reading
the fold as parergon calls into question notions of the
fold especially as they pertain to proprietorship.

It

becomes virtually impossible to settle the issue of
authority since the fold places the citation on either side
of itself at once, thereby rendering any claims to
ownership necessarily disputable and ultimately
indeterminate.
That citation produces such destabilizing effects on
speech, writing, presence and authority is no surprise when
we begin to contemplate the dictionary definition of the
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word "citation" itself. The English verb "to cite" is
derived from the French verb "citer," a word that initiallyappeared in legal terminology meaning "to summon." In being
cited one is required to present oneself for scrutiny
before a court. In juridical terms, citation is related to
adduction and the verb "to cite," therefore, implies the
presentation of evidence "as an example or means of
proof."3 Evidently, through its usage in law, citation is
related to questions of authority and property as well as
to matters of proof and truth, which holds interesting
implications for my discussion.
Although they are used synonymously with "to cite" and
"citation," the English verb "to quote" and its substantive
derivative "quotation" are not related to matters of
judgement, but rather to the concept and convention of
numbers and measure as in, for example, to divide into
chapters and verses

(ibid., p. 23). This definition of

quotation already carries with it the concept of boundaries
and division between texts. It is clear to see how it has
come to signify a delineation between primary and secondary
texts. Like the word "citation," carrying with it juridical
connotations, the word "quotation" bears its own useful
connotations since what is at stake in matters of
citationality is really the rupture of those divisions and
boundaries between cited and host text.
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Although "quotation" has now come to suggest the
insertion of markers in the text to delineate sections and
fragments of "other" texts, it did not always carry with it
this significance.

Indeed, prior to the use of quotation

marks as an indicator of cited passages,

italics were

employed as early as the 16th century to mark citations in
texts. The innovation of quotation marks, or "les
guillemets" in French, came with the advent of printing and
were first employed by the printer Guillemet from whom
these marks received their name in French. In order that a
text not be inadvertently attributed to the incorrect
source, quotation marks have become common practice in
writing. Quotation marks serve then to differentiate the
same from the other, the "main discourse" from the
secondary,

foreign textual fragment.

To arrive at a contemporary understanding of the
function of quotation and to provide fundamental background
knowledge for my study of citationality,

I will first

discuss Antoine Compagnon's exhaustive study of the
citation, La seconde main, ou le travail de la citation
Compagnon commences his work by examining the conditions of
repetition which "regulate" citation's use and role in
language.
Compagnon undertakes this study by borrowing from both
Emile Benveniste and Ferdinand de Saussure. In his
Problemes de linguistique generale, Benveniste employs the
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distinction between "langue" and "discours," evoking,
obviously, Saussure's "langue" and "parole," but with one
important difference. For Benveniste,

"discours" is not

synonymous with "parole." This is due to the fact that
Benveniste insists on "discours" as a "manifestation
vivante de la langue."5
Thus "langue" refers to the system/the global and
"discours" to the individual/the actualization of an
element of that system. Compagnon extends this notion to
the extensive/the infinite and the comprehensive, where the
extensive is the ensemble of elements in the system and the
comprehensive is the relation of elements within that same
system (La Seconde main, ou le travail de la citation, p.
50). He writes:
Sous le regime de 1'infini, du hasard, de
1'eventuel, la moindre repetition, non plus
contrainte mais contingente, est pertinente et
signifiante, elle est un fait de langage, une
relation a analyser comme telle: elle devient une
forme capable d'une fonction. Alors que dans la
langue il n'y a que des choses repetees, dans le
discours il y a la repetition des choses. (Ibid.,
p. 52)
In this passage, Compagnon explicates the distinction
between "langue" and parole" while attempting to establish
the validity of undertaking the study of discursive
repetitions, previously dismissed by linguists as
impertinent compared to studies of linguistic repetitions.
Yet, if we reconsider the previously mentioned strict
legal definition of citation as a presentation of
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evidence/proof, citation always already refers to an act of
repetition.

It establishes, indeed, a double articulation

between the singular and the universal. This dialectic of
the universal and the singular called into play by an act
of repetition is elaborated on by Gilles Deleuzes:
Si la repetition existe, elle exprime a la fois
une singularity contre le general, une
universality contre le particulier, un
remarquable contre 1'ordinaire, une instantaneite
contre la variation, une eternite contre la
permanence. A tous egards, la repetition, c'est
la transgression. Elle met en question la
loi
6
In other words, repetition, and likewise citation, as one
of its basic forms, concerns an instance that is neither
interchangeable nor replaceable.
Deleuze,

It is, according to

the condition of the universality of a singular.

Repetition is described as universal, because, to be
recognized as repetition, its singular instance must occur
more than once; this is not unlike Derrida's insistence on
the iterability of the sign, a concept crucial to the
phenomenon of citationality to be addressed later in this
chapter.
Discursive repetitions are always already
interdiscursive since the repetition would occur in at
least two different instances, or discourses, and the
relationship between one discourse and another must be
taken into consideration. For Compagnon, citation is but
one example of possible interdiscursivity. Other examples
would include pastiche, proverb, commentary and imitation.

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

I, however, view the above as forms of citation, since the
most rudimentary repetition defined by Compagnon is
"repetition d'unite de discours dans un autre discours;
elle apparait comme la relation interdiscursive primitive"
(La seconde main, p. 54). Therefore, for Compagnon, this
simplest form of repetition must be considered not only as
a product,

"enonce," but also as a production, an

"enonciation repetante," a definition the dictionary fails
to take into account, acknowledging simply the citation as
product.
In order to account for his insistence on citation as
a system,

incorporating, as mentioned above, both product

and production, Compagnon devises a scheme that becomes
more elaborate throughout his study. The fundamental system
of citation as conceived by Compagnon is composed of two
texts,

"Tl" and "T2" and the authors of those texts,

"Al"

and "A2," respectively. The citation itself is denoted by
the letter "t," representing its function as the object of
exchange between the two texts. Obviously, a potential
problem inherent in such a formulation is that it assumes
that "t," the repeated utterance, appears identical in both
texts. There is no allowance made at all for the
possibility that the citation will be modified, a fairly
serious oversight since repetition itself marks difference;
indeed, all repetition is itself difference. As Deleuze
writes,

"La difference est entre deux repetitions... la
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repetition aussi est entre deux differences"

(Difference et

repetition, p. 104).
Yet, the apparently reductive schematization of
Compagnon's system of citation does enable, as he aims to
demonstrate, one to confer the value of sign to the
repeated utterance, or citation, because of its appearance
in the two systems, where "SI"="T1"+"A1" and
"S2 "= "T2 "-t-"A2 ." This move allows Compagnon to undertake a
study of citation as discursive repetition in much the same
way as linguistic repetitions are studied by linguists as
pertinent elements of language.
Compagnon's rather conventional view of the role of
citation in texts establishes an apparent dichotomy between
so-called good citations and bad ones. For him, good types
of citations play by the rules. Quotation marks,

for

example, escort or accompany "t" into "S2," where it
remains distinguished from its host text "T2." There is no
confusion instigated by its appearance as a foreign element
in another text, because the quotation marks serve not only
to mark it as such, but also to prevent the contamination
of the host text.
Compagnon devotes the last sections of his study to a
discussion of the "bad" forms of citation, which he can
only describe as anomalies and perversions of writing. It
is these cases that Compagnon views as the particular
instances that emerge when there is a loss of markers that
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would normally contain the citation within its boundaries
in the host text. Once the quotation marks are lost, so too
is the regulatory function of citation on behalf of the law
of writing:
La structure 'normale' de la citation, qui a la
fonction d'un principe de regulation de
l'ecriture, met en relation deux systemes
semiotiques, chacun presume complet et autonome
(compose d'un sujet et d'un texte) ainsi
qu'independant de 1'autre. La liaison instauree
par une citation est done partielle et
ponctuelle. Une aberration pour cette structure
est une citation qui abolit 1'independance des
deux systemes, qui les accouple ou meme les
confond - e'est le cas de la copie. (La seconde
main, p. 3 70-71)
This passage raises several interesting notions that must
be

addressed. First, if the function of quotation marks

is

to

act as a regulator, as a code of the law of writing that

maintains textual boundaries both externally and
internally, then it is clear that the loss of such marks
jeopardizes this very system and serves to threaten the
economy of writing. Any instance of citation is thereby
rendered dangerous. As Deleuze insists, all repetition "met
en question la loi..."

(Difference et repetition, p. 9),

whereas it is evident that for Compagnon only the
occasional "aberrant" citation produces such an effect.
A second problematic arises in the formula for the
function of the citation in that it assumes there to be an
autonomous, completely closed system of author-producer and
text-product that remains impenetrable, immune from
"foreign" influence. The allowed exception is the brief
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insertion of "t" carefully and protectively bound in
quotation marks to keep its impact on the second semiotic
system at a minimum. The limitations of Compagnon's study
become apparent here through his insistence on the "texte"
and "hors-texte," which he clearly delineates and in terms
of which citation is the mere partial and temporary
insertion of a "foreign" text into another.
What Compagnon evidently views as an aberration and,
hence, a negative, unfortunate phenomenon is the deviation
of certain contemporary writings from the code of citation
which institutes the regulation. He even goes so far as to
question "la valeur de cette sorte de repetition" which he
finds much too unsystematic and unmotivated (ibid, p. 370) .
Finally, he reproaches Borges who "pervertit
systematiquement l'economie classique de l'ecriture"
(ibid.). Therefore, when a citation can no longer be
readily recognized as an "insertion" set off
typographically from the "main discourse," the relationship
between texts becomes what Claudette Sartiliot calls a
"form of complicity"

(Citation and Modernity: Derrida,

Joyce and Brecht, p. 20).
It is my contention that all forms of citation fit
into the category for which Compagnon reserves "la citation
capricieuse." Indeed, my study reveals the potential
inherent in all citations to "echappe[r] au controle" and
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"f[aire] douter de la notion meme d'equilibre"

(La seconde

main, p . 362) .
Citationality
As stated earlier in this chapter, my project entails
an exploration of concepts such as presence,

iterability,

intentionality and, of course, citation itself. Given the
limitations found in Compagnon's definition of citation, it
is instructive to consider how Derrida approaches the
question of citationality. In order to arrive at an
understanding of Derrida's term, we must begin by tracing
his re-conceptualization of speech and writing. It is
Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique generale that
contributes an essential component to Derrida's critique of
the Western logocentric tradition as evidenced by his
reading of Saussure in De la grammatologie, one of the most
elemental texts of deconstruction.7 In this text Derrida
undertakes a deconstruction of Saussure's Cours which he
views as emblematic of the problematic of western
metaphysics in general. He accomplishes this by drawing the
connection, as Spivak explains, of:
...this phonocentrism to logocentrism -- the
belief that the first and last things are the
logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite
understanding of God, an infinitely creative
subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self
presence of full consciousness.8
Derrida necessarily elucidates the link that has long been
established between phone and the logos by tracing the
voice and speech as the closest means of expression and
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communication to the soul, to truth and to thought. He
relates how speech has come to be intertwined with the
phenomenological concept of "hearing-oneself-speak" as a
means of coming into self-presence:
On pressent done deja que le phonocentrisme se
confond avec la determination historiale du sens
de 1'etre en general comme presence avec toutes
les sous-determinations qui dependent de cette
forme generale et qui organisent en elle leur
systeme et leur enchainement historial (presence
de la chose au regard comme eidos, presence comme
substance/essence/existence (ousia) , presence
temporelle comme pointe (stigme) du maintenant ou
de 1'instant (nun), presence a soi du cogito,
conscience, subjectivite, co-presence de 1'autre
et de soi, intersubjectivite comme phenomene
intentionnel de l'ego, etc.). Le logocentrisme
serait done solidaire de la determination de
l'etre de l'etant comme presence. (De la
gramma, tol ogi e , p . 22)
This confounding of speech with presence in all its "sousdeterminations" holds rather serious implications for
writing. As is the case with traditional binary oppositions
(speech/writing, presence/absence, male/female, etc.), one
term maintains privileged status over the other. This
hierarchization of orality over writing has been documented
as far back as Plato and Aristotle and since what is at
stake in this project are questions of the "written," I
find it necessary to examine these assumptions of speech as
opposed to writing in order to demonstrate how they are
called into question by the phenomenon of citationality.
In De la gramma tologie, Derrida addresses the value
distinctions imposed on speech and writing, revealing that
speech has been privileged for its immediacy and it has
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maintained its dominant status over writing as the primary
mode of communication due to its presumed accuracy and
directness via "un rapport de proximite essentielle et
immediate avec 1'ame"

(ibid., p. 22).

This tendency to subjugate writing in favor of speech
can be traced to Plato and Aristotle,

in particular, who

wrote of the relation of the voice and speech to the soul.
If we briefly review Plato's work, we can trace for
ourselves the emergence of such a view.

In the famous and

often cited Book III of The Republic, Plato unveils his
classification of literary genres. The two forms of lexis,
or the way of speaking, are mimesis and diagesis, which
compose the two modes of repetition of others' words.
Mimesis is basically synonymous with imitation and involves
what Plato calls indirect style, where the poet assumes the
voice of another. Diagesis, or the simple mode, involves
the poet speaking in his own voice to narrate the story.9
As explained in The Republic, Plato expresses his
desire to exclude forms of poetry that invoke dangerous
lamentations and excessive laughter which would potentially
impede readers from learning the value of shame and selfcontrol.

It is during this discussion that Plato proceeds

to reproach his contemporary poets, most notably Homer, for
the deceitful assumption of another's voice in order to
narrate his story.

Additionally, poets who employ the

mixed style, that is, a combination of direct and indirect
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styles of narration, obviously weaken their poetry by
resorting to the mimetic form in order to accomplish the
story (ibid.).
Homer, for example, employed the mixed style and the
following passage illustrates the difference between the
direct and indirect styles. Simple narration proceeds as:
"So now they were in the deep valley of Lacedaimon, and
drove up to the gate of the illustrious King Menelaos,"10
whereas imitation would result in the concealment of Homer
as narrator resulting in the narration of the passage
the first person, as if Homer had assumed

in

the identity of

one of King Nestor's sons.
In The Poetics, Aristotle appears

to diverge

drastically from Plato's classification of literary genres
when he states that mimesis is the form of all literary
endeavors. Indeed, he valorizes mimesis as the ambition of
all poets. Its two subgenres are direct style and indirect
style and it is here that the undeniable proximity to
Plato's schema is revealed.11 Aristotle's direct style
corresponds to Plato's notion of imitation or mimesis where
the poet assumes the voice of another as a means of
narration. Aristotle's notion of indirect style or
narrative also finds its synonym in Plato's mode of
diagesis. Aristotle however declares the recit of mixed
styles as the universal literary form where verbal and non
verbal matters are represented in the same way. Genette
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reveals the problems inherent in such distinctions in his
essay "Frontieres du recit."12
Returning to Plato, we see that he proceeds to
establish a distinction between eikon and phantasma, in The
Sophist.13 He further differentiates between types of
repetition and imitation and privileges one form of copy
over another. Eikon are copies that respect the proportion
of the object being copied or represented. Such copies
resemble the idea so very closely that the detection of the
copy on the very basis of the object copied would not be an
easy task. This type of copy flows directly from the
thought/idea and as such is the truest form of copy.
Phantasma, on the other hand, consists of copies of copies,
where there is movement from eikon to copies of it
resulting in the subsequent prevalence of distortion and
the creation of a sense of illusion, or of simulacra. It is
interesting to note that Compagnon actually introduces the
question of citation as simulacra, a copy of a copy, or the
repetition of another's words. This conception renders
citation a poor image of thought, already removed from the
eidos, or thought.
Two discourses arise therefore out of Plato's and
Aristotle's contemplations on literary genres and the
imitative nature of narration, that of direct and indirect.
Whereas Plato dismisses mimetic forms, or the indirect
style, for the poet's deception in assuming another's voice
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and thereby producing simulacra., Aristotle, at first
appearance,

rehabilitates mimesis by validating its role as

the ambition of all artists. Yet, a closer look at
Aristotle's divisions of genres actually reveals a
proximity to those of Plato and even more importantly,
their views on writing indicate its devaluation.
If we consider Plato's formulation of thought/idea and
copies drawn directly from it, contrasted with copies based
on those copies, we can see, by extension,

how these

concepts of eikon and phantasma implicate speech and
writing. Speech draws directly from thought or "les etats
de I'ame" whereas writing is a copy of that copy, a
derivative prone to distortion and inaccuracy owing to its
distance from thought.
Despite the commonly held belief that Derrida uses the
first part of De la grammatologie to discredit Saussure's
Cours de la linguistique generale for being steeped in
logocentric views that merely sustain the privileging of
the phone,

it is indeed true that Saussure actually

provides his own limited critique of the metaphysics of
presence, an important aspect of his text that readers of
De la grammatologie often neglect. However,

in spite of

Saussure's re-articulation of language in terms of the
arbitrary and difference,

there are, as we shall see,

moments where his work does seem to affirm the logocentrism
against which he attempts to articulate his theory.
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What is especially important in Saussure's conception
of language as a system of signs is that it is based on an
understanding of their operation as arbitrary and
conventional. For example, he illustrates the arbitrariness
of the sign with the word "soeur" which is linked "par
aucun rapport interieur avec la suite de sons s-o-r qui lui
sert."14 In other words, each sign is defined by its
relation to other signs and not by any essential properties
it may possess. A sign can thus be described as "immotive,
c'est-a-dire arbitraire par rapport au signifie, avec
lequel il n'a aucune attache naturelle dans la realite"
(ibid., p . 101).
The relational nature of systems indicates that there
are no positive terms; there are only differences. As
Saussure explains:
...dans la langue il n'y a que des differences.
Bien plus: une difference suppose en general des
termes positifs entre lesquels elle s'etablit,
mais dans la langue il n'y a que des differences
sans termes positifs" (Ibid., p. 166).
This system of differences is in fact how Saussure
conceives of what constitutes "langue" or language. If
"langue" refers to the system of signs, then Saussure's
term "parole" designates the speech events that render the
system, or "langue" possible. This is not unlike Derrida's
notion of the originary trace which he identifies in
Saussure's system in that there is only infinite referral
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to other traces without a fixed, inherent meaning in any
one trace.
while Saussure's work offers an innovative means of
considering language and has had an immeasurable impact on
various aspects of post-structuralist thinking, the
logocentric aspects with which Derrida takes issue emerge
in Saussure's attitude to writing, which, as in Plato, is
relegated to a secondary and derivative status in the
Cours. According to Saussure:
...langue et ecriture sont deux systemes de
signes distincts; 1'unique raison d'etre du
second est de representer le premier; l'objet
linguistique n'est pas defini par la combinaison
du mot ecrit et du mot parle; ce dernier
constitue a lui seul cet objet" (Cours de
linguistique generale, p. 45).
With the spoken word and the spoken word alone constituting
the object, writing, therefore, is merely a device that
allows for the representation of speech and, if we accept
Saussure's contention, does not need to be considered in a
discussion of the sign. It is this apparent dismissal of
writing that Derrida regards as yet another example of the
privileging of the phone. This hierarchization of speech
over writing is endemic to the Western metaphysical
tendency to treat writing as a dangerous artifice, or like
the pharmakon offered in Plato's Phaedrus, a remedy that is
simultaneously treated as a poison.15
The fundamental basis of the connection between speech
and thought stems from the privileging of presence, as
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mentioned previously. Derrida views this problematic as one
of equating the "etre de l'etant" with "presence," where
presence refers to that of the thing, to presence as in
essence and existence, to presence as temporal in the
"here" and the "now" and finally, presence as in conscious
subjectivity:
Au regard de ce qui unirait indissolublement la
voix a l'ame ou a la pensee du sens signifie,
voire a la chose meme...tout signifiant, et
d'abord le signifiant ecrit, serait derive. Il
serait toujours technique et representatif. II
n'aurait aucun sens constituant. Cette derivation
est l'origine meme de la notion de "signifiant."
La notion de signe implique toujours en elle-meme
la distinction du signifie et du signifiant, futce a la limite, selon Saussure, comme les deux
faces d'une seule et meme feuille. Elle reste
done dans la descendance de ce logocentrisme qui
est aussi un phonocentrisme: proximite absolue de
la voix et de l'etre, de la voix et du sens de
l'etre, de la voix et de l'idealite du sens. (De
la grammatologie, pp. 22-23).
Jonathan Culler elucidates the intertwining of phone with
the logos seen in the expression "s'entendre parler" which
means not only "hearing-oneself-speak" but also
"understanding oneself" as in the phenomenological sense of
coming into full presence. According to Culler, there are
no grounds for claiming that voice delivers thoughts
directly and precisely even though that appears to be the
case when one hears oneself speak at the moment of
speaking. As Culler points out, speech, just as writing, is
a "sequence of signifiers...open to the process of
interpretation. 1,16 This view follows Derrida's contention
that if writing is defined by qualities traditionally
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assigned to it, then speech, by extension, can likewise be
considered a form of writing. He states,
'originel,'

"Le langage

'naturel,' etc., n'ait jamais existe,

n'ait jamais ate intact,

intouche par l'ecriture,

ait toujours ete lui-meme une ecriture"

[qu']il
[qu'il]

(De la

grammatologie, p. 82). It is here that Derrida's
formulation of "l'ecriture generalisee" emerges as an
infrastructure to which oral language, just as writing, in
the conventional sense of the word, belongs. Derrida
attributes the elements traditionally pertaining
exclusively to writing to generalized writing, which
encompasses speech as well. Geoffrey Bennington explains:
"Writing" implies repetition, absence, risk of
loss, death; but no speech would be possible
without these values; moreover, if "writing" has
always meant a signifier referring to other
signifiers, and if, as we have seen, every
signifier refers only to other signifiers, then
"writing" will name properly the functioning of
language in general.17
By rearticulating conceptions of speech and writing and by
deconstructing the hierarchy that privileges speech as
presence over writing and the absence it denotes, Derrida
initiates a movement toward the graphematization of
language, both oral and written.
The graphematic in general comprehends five basic
systems as outlined by Rodolphe Gasche in The Tain of the
Mirror. Briefly, these systems are that of the "archetrace," "differance," supplementarity,

"re-mark" and

iterability.18 Although all of these systems are
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intertwined and overlap one another,

for the purposes of my

discussion of citationality, I will focus, obviously, on
the question of iterability since it is, quite simply, the
possibility of repeatability and, as such, bears most
directly on my study. Now that we have viewed all language
in general in terms of the graphematic,

following Derrida's

deconstruction of the binary opposition speech and writing,
as found in Saussure's discussion of the sign, we shall
consider the performative utterance as defined by J.L.
Austin.
Speech Acts
The movement toward the concept of generalized writing
enables an examination of Speech Act Theory as promulgated
by J. L. Austin that will in turn bring us one step closer
to comprehending what is understood by the term
citationality. Because Derrida's reading of Austin's text
and the subsequent polemic it provoked with Searle,
commonly thought of as Austin's greatest disciple, are
crucial to the development of the concept of citationality,
I find it indispensable to devote attention to the basic
principles of this theory.
In How To Do Things With Words, Austin offers his
working definition of the performative utterance as
compared to the constative, where the performative does not
describe or affirm and is neither true nor false, but
instead "performs" a "speech act."19 This differentiation
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of constatives and performatives arose out of Austin's own
critique of the belief that the important element of
statements is their "truth" or "falsity." While Austin's
argument against this tradition shares some common points
with Derrida's work, it, like Saussure's text, ultimately
discloses its entrenchment in that very tradition. Through
his discussion of what constitutes the performative, Austin
ends up reaffirming phonocentrism.
Regarding the constative, Austin describes this type
of utterance as a statement of fact, as in a report that
can be either true or false. A performative, on the other
hand, is an utterance that participates in doing an action
(performing something) which normally would not be
described as saying something. It is an utterance necessary
to accomplish an act and so conforms to pre-established
societal norms and conventions. One of the most excellent
examples of the performative cited by Austin is the
utterance "I do" spoken during a marriage ceremony. Such a
phrase is considered performative, since it is indeed
"contractual" or "declaratory"

(How to Do Things With

Words, p. 6) and the utterance of those words is part of
the performance of an act. Shoshana Felman explains that
such an utterance involves the production and the
accomplishment of the event and not its description.20 It
is neither true nor false but only successful or
unsuccessful. Austin uses the terms "felicitous" and
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"infelicitous," respectively,

to denote the success or

failure of any given performative. According to Austin, a
felicitous speech act occurs when correctness of form and
propriety of context are followed. As Christopher Norris
states,

"To fail in any of these counts is to fall into

idle talk or other more insidious kinds of linguistic
delinquency."21 Furthermore, Austin categorizes the types
of failure of infelicitous performatives, which he
considers as either misfires or abuses. Misfires result
when the act, or promise,

is not carried out. Abuses, on

the other hand, are acts achieved, but in bad faith. An
example is a marriage ceremony conducted under duress,
where one of the parties involved goes through with the act
despite

(his/her) intentions to the contrary.

At this juncture in How To Do Things With Words,
Austin commences his categorization of the performative
into serious and non-serious types of uses, and he excludes
the non-serious performative as an "ill"

(ibid., p. 21). He

asserts that "a performative utterance will, for example,
be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on
the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in
soliloquy"

(ibid., p. 22). On the grounds that such an

instance of language use is not serious because it acts in
ways "parasitic upon its normal use - ways which fall under
the etiolations of language," Austin excludes it from
consideration in his discussion. As Culler points out, the
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use of the word "parasitic" to describe non-serious uses of
language suggests a certain supplementarity, that such
categories are in addition to "normal," serious language
uses

(On Deconstruction, p. 108). Obviously, this alludes

to a "restatement of the philosophic stance that privileges
'speech' at the expense of writing,"

(Norris,

Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 109) . In conformity
with the sign as defined by Saussure in terms of the spoken
word, writing exists for Austin also outside of the system
of language, as a derivative, a signifier of a signifier
(De la grammatologie, p. 22) .
Austin's assertion that literary language should not
be considered an ordinary and normal use of language stems
from his belief that, as Sandy Petrey notes,

"When words

enter a text... they move beyond the reach of the social
conventions with which they must interact in order to
perform."22 According to Austin, the conventions of
correctness and propriety that guide the performative cease
to operate when language is used non-seriously. Literary
language, in particular, as Petrey writes, is
"'parasitic'...an enfeebled 'etiolation' of language...a
copy rather than an original, an echo rather than speech"
(ihid, p. 51). Petrey goes on to question Austin's
reasoning for his acts of exclusion by posing the question:
Agreed that I can't do what Donne orders when I
read his injunction to go and catch a falling
star or get with child a mandrake root, why does
that mean the absence of conventions rather than
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the presence of the conventions defining literary
language? {Ibid, p. 52)
Indeed, Petrey concludes,

it would make the difference

between "interpretation versus execution of the imperative"
{ibid.).
What is especially interesting in the case of Austin's
exclusions of literary language, is his use of such
language in order to illustrate his points. Norris and
Petrey both astutely point to the fact that Austin himself
resorts to "storytelling and fictionalizing to make his
claims about speech act theory"

(Deconstruction: Theory and

Practice, p. 109) yet he "excludes the literary from his
theory as a non-serious and abnormal use of language"
(Speech Acts and Literary Theory, p. 52) . In The Critical
Difference, Barbara Johnson adds,

"Left to their own

initiative, the very words with which Austin excludes
jokes, theater, and poetry from his field of vision
inevitably take their revenge"23 reiterating the
inevitability of Austin's employing the very terms and
examples to explicate his principles while attempting to
exclude those types of examples.
While Johnson asserts that Austin is "done in" by his
words and that the "joke ends up being on Austin"

{ibid.),

Shoshana Felman, however, posits her hypothesis that
perhaps Austin's exclusion of jokes and literature is
really a joke itself, emphasizing the playful aspects of
his work {The Literary Speech Act Don Juan with J.L.
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Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages, p. 27). In fact, she
draws comparisons between Austin's and Don Juan's seductive
abilities, which Jonathan Culler contends "only emphasizes
the inappropriateness of excluding non-serious discourse
from consideration"

(On Deconstruction, p. 118) .

Regardless of the seriousness, or lack thereof, of
Austin's writings, his definition of the performative in
terms of presence, intentionality and, therefore,
authenticity remain points with which Derrida takes issue.
Since a performative utterance is contractual under
appropriate circumstances, the parties involved must act in
good faith. This bears heavily on the speaker of the
utterance, obviously, because such an utterance of a
promise entails an intention to keep one's word. In
addition to the speaker uttering the performative seriously
and in good faith, a burden falls on the recipient of the
utterance as well. If the speaker uses words seriously with
the intention of keeping his/her word, the utterance must
be taken and understood as such. The promise must be heard
by someone and must be understood as a promise. Therefore,
an utterance spoken under appropriate circumstances and in
good faith qualifies as a serious use of language.
It is quite evident from the preceding passage that
Austin's conception of the serious performative utterance
relies on speaker and receiver being face-to-face in an
oral exchange. Petrey elaborates on Austin's insistence
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upon the interlocutors' presence to achieve the utterance:
"The key criterion is presence: speaker and listener in the
presence of one another, meaning and intention present in
spoken words, those words themselves present both as the
physical reality of sound and the mental reality shared by
the communal parties"

(Speech Acts and Literary Theory, p.

134) .
In "Signature Evenement Contexte," (to be referred to
as "SEC") Derrida commences his reading of Austin with a
commentary on communication, addressing Austin's
requirement that the speaker be fully involved with his/her
utterances.24 Derrida writes that the marks produced by the
sender/addressor are cut off from him/her yet these marks
"continue[nt] de produire des effets au-dela de sa presence
et de l'actualite presente de son vouloir-dire, voire audela de sa vie meme..."

(ibid., p. 372). Whereas writing,

in the conventional sense, has been viewed as a mere
representation to supplant presence and to act as a
placeholder in the absence of a receiver, Derrida asserts
that these traits of writing are generalizable and hold
true for all signs, even those presumed to be determined by
"presence"

(ibid., pp. 373-74).

It follows therefore that every sign presupposes "un
certain absolu de 1'absence" that renders it "repetable iterable - en 1'absence absolue du destinataire ou de
1'ensemble empiriquement determinable des destinataires..."
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{ibid., pp. 374-75) . Indeed, it is this iterability that
structures the mark of writing, regardless of the type of
writing under consideration {ibid.) . Gasche defines
iterability as a "repetition...that would be capable of
accounting for the fact - the possibility and the necessity
- that any singular and unique moment must be repeatable in
order to exist"

{The Tain of the Mirror, p. 212).

The iterability (a word traced by Derrida via the
Latin "iter" to the Sanskrit "itara," meaning "other") of
the mark thus denotes its ability to function in the
absence of the addressor and addressee.

If a mark can

function without and beyond the conscious presence of
addressor and addressee, it functions likewise outside the
intentionality of the sender/addressor and the response of
the receiver/addressee. The possibility that writing can
continue to act under these conditions of absence is,
according to Derrida:
Possibility de prelevement et de greffe
citationnelle qui appartient a la structure de
toute marque, parlee ou ecrite, et qui constitue
toute marque en ecriture avant meme et en dehors
de tout horizon de communuication semiolinguistique; en ecriture, c'est-a-dire en
possibility de fonctionnement coupe, en un
certain point, de son vouloir-dire 'originel' et
de son appartenance a un contexte saturable et
contraignant. ("SEC," p. 381)
The iterability of the mark implies both repetition and
difference, or as Gasche prefers, it "subsumes the
possibility of repetition and the possibility of
alteration"

(The Tain of the Mirror, p. 212). In other
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words, what is reproduced through repetition or citation
can never be identical to itself. There will always be a
loss, or remainder. Therefore, language always says
something other than what one wishes it to say. This is
why, for Compagnon, citation takes on the connotation of a
"clin d'oeil," a sort of gaming of opening and closing not
at all unlike Freud's fort/da game of disappearance and
return (La seconde main, p. 34). Therefore, when I quote
and wink at you,

I am at once both present and absent,

meaning and not meaning what I say. According to Sartiliot,
Derrida shows "through a disseminative process, that the
text says a son insu (unwittingly, unconsciously)

-- and

especially 'a l'insu' of its author -- something other than
what it means to say"

(Citation and Modernity, p. 47) .

This is why Derrida sees citation as both
dissemination (of seeds) and theft

("vol," which also

carries with it the connotation of flight), not at all
unlike Deleuze's definition of repetition as both gift and
theft

(Repetition et difference, p. 11). In other words,

any mark is capable of rupturing with its "present" context
and becoming situated in a plurality of other (con)texts.
This point differs radically from Austin's emphasis on the
context of the performative as total and complete, which,
according to Derrida, suggests that "no residue escapes the
present totalization" and that there is no "dissemination
escaping the unity of meaning"

("SEC," p. 188). Christopher
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Norris adds that the very iterability of the mark, spoken
or written,

is evidence "that speech acts cannot be

confined to the unique self-present moment of meaning"
(.Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 110) . Indeed they
"partake of the differance, a distancing from the origin
that marks all language in so far as it exceeds and p re
exists the speaker's intention"

(ibid.).

That speech acts, as a form of generalized writing,
can escape the "self-present moment of meaning"
demonstrates that there is no totalizing context to contain
them. It might be that meaning is context-bound, as Culler
puts it, but context is itself boundless and as such is
open to alteration (On Deconstruction, p. 55). Derrida
refers to context as "non saturable." He writes:
Tout signe, linguistique ou non linguistique,
parle ou ecrit (au sens courant de cette
opposition), en petite ou en grande unite, peut
etre 'cite,' mis entre guillemets; par la il peut
rompre avec tout contexte donne, engendrer a
1'infini de nouveaux contextes, de fagon
absolument non saturable. ("SEC," p. 381)
Thus, the citationality common to all signs means that all
signs are subject to being repeated and to taking on new
meaning once grafted or cited in new contexts, and despite
any intentionality on the part of the speaker.
In his article "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply
to Derrida," which appeared in the same issue of Glyph as
did Derrida's article, Searle disputes Derrida's claims of
generalized writing and citationality.25 He insists that
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Derrida has misunderstood Austin's work by confusing the
terms parasitic discourse, citationality and iterability.
He reverses Derrida's statement concerning iterability,
writing instead that "the iterability of linguistic forms
facilitates and is a necessary condition of the particular
forms of intentionality that are characteristic of speech
acts"

{ibid., p. 208). Norris discloses the fallacy of

Searle's argument by stating that Searle "presupposes what
Derrida denies to begin with: that language is properly
adapted to communicate meaning, and -- as a corollary to
this -- that whatever obstructs communication is either
deviant or somehow beside the point"

(Deconstruction:

Theory and Practice, pp. 111-12). Searle neglects to
realize that Derrida considers all language as containing a
certain element of indeterminacy no matter whether it is in
a "serious" or "non-serious" context. As Norris explains,
"language reveals aberrations and never arrives at a stable
order of meaning"

{ibid., p. 113).

In "Limited Inc a b c...," Derrida's reply to Searle's
"Reply," Derrida cites the example of a personal shopping
list, a list destined for himself issued by himself, a list
which remains utilizable later,

"a un autre moment, en mon

absence, en 1'absence de moi-present-maintenant.1,26 He goes
on to say,

"Le recepteur et l'emetteur de la shopping list

ne sont pas le meme: meme s'ils portent le meme nom et sont
forts de l'identite du moi"

{ibid) . If this were not the
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case, if repetition did not occur with alteration, then why
would one need to bother with a personal shopping list? If
there is an alteration, a differentiation that takes place
between moments of presence then producing a list that can
be written now but function later, in a different time and
place, makes sense.
In his reply, Searle ignores what Derrida calls the
marginal or fringe cases; yet, it is the very existence or
occurrence of such cases that renders potential failures of
all performatives, of any communication, a necessary
possibility.
In "Limited Inc a b c . ..," Derrida explicates this
indeterminacy or undecidability in terms of iterability's
engendering not only repetition, but also the
transformation of that repetition as an alteration or
difference that is a function of something being repeated:
L'iterabilite altere, elle parasite et contamine
ce qu'elle identifie et permet de repeter; elle
fait qu'on veut dire (deja, toujours, aussi)
autre chose que ce qu'on veut dire, on dit autre
chose que ce qu'on dit et voudrait dire, comprend
autre chose que...etc. (Ibid., p. 33)
Since iterability alters what it enables to repeat or to be
repeated, there is always a difference between what is said
and what is meant. Here, I would like to recall Compagnon's
comparison of quotation, signalled by the quotation mark,
with the blink of an eye. It is precisely this alternance
between presence and absence, between what is said and
meant, that indicates the instability of meaning what one
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says and saying what one means. While Searle accuses
Derrida of being obsessed with what lies behind utterances,
he seems to regard intention as "something separate,
intrinsic and behind the expression" where there is no
space between the expression and intention. Searle
apparently confounds the two, considering expression, or
the "utterances" as serious literal speech.
In terms of performativity then, we must reconsider
Austin's and Searle's insistence on intention as a
determining factor in the success of any utterance. Since
performatives also adhere to certain conventions, they
repeat and re-cite those stipulations in order to be
completed and in this sense are derivative of those very
conventions.
In "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech," Judith Butler
addresses questions of the prosecution of hate speech in
terms of the performative, a category of utterances which
exceeds the singularity of its eventhood/occurrence as
event owing to the iteration always already inscribed in
every mark.27 She writes:
If a performative provisionally succeeds... then
it is not because an intention successfully
governs the action of speech, but only because
that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates
the force of authority through the repetition or
citation of a prior and authoritative set of
practices. It is not simply that the speech act
takes place within a practice, but that the act
is itself a ritualized practice. (Ibid., p. 157)
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Butler's view of the performative basically reiterates the
claims that Derrida made in "Signature Evenement Contexte"
and points to the fact that the driving force of
iterability or citationality must always remain open, must
always remain a possibility:

"Could a performative

utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a
"coded" or iterable utterance..."

(ibid.) . The answer is

obviously no. The success of a performative relates
directly to its recognition as conforming to a certain,
pre-determined convention. A wedding, for example, could
not be considered successful if it did not cite or repeat
the code for such ceremonies.
The questions of iterability and contextualization
form the crux of David Wills' forthcoming article "Lemming:
Reframing the Abyss." Wills explicates the process of
iteration or citation as that which is capable of breaching
one context only to broach, or to be called to function, in
a newly engendered context:
Once one accepts that sense "moves" in order to
function, and Derrida insists that there must be
such a break with the intactness of a selfpresence in order for there to be any meaning
whatsoever -- a play of sense rather than some
impossibly ideal immediate and permanent
transparency of meaning -- then limiting the
extent of that "movement" or spacing becomes an
insoluble problem or question. From this point of
view language and meaning take place as a form of
rupture; they occur over an abyss .28
Once citationality comes into play, it enables the
generation of a plurality of new contexts, actualized
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through the dissemination or grafting of the mark. While
the possibility of such an operation must be a given,
according to Derrida, the effects of citationality remain
to be explored. First, the creation of new contexts stems
from Derrida's insistence that there is no "hors-texte;"
there are only contexts. Because context begets context
interminably, citationality produces an abyssal structure.
In other words, the incessant emergence of new contexts in
which one finds the iterated mark -- the repeated and
altered mark -- places that mark en abime.
This process of mise-en-abime serves to reinforce the
rupture with the originary mark, or rather its deferral,
therefore rendering access to it impossible and perpetually
displaced.
Geoffrey Bennington writes:
No natural necessity prevents any statement from
being lifted from "its" context and grafted into
another. Once more, it is writing which best
illustrates this general property of language:
writing is by definition destined to be read in a
context different from that of the act of its
inscription (Jacques Derrida, p. 85-86).
Citationality therefore emerges from the graphematization
of all signs, all language. It allows speech to be
discussed in the same ways as writing and holds speech
subject to the same problems and questions that have been
commonly attributed to writing. While allowing a
reformulation of what elements constitute speech and
writing, that is, what is "proper" to each, citationality
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also produces effects that call into question borders and
frames, private and public, authority and property and
origin and repetition.
What happens then to traditionally oral modes of
communication when they are indeed shown to be subject to
the same problems/questions facing writing, in the
conventional sense? What happens when these modes function
in narrative,

in writing? How does this problematize

narrative? What does this mean in terms of the performative
when these categories of orality subscribe to juridical
conventions? How are borders and frames affected, indeed
exceeded and ruptured as the result of citationality? These
are but a few of the questions to which the following
chapters will attempt to respond.
It is precisely this citationality or iterability and
its effects that I wish to study in the works by Marguerite
Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida. What I see as
the different functions of citationality manifest
themselves in the various texts I have selected for this
proj e c t .
I call such functions "hearsay," "testimony" and
"conference" where an insistence on the juridical aspects
of these terms allows a questioning of presence, property
and authority and as such introduces a problematic, as
previously discussed,

inherent in all signs: that is, their

possibility of being repeated, disseminated and therefore
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of coming to function in a variety of contexts escaping
attempts to control or regulate their appearance and use in
these new contexts. This slippage between contexts and the
resultant inability to affix a stable order of meaning
merits textual analysis, and has been conspicuously absent
from otherwise productive work on Duras, Blanchot and
Derrida.
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CHAPTER TWO
HEARSAY: MARGUERITE DURAS' LOL V. STEIN CYCLE
Introduction
Marguerite Duras' 1964 novel, Le Ravissement de Lol V.
Stein, marked a departure from her previous works and a
move toward a more experimental type of writing. Through
effects of citationality which prevent an absolute closure
of the narrative, Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein in turn
generated a multiplicity of texts, including novels,
screenplays and films, known collectively as the Lol V.
Stein cycle.
Most of the critical work dedicated to this phase of
Duras' writing focuses on Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein.
Psychoanalysts and feminists in particular have devoted
much attention to the character of Lol V. Stein and to the
ball scene at T. Beach, especially addressing questions of
memory and oblivion as well as feminine writing and
desire.1 Certainly, the importance of these contributions
to studies of Duras' work cannot be underscored.
Yet, what I see at work in certain phases of Duras'
writing,

in particular the Lol V. Stein cycle, which

includes the texts of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Le
Vice-Consul, L'amour, India Song and Son nom de Venise dans
Calcutta desert are citational practices which undermine
the classical economy of textual production to such an
extent that the narratives resist closure and remain for
50
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the most part simply a series of attempts at narrative.
Such citational practices operate at both the intertextual
and intratextual levels in the Lol cycle.2
At the intratextual level, that is, within each of
these texts themselves, the use of hearsay as a (oral)
function of citationality serves to underscore the lack of
textual stability, as the narrators are dependent upon it
in order to attempt their narratives.
Further destabilization and disruption occurs among
the above-mentioned texts where we find a citation and re
citation of narrative aspects of the other texts. The texts
of the Lol cycle cite each other. Therefore, the narratives
consist of an attempted re-writing, re-constitution of
various facets of Lol's own story. The narratives feed off
each other, appropriating and thus repeating, yet always
with a difference, certain textual threads of the other
texts. Citationality among the texts destabilizes the
entire cycle by preventing closure from text to text and
allowing the generation of a plurality of texts.
While I will certainly discuss textual elements such
as characters, places and events which are disseminated and
cited within and among these texts, I will also show that
what is at stake in this cycle is the progressive
radicalization of the function of hearsay marked by the
"mot-trou," or "word-hole," as first mentioned in the
seminal narrative of the cycle, Le Ravissement de Lol V.
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Stein. This impossible word or "would-be word" functions as
the mark of the origin, which necessarily remains
inaccessible. It is my contention, therefore, that since
access to the origin is severed, the narratives of the
cycle exhibit a strong reliance on hearsay in a futile
attempt to recuperate this lost originary event. These
repeated efforts manifested in the citational practices of
hearsay generate the production of numerous narratives
while rendering absolute narrative closure impossible.
In Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, for example, the
hearsay upon which the text is built focuses on the effort
to recuperate the lost scene of Lol's ravishing, or
abandonment, at the T. Beach ball years earlier. The trace
of this ball is carried in the "mot-trou" and subsequently
becomes articulated through the "cri," or scream. As
discussed in the previous chapter, any sign, linguistic or
not, is subject to the condition of a potential iterability
and, by extension, to citational modes such as hearsay.
Yet, the scream is an utterance that is neither within
speech nor exterior to it. Therefore, the scream can be
viewed as treading the borderline of speech itself,
threatening to collapse into the abyss of the "mot-trou."
What I will show is that it is indeed in the
subsequent texts of the cycle that the scream is put into
circulation through an insistence on hearsay and that this
hearsay becomes increasingly focused on the scream. In Le
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Vice-Consul, for example, the "mot-trou" is found in the
scream of both the Vice-Consul and the beggar woman, who
are two characters figured as impossible owing to the
inability of naming the unnameable of their stories. In
other words, the inability to achieve access to what has
rendered them impossible in the text results in the
marginalization of these two characters by the European
community. The impossibility of accessing their stories
leaves them incapable of uttering anything other than a
scream. This

(in)articulation of the "word-hole" remains in

circulation throughout the cycle and progressively consumes
what is being heard and said.
Proceeding to L'amour, we will see how the use of
hearsay in the cycle becomes indeed increasingly
disjunctive.

In this telegraphic-style text that

incessantly cites and re-cites itself, the "cri de S.
Thala" resonates most clearly and frequently.
Hearsay becomes further radicalized in the film-text
India Song through the discontinuity between the visual and
auditory fields of the film. I see hearsay in this text as
condensing further into the re-citation of the "mot-trou, "
or scream, since the citation of other textual elements,
such as places and characters, appears to be increasingly
filtered out of circulation.
This condensation of hearsay culminates in Son nom de
Venise dans Calcutta dSsert, a film that discloses the
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irrecuperable disjunction between the visual and auditory
domains through its citation of India Song's soundtrack and
its characterless shots of the embassy in ruins. With this
final text in the Lol cycle, hearsay has moved from the
heard and said to simply the heard. Since all other textual
elements of the cycle are apparently portrayed as dead or
"deserted," all that remains to circulate is the scream as
the (in)articulation of the "mot-trou." As stated earlier,
a scream is on the threshold of speech; it is an utterance
that, in these instances, is difficult to determine.
Therefore, what Son now involves is the point at which
everything is still heard, since all is carried within the
scream of the word-hole, but nothing is said any more.
It is within this framework that I will first explore
each of these texts individually before moving to the cycle
as a whole, where I will examine the process and
implications of hearsay from a larger intertextual
perspective. However, before delving into an analysis of
the Lol V. Stein cycle of texts,

I intend to first discuss

how hearsay and its modes operate as a function of
citationality.
Hearsay
Derived from the verbs "to hear" and "to say," hearsay
commonly denotes the repetition of what another has already
said.

In its legal definition, hearsay is "information

relayed from another person to the witness before it
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reaches the ears of the court or jury. "3 Contrary to
testimony, where the (twice present) witness offers first
hand knowledge obtained through the observation of or
participation in the event, hearsay suggests the possession
of second-hand information by the witness and hearsay
evidence therefore consists of extra-judicial statements
made by the witness or another. Due to its unreliable and
often incompetent character,

hearsay evidence is generally

inadmissible in court.
Hearsay is a term I choose to use in my discussion of
Duras owing to what it evokes between writing and speech as
well as property and authority with regard to Derrida's
notion of citationality. Often used interchangeably with
rumor and gossip, hearsay actually denotes a more general,
traditionally oral mode of communication and information
dissemination. In order to dispel the commonly held belief
that two of hearsay's modes, gossip and rumor, are
synonymous,

I will briefly differentiate them from one

another.
Gossip appears dependent on a pre-established social
network for the dissemination of typically personal
information regarding a member of the social group. It is
therefore spread in a highly selective manner within a
fixed social network.
The word gossip is derived from "god-related" and was
used to designate godparents. Eventually the meaning of
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gossip expanded to include any close friend. In the 18th
century Samuel Johnson offered another definition of gossip
which linked the word to women for the first time: "one who
runs about tattling like women at a lying-in."4 It was only
at the beginning of the 19th century that gossip came to
signify a type of conversation and not a person: "idle
talk, trifling or groundless rumor; tittle-tattle"

(CED).

The current definition of gossip as given by Patricia Meyer
Spacks is "chat or light writing" or "idle talk about
someone not present"

(Gossip, p. 14).

Whereas gossip has traditionally been attributed to
women, Duras, in the Lol cycle, employs male narrators in
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein and Le Vice-Consul who rely
on gossip in order to attempt the narrative. Such a
technique itself raises interesting questions related to
gender and gossip. Indeed, I view this as an oppositional
maneuver on Duras' part that destabilizes traditionally
held assumptions of women as purveyors of gossip.
Sociological studies have in recent years examined the
process and the implications of gossip in social groups as
compared with rumor, which will be addressed below. Studies
in general have found that gossip holds relevance only for
a specific group and as stated above is disseminated
selectively only through friends and acquaintances and
remains limited to them. According to one researcher, the
law of gossiping, of hearing and subsequently repeating
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information, is "a privilege extended only to those who
mutually recognize themselves as members" of the group.5 It
represents, in other words, an excellent case of "clique
phenomenon"

(ibid.).

In her book entitled Gossip, Spacks distinguishes two
modes of gossip, distilled malice and serious gossip. The
former plays with truths and falsehoods and serves the
speaker who seeks some sort of political or social gain at
the expense of others by playing with their reputations.
Serious gossip, on the other hand, serves to solidify a
group's sense of self, by distinguishing insiders from
outsiders. As a function of intimacy, serious gossip is
talk about others in order to reflect on oneself

(Gossip,

p. 19) .
Considered "intellectual chewing gum," gossip usually
denotes simple idle talk, as both Heidegger and Kierkegaard
suggest. According to Spacks, their definition of gossip is
the desire to say something without having to think too
much (ibid.). Yet there is a danger lurking in the
definition of gossip as "idle talk," presumably harmless,
for its potential destructiveness is concealed.

It does not

announce its intention. This contributes to the suspicion
that gossip is subversive, particularly in terms of the
question of public versus private discourse. It appears
that gossip blurs the boundary between the two, giving rise
to an anxiety over where gossip goes and how far-reaching
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its effects are. For even the most private of
communications can create an impact of "incalculable scope"
(Gossip, p . 23).
Sociological researchers, such as Jorg Bergmann, have
found that gossipers themselves are "border-runners" who
delight in excursions into the improper. Fully aware of the
boundaries, gossip producers disdain the borders between
public and private, decent and indecent, truth and lies
(Discreet Indiscretions, p. 118) .
Interestingly enough, gossipers often resort to the
use of citations as a means of presenting a "true event"
(ibid.). At the same time, citation provides the
opportunity for a fictionalization since it is a mode of
reconstruction. In other words, an event is not copied in
quotations in the form of a document, but instead it is re
written.

Its subjects, as Bergmann points out, are not

imitated, but imitatively stylized, as evidence in the Lol
V. Stein cycle suggests, where events are not replicated in
the narratives, but reconstructed.
Citations, commonly used in gossip, allow the
possibility of exaggeration of what is disseminated. The
gossip producer's presentations cannot be verified by the
recipients and are as a consequence difficult to doubt.
This is especially true when the gossiper indicates through
quotations that s/he possesses first-hand information. With
such speakers, who possess privileged information, however,
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minor deviations from the truth seem harmless, as they are
undetectable by the receiver. Gossipers accentuate the
extraordinary in order to prove or justify the worthiness
of their communication, which enables a dramatization of
the original event. Exaggeration can also express a
heightened experience of an extreme situation for which
there is no adequate possibility of communication.
Quotations therefore constitute a structural basis for
exaggeration while at the same time functioning as a means
of authentication of the disseminated information. In
summary, gossip "raises questions about boundaries,
authority and the nature of knowledge" and has "subversive
implications" for operations of knowledge

(Gossip, p. 12) .

Although the Random House Dictionary offers rumor as a
synonym for gossip, rumor is distinguishable in that it
suggests a more easily disseminated piece of information.
Since it is spread in an unspecific way, its origin is
lost. Rumor is information that is neither substantiated
nor refuted, and it is spread when there is a strong desire
for meaning or a quest for clarification and closure. Like
gossip, rumor usually has a pejorative connotation as it is
often associated with scandal and mischief. Some social
scientists, though, view the purpose and function of rumor
more positively (Discreet Indiscretions, p. 27). For them
rumor is not pathological, but essential to the social
process of group problem solving, since it reflects a
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normal desire for meaning in events. The propensity for
rumor is established when events are important and the news
concerning them is ambiguous or lacking.
To briefly summarize, rumor can generally be defined
as a piece of unverified information, which suggests a
process of widespread oral dissemination occurring in a
rapid and unspecific manner. The quick and easy dispersion
of the information results in the nearly always guaranteed
loss of its source of origin. Gossip, on the other hand,
appears to be dependent on a pre-established social network
for the dissemination of typically personal information
regarding a member of the social group. It is therefore
spread in a highly selective manner within a fixed social
network, yet still involves the loss of the information's
origin. These two modes of unauthenticated second-hand
information dissemination are to be considered as different
functions of hearsay, as hearsay refers to a more general
dissemination of second-hand information. In addition to
denoting simply the general circulation of second-hand
information, the use of the term hearsay,

furthermore,

allows a discussion of property and authority since it
carries with it juridical connotations.
Based on the above definition of hearsay and the fact
that courts generally prohibit the introduction of hearsay
evidence due to its unreliable nature and the lack of
competence associated with it, we can now examine how this
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translates into hearsay's role in narrative. In Gossip,
Spacks contends that gossip

(and likewise, hearsay)

is

indeed a very useful narrative technique serving to impel
plots. While on a certain level the transmission of
information concerning a text's characters provides the
reader with the background necessary to arrive at an
understanding of characters' motives and actions,

I contend

that the punctuation of a narrative by gossip or hearsay is
potentially more disruptive than useful, as evidence found
through an analysis of Duras' texts seems to suggest. As
Ross Chambers articulates in his work on gossip's role in
the novel,

its disruptiveness stems from the destabilizing

effect it has on the authority of the narrative, thereby
rendering the narrator unreliable and decentering,
fragmenting even, the formerly stable, omnipotent authorial
voice.6 In Room for Maneuver, Chambers states that gossip's
status as unreliable is "structural" and not "accidental"
since once "'truth' has become inaccessible, all
information without exception becomes misinformation, there
being no guaranteed criterion against which to measure its
veracity and/or accuracy."7 This inaccessible truth (of
Lol's ravishing, of the beggar woman's story, of the ViceConsul's unspeakable incident at Lahore)

is in fact what

appears to propagate the hearsay responsible for the Lol V.
Stein cycle. With this in mind, we can explore hearsay's
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impact within and among the texts of the cycle, beginnning
with an analysis of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein.
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein
The first example from the Lol cycle I wish to examine
is Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, the generative text of
the cycle. Composed almost exclusively of hearsay, this
text involves an attempted re-writing of Lol V. Stein's
story by the narrator, Jacques Hold, a 36-year old doctor
newly arrived in S . Tahla to work in the hospital. Hold has
an affair with Tatiana Karl, the wife of Hold's colleague
Pierre Beugner. As it turns out, Tatiana is the childhood
friend of Lol. Introduced to Lol by Tatiana, Jacques Hold
subsequently becomes obssessed with her and driven to re
construct her story after hearing how her fiance Michael
Richardson abandoned her at the Casino ball, by leaving
with the mysterious Anne-Marie Stretter. The locus of Lol's
ravishing is therefore this ball scene which terminates
with Lol's scream as she leaves the casino ballroom.
Having occurred a decade before the actual beginning
of the novel, this event around which the whole of the text
centers is lost and the novel immediately sinks into an
attempt at the recuperation of this lost event, which
Jacques Hold tries to accomplish by means of questioning
and probing various sources of information on Lol, her
childhood and the ball itself. As Leslie Hill states:
What the novel dramatises is a crisis in
knowledge; it is continually citing, juxtaposing
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and thereby questioning a range of different
discourses of interpretation as represented by
each one of the characters in the novel - all of
which claim some purchase in the story of Lol,
but none of which are finally validated or proven
to be adequate by the writing of the text."8
The narrator's account of obtaining information from other
sources in order to reconstitute the ball scene v/here Lol's
ravishing took place ultimately culminates in the re
enactment of it, when Hold accompanies Lol to T. Beach. It
is as if the story attempts to repeat the event it is
trying to tell, collapsing eventually and inevitably into
the citation of citations of a lost event.
"Difficile a capter" and "etrangement incomplete," Lol
V. Stein is herself figured as a sort of presence-absence,
neither here nor there, but rather quite fragmentary in
nature. Numerous critics have found evidence of this in
Lol's name itself. Perhaps the most notable of these is
Jacques Lacan for whom the "V" in Lol's name represents
both wings and scissors which cut her into pieces.9
Further evidence of Lol's fluid, mobile and fragmentary
character exists, for example, in the names she is called
throughout Le Ravissement, and indeed in its citations of
that text in subsequent texts of the cycle, which reinforce
the fact that Lol is not a fixed character at all. She is
called everything from Lola Valerie Stein to Lol V. Stein
to Lol and, by the time, of L'amour, simply "la femme." At
any one time in the text she appears as only a fragment of
the whole, a partially present, partially absent figure,
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never complete or anchored.

"Lol est en cendres"

(p. 49)

gives one indication of how her character is portrayed in
the text. In general, descriptions of her in Le Ravissement
focus on the negative and at one point in the text, Hold
announces,

"Elle n'est personne"

(p. 47) thereby utterly

negating her.
Tatiana sheds light on Lol's childhood when she
explains to the narrator,

"Au college, dit-elle, et elle

n'etait pas la seule a le penser, il manquait deja quelque
chose a Lol pour etre - elle dit la"

(p. 12). As Hold

continues his investigation of Lol's childhood, he provides
another account of Lol, as relayed to him by Tatiana:
Une part d'elle-meme eut ete toujours en allee
loin de vous et de 1'instant. Ou? Dans le reve
adolescent? Non, repond Tatiana, non, on aurait
dit dans rien encore, justement rien.
Tatiana aurait tendance a croire que c'etait
peut-etre en effet le coeur de Lol V. Stein qui
n'etait pas - elle dit: la... (p. 13)
This passage reveals the fragmentary nature of Lol - not
only is she not really "la," but it is even impossible to
pinpoint exactly what about her is lacking, as Tatiana can
only hypothesize that it is possibly "le coeur."
Later in the text, Hold comments,
1'absence,

"Je reconnais

son absence d'hier, elle me manque a tout

moment, deja"

(p. 136). Hold finds himself already

subjected to the oddly, partially absent Lol: "L'approche
de Lol n'existe pas. On ne peut pas se rapprocher ou
s'eloigner d'elle"

(p. 105) . Lol's effect on Hold becomes
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more evident as he explains,

"...il manquait quelquechose a

Lol, deja elle etait etrangement incomplete..."

(p. 80).

Hold states:
Je sais: je ne sais rien.
Ne rien savoir de Lol etait la connaitre deja. On
pouvait, me parut-il, en savoir moins encore, de
moins en moins sur Lol V. Stein, (p. 81)
Instead of drawing nearer and nearer to Lol, Hold now finds
himself in the peculiar position of not being able to draw
closer to her, but of experiencing a sort of recoil by her.
In other words, the closer he gets to her, the further away
she goes, leaving Hold with less and less knowledge of her.
This effect of Lol's is painful for Hold, as he is so
driven to write her story. Yet, this story remains an
impossibility, given Lol's present-absent nature and her
constant fragmentariness. Hold is, therfore, prevented from
accomplishing of her story.
What I consider to be a physical citation of Lol's and
the story's impossibility arises on the actual pages of the
novel. The disruption of the printed text by lacunae of
plain white space seems to be a manifestation of what is
taking place within the printed text and serves as yet
another means of destabilizing the narrative, by impeding
continuity.10
Faced with the impossibility of knowing Lol, who is
neither complete nor fixed, Hold's narrative is therefore
already on shaky ground. This lack of narrative stability
is most evident in Hold's narration itself and its reliance
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on hearsay. The first part of the text is comprised of
first-person narration without any indication at all
concerning to whom the "je" of the narrator refers. There
is however a sudden shift to third-person narration, as the
narrator describes Lol following and being followed by an
unnamed man on the street. At this juncture in the text the
narrator names himself as Jacques Hold and only then does
it become clear that the "je" and the "il" are one and the
same. The slippage from first- to third-person and back
undermines the integrity of the narrator and calls into
question the authority he maintains over his narrative.
Although one would tend to expect the destabilizing
effects of the shifts in narrative voice to diminish
subsequent to the revelation of the narrator as Jacques
Hold, one senses more acutely that Hold, obviously
overwhelmed by Lol and his feelings for her, actually has
no "hold" whatsoever over the narrative. In fact, the
slippage from "je" to "il" provides evidence of the little
control he actually retains over his attempt at narrative.
In Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Jacques Hold's
authority over Lol and the text becomes further
questionable and undermined as it is revealed that he bases
much of what he feigns to know of Lol on unauthenticated
second-hand information obtained from friends and
acquaintances of Lol. The narrative's insistence on
citationality calls into question the authority of that
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very narrative by casting Hold as unreliable and the text
overall as destabilized. Jacques Hold's impossible attempt
at and desire for a re-writing or a re-construction of
Lol's story for himself is indicated at the novel's onset,
where Hold states, "je raconterai mon histoire de Lol V.
Stein"

(p. 14). Hold proceeds to piece together "his

narrative" with fragments of various aspects of Lol's life
and story that he acquires from Tatiana, Lol's mother, Jean
Bedford and Pierre Beugner,

in addition to various other

anonymous sources.
Here, I would like to recall the process of hearsay as
was previously discussed, whereby the speaker often relies
on quotation in an attempt to lend authentication to
his/her information/story. Since the one who allegedly
relayed the information to the speaker is not present,
there is no means of verification of what is passed on. The
tendency of the interlocutor is to accept the information
rather than doubt it since the use of quotation lends an
air of authority to the speaker. Therefore, when Hold
states that "Tatiana dit que" and "Tatiana dit encore que,"
Hold expects the interlocutor to accept what he relates as
true because he is the one in possession of privileged
information about Lol.
Yet, the very fact that he relies on hearsay in order
to write his story renders him immediately suspect as a
narrator. Since verbal citation enables a fictionalization
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of what is being said, strictly because it is impossible to
verify and because it demands a suspension of disbelief,
trust as to the accuracy of the reported information is
weak. As far as accuracy is concerned, one must remember
that hearsay, coupled with the use of quotation, amounts to
a reconstruction of an event, meaning that the event is not
merely copied or replicated but entirely re-written, as
Hold attempts to do.
If Hold feigns authority by presenting his information
as authenticated due to his use of quotations he attributes
to others, he begins to call his authority into question as
a narrator by moving from "Tatiana dit que" to phrases such
as "Tatiana avait tendance a croire que c'etait peutetre..." (p. 13). This raises two possibilities. First, it
provides an indication of the pressure Hold could be
applying on Tatiana to give as much story as possible to
him, in which case she is in the position of resorting to
conjecture in order to fulfill Hold's desire. This assumes
however that Hold relates verbatim what Tatiana tells him,
without fictionalization or exaggeration on his part.
Second,

it is rather more probable that Hold himself begins

to resort to fictionalization or exaggeration of Tatiana's
alleged account of Lol since he in fact reveals his
distrust for the information supplied him by Tatiana:
ne crois plus a rien de ce que dit Tatiana,
convaincu de rien"

je ne suis

(p. 14). Once he himself begins to
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question the hearsay he receives from his sources, one can
hardly avoid questioning his reliability as narrator.
Since his sources can provide only fragmentary
information concerning Lol, about whom information can be
only fragmentary at best, Hold supplements this with his
own first-hand observations. Yet, this still fails to
complete Lol's story. The narrator's reliance on
unauthenticated second-hand information reveals the lack of
a unified, stable narration.
The narrator's effort at narrative thus turns out to
be based on hearsay, that is unverified information he
obtains second-hand, which automatically renders it
suspect, and on sheer speculation and conjecture on his
part. It becomes apparent in fact that the text is nothing
more than the citation and re-citaion of hearsay concerning
various aspects of L o l . The absence of the traditional
quotation marks, which would attribute specific pieces of
information to the rightful sources, serves to destabilize
further the authority of the narrative, as it becomes
impossible to distinguish the hearsay from the narrator's
first-hand observation and then from his apparent
inventions of what possibly happened to Lol.
In fact, desire for "mon histoire de Lol V. Stein,"
for access to the locus of her ravishing, accentuated by
Hold's increasing distrust for what Tatiana Karl tells him
and the ultimate failure on Tatiana's part to ever fill in
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Che gaps of Lol's story for Hold, forces Hold to resort to
utter invention in a desperate attempt to recuperate her
story. As Ross Chambers states, when information is
unavailable, as is the case in this text:
People interpret signs as best they may...They
thus invent for themselves an alternative
knowledge to substitute for the information that
is unavailable. (Room for Maneuver, p. 206)
This is quite often the case involving hearsay, when the
desire for knowledge about a certain subject is very strong
and the access to complete information from various sources
is impossible. The tendency .exists to plug in pieces of
information, either through exaggeration or distortion of
the information at hand or through the invention of other
information to substitute for what is lacking. Obviously,
in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, much indeed is lacking,
due to Lol's nature and to the general function of hearsay
as well. Having established early in the text his distrust
for what Tatiana tells him, Hold moves toward the
inevitable invention of various fragments of Lol's story.
The text subsequently becomes punctuated by Hold's
interjections

which directly precede his "writing" of the

story. The following examples are but a sampling of
expressions replete within the text,
ceci..."

"J'aime a croire

(p. 48) followed several pages later by

"J'invente, je vois" p. 56) and then "Je ne sais plus...je
crois voir ce qu'a du voir Lol V. Stein"

(p. 59). The

speculation and uncertainty of these expressions again
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offer evidence of Hold's unreliable status. One of the most
telling moments is found on page 121 when Hold recounts his
observation of Lol through a window. Right at the end of
the passage Hold announces,

"Je mens. Je n'ai pas bouge de

la fenetre."
Lol's figuration as a sort of presence-absence
"difficile a capter" and "etrangement incomplete" forces
Hold to confront the impossibility of ever achieving the
story and grasping,

"holding" both Lol and the narrative.

The impossibility of saying what is impossible to be said
resonates like the "mot-trou" and threatens the text with
the collapse of any and all narrative stability and
authority. This is obviously set in motion by Hold's
reliance on hearsay for the re-constitution of Lol's story,
and once he realizes the inevitable failure of hearsay to
accomplish his project, he resorts to invention in an
impossible attempt to fill the lacunae. Rather than provide
him with all the missing links and pieces of Lol's life,
the hearsay and conjectures fail miserably and eliminate
any remaining shred of narrative authority by casting Hold
as utterly unreliable.
Le Vice-Consul
The propagation of hearsay in response to the scene of
Lol's ravishing in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein functions
like the "mot-trou" where the event or word itself is
inaccessible yet its reverberations are incessantly
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produced.

The failure of the novel to gain access to the

originary event results therefore in the dissemination of
certain textual elements throughout the subsequent texts of
the Lol cycle.
In Le Vice-Consul the word-hole resonates in the "cri"
or scream of two of its characters and re-cites the "cri"
uttered by Lol at the end of the ball. The reliance on
hearsay in Le Vice-Consul produces a problematization of
textual borders. It is in effect a story set within a
story. In fact, this text is the attempted narrative of the
mysterious Vice-Consul of Lahore intertwined nearly
seamlessly with Peter Morgan's attempted writing of the
story of the "mendiante," a bald-headed beggar woman
roaming the streets of Calcutta with the lepers. The story
of the "mendiante" parallels in some respects that of the
Vice-Consul, as they are both figured by Duras as
impossible, as marginalized from the same society and as
two characters for whom a lack of information exists,
provoking the desire for knowledge of their stories among
the members of the European circle.
The demarcation between the beggar woman's story,
narrated by Peter Morgan, and the story within which it is
framed, and within which Peter Morgan and the beggar woman
are placed, is not always distinct. In other words, the
beggar woman who is a character in Morgan's story is not
confined to the pages of his story but re-surfaces in the
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framing story of the Europeans, a story in which Morgan is
himself a character. What happens in this text is the
observation of and limited interaction with the beggar
woman by the Europeans as recounted in the main story. For
example, reference is made to Anne-Marie Stretter giving
instructions to leave left-overs for the beggar woman and
others. In addition, Morgan often discusses this woman with
other Europeans to

obtain ideas about her life for the

story he is writing. But, as Sharon Willis

states, the

writing of the story and the observation of the beggar
woman on the streets are not always two distinct
occurrences in the

text (Marguerite Duras:

Writing on the

Body, p. 103). The

seam between the two in

fact is mostly

obscured and the text switches from what could constitute
the Europeans' observation of the beggar woman to what
could be considered Peter Morgan's account of her life. The
lack of definitive borders between the two tales produces a
contamination between them, as Mieke Bal writes:
On ne sait plus lequel de ces deux recits est
1'hypo-recit...La structure narrative, si nette,
si rassurante au debut signifie sa propre
impossibility... La destruction, comme la lepre,
est contagieuse: les deux recits s'infectent l'un
1' autre.11
Much as Jacques Hold attempts to write Lol's story by
piecing together his observations with second-hand
information, Morgan also relies on conjecture and on
information on the beggar woman supplied to him by others,
including Anne-Marie Stretter:
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La vente d'une enfant a ete racontee a Peter
Morgan par Anne-Marie Stretter. Anne-Marie
Stretter a assiste a cette vente, il y a dix-sept
ans, vers Savannakhet, Laos. La mendiante,
toujours d'apres Anne-Marie Stretter, doit parler
la langue de Savannakhet. Les dates ne coincident
pas. La mendiante est trop jeune pour etre celle
qu'a vue Anne-Marie Stretter. Cependant Peter
Morgan a fait du recit d'Anne-Marie Stretter un
episode de la vie de la mendiante. (pp. 72-73).
The preceding passage demonstrates how the beggar woman's
story is being (re-)constructed in the text through Peter
Morgan's reliance on second-hand information, or hearsay
provided by his friends. Morgan in fact appropriates and
re-cites that which is told to him in order to complete his
story, thereby subjecting his narrative to the same
uncertainty as was found in Le Ravissement.
Figured as an impossibility,

"enfermee dans le mot

Battambang" which is her "maison fermee," the beggar woman
protects herself with the word "Battambang" and as such is
constructed as lost and cut off from her past, her only
memory being "Battambang":

"Battambang la protegera"

(p.

65). Her impossible nature is disclosed in examples such as
"Un rien 1'amuse"
inutiles"

(p. 81) and "Elle fait des discours

(ibid.) which negate any access one might have to

her. Later, we read,

"A Battambang, il y avait une ecole. Y

en avait-il une a Battambang? Elle a oublie." Although it
is not clear at this point if this belongs to Peter
Morgan's story or not, he apparently decides that the
beggar woman retains no memory of her experiences because
the text states,

"Peter Morgan voudrait maintenant
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substituer a la memoire abolie de la mendiante le bric-abrac de la sierrne." (p. 73). The very "bric-a-brac" of
Peter Morgan's memory is constructed as such owing to all
the unverified information and speculation on the beggar
woman's life that he has obtained.

"Peter fait un livre a

partir de ce chant de Savannakhet?" Peter replies,
prends des notes imaginaires
ne peut plus lui arriver. . .11

"Je

sur cette femme" because "rien
(p. 157) .

Described by Anne-Marie Stretter during the ball as
"un homme mort"

(p. 128), the Vice-Consul himself is

figured as impossible, which is the word repeated most
often whenever he is mentioned in the text. His face, for
example, is described as "impossible encore"
is considered "quelqu'un d'impossible"

(p. 78) and he

(p. 104) before

being told by Charles Rossett

at the end of the ball, "Vous

etes impossible, decidement"

(p. 146) . He is rendered as

such by what occurred at Lahore before his arrival in
Calcutta as a letter in his dossier indicates,

"Je me borne

ici a constater 1'impossibility ou je suis de rendre compte
de fagon comprehensible de ce qui s'est passe a Lahore."
(p. 39). When his aunt is questioned about his childhood,
all she is able to offer is, "presque rien" for the dossier
(p. 46). Reference to the contents of the dossier surface
several times in the text, with Michael Richard at one
point stating,

"Il y a dans le dossier le mot impossible"

(p. 159).
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The impossibility of the Vice-Consul is again
indicated at the end of the ball when Peter Morgan replies
to his pleas to remain with them, "Ce n'est pas possible,
dit Peter Morgan, excusez-nous, le personnage que vous etes
ne nous interesse que lorsque vous etes absent"

(p. 147).

Curiosity over the Vice-Consul and the lack of
knowledge about what exactly happened to him at Lahore
causes much speculation and conjecture about him, in very
much the same way as happens in the case of the beggar
woman. Hearsay concerning him spreads rapidly throughout
the European group in Calcutta, neatly placing the ViceConsul into circulation,

"Le Vice-Consul fait des

confidences au directeur du Cercle, dit Charles Rossett, et
il ne doit pas ignorer que presque tout est repete."

(p.

42). Yet oddly enough, the Vice-Consul seems oblivious to
what happens to his words after speaking with the director.
Thirst for knowledge about the Vice-Consul is further
demonstrated in the following,

"Le directeur du Cercle est

souvent questionne sur ce qui lui raconte Le Vice-Consul. A
Calcutta on veut savoir." (p. 75). Desire for information
on Lahore coupled with the lack of available information
prompts a demand for any and all information, because,
veut savoir." Yet, here, as is the case with Le
Ravissement, there are indications that information
concerning the Vice-Consul will remain sketchy or
fragmentary at best.
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Charles Rossett speaks to the Vice-Consul at the ball
and broaches the subject of Lahore and the dossier, in
which the Vice-Consul is described as "quelqu'un
d'impossible" followed by the words "le pire, c'est Lahore"
(p. 104) . Rossett continues trying to discuss Lahore with
the Vice-Consul, by stating "Je m'excuse de vous dire qa,
mais on ne peut pas comprendre Lahore"

(p. 104-5).

Anne-Marie Stretter subsequently dances with the ViceConsul, during which time she speaks to him about Lahore,
which is yet again marked by the impossibility of saying
what is impossible to be said:
Le mot le plus juste pour dire qa...Elle ne
cherche pas le m o t . - Le mot pour le dire? C'est-a-dire que le premier mot qui parait
convenable, ici aussi, empecherait les autres de
vous venir, alors...(p. 123)
This passage again offers further evidence of hearsay
contaminating the narrative of Le Vice-Consul as the "mottrou" of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein seems to resurface.
The impossibility of finding the word to express what took
place at Lahore is also reflected in the voice of the ViceConsul , which seems strangely anomalous with the character
who speaks through it:
La voix du vice-consul, quand il parle a AnneMarie Stretter pour la premiere fois, est
distinguee, mais bizarrement privee de timbre, un
rien trop aigue comme s'il se retenait de hurler.
(pp. 123-24)
Since "le mot pour le dire" cannot issue forth from the
Vice-Consul as it does not even exist, a shout or a cry
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appears to be the only means of articulating this lack,
a peur. L'heure du vice-consul est arrive. Il crie."

"On

(p.

146). Mieke Bal views the cry of the Vice-Consul as the
only means of communication remaining open for him; it
signifies "la communication echouee, la tentative ultime et
desesperee d'echapper a l'isolement. Les cris etablissent
une communication en-dega des mots, negative, qui denonce
l'echec de communication verbale"

(Narratologie, p. 79). In

accordance with Bal, Viviane Forrester writes that the cry
takes the place of what cannot be said or proposed.12
Therefore,

it follows that the cry is the (in)articulation

of the impossible and as relates to hearsay, the cry is
heard but not said:
Parce que j 'ai 1'impression que si j 'essayais de
vous dire ce que j'aimerais arriver a vous dire,
tout s'en irait en poussiere...- il tremble -,
les mots pour vous dire, a vous, les mots...de
m o i ...pour vous dire a vous, ils n'existent pas.
Je me tromperais, j 'emploierais ceux...pour dire
autre chose...une chose arrivee a un autre...(p.
125) .
Again, the Vice-Consul attempts to verbalize Lahore for
Anne-Marie Stretter and again, he is unsuccessful,
realizing that if he were to use the only words available,
he would say something else entirely. This passage reveals
another displacement that arises out of the impossibility
of saying that which is impossible to be said. We are left
instead with the "poussiere" of the "mot-trou" which
resonates here again as "un gong vide." Yet another
discussion over what happened at Lahore is attempted at the
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ball and one overhears,
dire?"

"II a fait le pire, mais comment le

(p. 94). Indeed, how to articulate, verbalize,

the

impossible? Here again can be felt the resonance of the
"mot-trou" of Le Ravissement.
When the ball begins, the narrative suddenly becomes
punctuated by phrases such as "On dit: Vous avez vu?" or
"On dit, on demande." This change in narrative voice
disrupts the continuity of the story concerning the
Europeans, as the previously unremarkable narrative voice
suddenly allows the intrusion of what "on" sees, hears and
discusses at the ball. Such expressions as "on dit" or "on
pense" indicate the free circulation of hearsay at the
ball, where much of the attention of the evening is focused
on the Vice-Consul (here we recall that "A Calcutta, on
veut savoir"); it appears that all eyes are upon him and
that all the guests chat in clusters, discussing the ViceConsul's actions and appearance,
courant"

"tout Calcutta est au

(p. 137). Somehow the interruption of the

narrative by "on" places the reader, temporarily at least,
within the group of guests at the ball. Yet, this status is
short-lived as the "on" voice disappears and the reader
loses the privilege of obtaining other perspectives on the
evening.
To conclude, Le Vice-Consul concerns the textual
attempts to access the event(s) which rendered the beggar
woman and the Vice-Consul mad. Their difference or rather
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the impossibility of naming their unnameable stories
marginalizes them from the European community. Yet, the
narrative persists in its impossible movement toward the
originary event of both characters which in turn propagates
hearsay in order to fill in the gaps concerning them. As in
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, the reliance on hearsay
problematizes the narrative; in the case of Le Vice-Consul
the boundaries between the two stories is obscured in such
a way as to weave them together and to allow one to cite
the other.
L'amour
The following text in the cycle, L'amour, commences
some seventeen years after the ball scene of Le Ravissement
de Lol V. Stein where Lol had been abandoned by her fiance
Michael Richardson. In this novel, as in the preceding
texts of the cycle, the narrative hinges on hearsay and
marks the increasing condensation of that hearsay as the
narrative is considerably more barren in its information.
Hearsay in this case contains residual information from Le
Ravissement that is only vaguely recollected. The
characters incessantly cite and re-cite each other and seem
to have heard certain things, but they cannot quite say
them, since they lapse repeatedly into states of
forgetfulness.
The text involves three characters, two men and one
woman. One of the men is designated "le voyageur" and can
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later in the text be considered Michael Richard(son). The
other man is known simply as the madman and the woman as
"la femme." The traveler has apparently returned to this
seaside town after having abandoned his wife and children.
It appears he has come to commit suicide and speaks
incessantly of the voyage he has undertaken to arrive
there. This voyage culminates in his return to the casino
ballroom which has long since been deserted.
This text opens on the beach in S. Thala with two men
and one woman moving about:
Le triangle se ferme avec la femme aux yeux
fermes. Elle est assise contre un mur qui
delimite la plage vers sa fin, la ville. Du fait
de 1 'homme qui marche, constamment, avec une
lenteur egale, le triangle se deforme, se
reforme, sans se briser jamais, (p. 8 ) .
The triangle formed by the three on the beach reflects the
narrative(s) of the Lol cycle in that the triangle, like
the narrative, remains fluid and mobile. The lack of a
fixed or anchored form at the text's opening hints at the
fluid circulation of hearsay within the text itself.
The telegraphic style of the narrative also suggests
the repetition by transformation of numerous phrases and
textual threads. For example,

"II la regarde"

(p. 10) is

re-cited several lines later as "La femme est regardee"
10). In this way the narrative stops and starts, moves
tentatively forward then seems to regress or become
momentarily static just as the triangle on the beach "se
deforme, se reforme"

(p.

8

):
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Le pas reprend.
Irregulier, incertain, il reprend.
Il s'arrete encore.
Il reprend encore, (p. 1 1 )
The textual emphasis on the word "pas" which is repeatedly
employed throughout the narrative raises some interesting
points for discussion.

In this sense "pas" refers to the

steps of the characters,
course,

implying forward motion. Of

"pas" also forms part of the negative expression

"ne...pas" itself suspended, as Sharon Willis observes in
Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body, around the verb it
negates

{ibid., p. 122). Therefore, the narrative moves

forward while it negates itself. The characters' memories
reawaken only to be forgotten. Repeated throughout L'amour,
these steps remain spaced out, punctuating the text and
mimicking its own attempt to narrate itself.
This narrative repetition that somehow punctuates
while remaining incomplete, also surfaces in the
characters' discourse, in which one character's lines are
subsequently repeated by another character without ever
filling out the thought or statement. For example, the
woman explains to the traveler that,
jusqu'a la riviere"

"Ici, c'est S. Thala

(p. 15); yet the traveler later re

states the phrase and adds "Apres la riviere c'est encore
S. Thala"

(p. 20).

Numerous examples of such inter-textual citations
exist, with one of the most-often repeated being "Vous etes
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venu" sometimes extended to "vous etes venu pourquoi?" or
"vous etes revenu."
The individual characters cite and re-cite themselves
in addition to citing each other. Each time it seems as if
they have heard something said about what they are saying,
but the access to the source of che statement is cut off
and they seem to retain only a vague recollection of their
previous statements. Therefore, the woman announces,

"Je

suis venue vous voir pour ce voyage que vous voulez faire"
(p. 62) which is subsequently repeated as "Je suis venue
vous voir pour ce voyage"

(p. 107) and then as "Ce voyage a

S. Thala, vous savez." (p. 107).
In L'amour there is again the citation of the
impossibility of articulation found previously in Le
Ravissement and in Le Vice-Consul. The characters are
speechless at various instances in the text, trapped in the
"impossibility de repondre"

(p. 18). At one such point, the

woman, speaking about the man,

"voit

1

'effort qu'il fait

pour essayer de parler, son impuissance a y parvenir"

(p.

92). This indicates the inaccessibility of the originary
event bound up in the "mot-trou," the would-be response or
resolution.
Pages after the opening of the text the story itself
begins. Just as the triangle formed by the three characters
ultimately dissolves, so too does the story ultimately
begin again, introduced by the scream or cry that seems to
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re-cite that of Le Vice-Consul and the resonance of the
"mot-trou." This cry stirs something within the woman and
only then does the story appear to begin:
L'histoire. Elle commence. Elle a commence avant
la marche au bord de la mer, le cri, le geste, le
mouvement de la mer. Le mouvement de la lumiere.
(p. 13) .
Anterior to its explicit textual form, the story has
(always) already begun, despite its announcement several
pages into the narrative. It too, though, is punctuated, is
fragmented:

"L'histoire. Elle commence." Sharon Willis

views this passage as an "autonomous inscription" of the
story which remains "suspended, in a sentence of its own"
{Marguerite Duras: Writing On the Body, p. 122). She
elaborates:
....the story begins after the text has begun,
only to begin by telling us that it has already
begun, before. It has begun anticipating the cry
already emitted. It has, in effect, just
remembered, only to forget again, its own
beginning -- its own anteriority. {Ibid.)
This forgetting, or even obliteration of memory, by the
story itself, manifests itself in the characters as well.
Once at the casino where "il n'y a plus de bal"

(p. 127),

the traveler asks the man to recognize the woman. Yet when
he is asked her name, he answers,

"Je ne sais plus rien"

(p. 131) . The man then says a name for the traveler, who
asks,

"Voulez-vous repeter ce nom?" Yet the man appears to

have already forgotten the name he had said just moments
before, since the traveler has to prompt him, "celui que
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vous venez de dire..."

(p. 131). The man, we read,

"repete

clairement, completement, le nom qu'il vient d'inventer"
(p. 131).
The preceding example is representative of the
exchanges of recollection and forgetting taking place among
the characters. The text is in fact riddled by this
perpetual forgetting and reawakening to memory which
subsequently collapses into an obliteration of that memory
on the part of the characters. This oscillation between
memory and forgetting reveals, on another level, the
indeterminacy which emerged figuratively in the fluidity of
the triangle formed by the characters.
For Sharon Willis, L'amour is precisely as much about
this fluidity and indeterminacy as it is about a
crystallization of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. In what
she terms a story of "suspense," L'sunour is itself
suspended with Le Vice-Consul on the flanks of Le
Ravissement. Textually, everything in the narrative deals
with suspense -- the suspension of memory, of thoughts, of
looks, of sentences, of movements

(Marguerite Duras:

Writing on the Body, p. 125). Obviously, the suspension of
narrative devices indicates that the story can never be
accomplished. The indeterminacy of the narrative derives
from the impossibility of recuperating the scene of Lol's
ravishment. The fact that this event remains severed from
the characters results in the multiplication of citational
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effects -- instances of hearsay/recollection coupled with
informational void. In L'sunour is once again the impossible
attempt to articulate the impossible articulation of Lol's
ravishing that is carried in the cry which opens the text.
As Lucy Stone McNeece writes in Art and Politics in
Duras' India Cycle:
The story has no content: It is trace, resonance,
reflection, echo. It is sensation, not action;
place, not event...The story is important because
it is about the impossibility of telling a
story .13
Coinciding with the impossibility of telling the story, as
evidenced in the indeterminacy and suspension operating at
various textual levels, is the impossibility of achieving
some sort of closure. In fact the last word of the text is
"exterieure" which serves to figuratively push the
narrative in an outward direction and to maintain its
openness. Carol J. Murphy remarks on the explicit lack of
finality to L'sunour, as well as to the other texts of the
cycle:

"What is important is the shifting or glissement

between two poles

(the beginnning and the end) with the

hint of a new beginnning at the story's 'tentative' end . " 14
This is accomplished through the use of the future tense in
the last passage of the novel:
-- Pendant un instant elle sera aveuglee. Puis
elle recommencera a me voir. A distinguer le
sable de la mer, puis, la mer de la lumiere, puis
son corps de mon corps. Apres elle se separera le
froid de la nuit et elle me le donnera. Apres
seulement elle entendra le bruit vous savez...?
de Dieu?... ce true...?
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Ils se taisent. Ils surveillent la progression de
1'aurore exterieure. (p. 143)
This closing passage reveals how the text itself impedes
its own closure, which enables, in its turn, the textual
multiplication and generation already instigated by the
first text of the cycle, Le ravissement de Lol V. Stein. Of
course, this possibility of engendering other texts
develops as a result of the reliance on hearsay. As we have
seen in this text, hearsay forms the basis of the narrative
in a more radicalized way than seen in the previous texts.
India Song
While the insistence on hearsay in the other texts of
the Lol V. Stein cycle has operated as a compelling force
behind each of those narratives, the function of hearsay
moves increasingly toward a focus on the scream. In what I
call a condensation, other textual elements become less
integral to the circuit of hearsay. With the increasing
emphasis on re-citation of the scream as the
(in)articulation of the "mot-trou," hearsay becomes
progressively radicalized in the citation of what is heard;
yet, nothing is really said at the limits of speech itself.
This movement becomes especially acute in India Song
since it marks a discontinuity between the visual and
auditory fields. Although the characters of the beggar
woman and the Vice-Consul are heard screaming, they do not
produce any comprehensible utterances.
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The multi-genred text India Song, subtitled "textetheatre-film" was first published in script form in 1973.
The following year Duras directed the film version of the
text. As Carol J. Murphy points out, the doubling of India
Song -- that is, its double production as text and film -echoes and re-cites ad infini turn other aspects of the Lol
V. Stein cycle, while rearticulating much of Le Vice-Consul
(Alienation and Absence in the Novels of Marguerite Duras,
p. 79). Again, this text, as others previously discussed,
hinges on the circulation of hearsay as it weaves together
three characters: the beggar woman, who is often heard
chanting Laotian phrases, but never seen, the Vice-Consul
of Lahore and Anne-Marie Stretter.
In the film, the characters on the screen rarely
speak. Instead, as Trista Selous explains in The Other
Woman, one overhears voices questioning each other about
the general story of Le Vice-Consul, while on screen, one
sees several actors "represent, rather than portray the
protagonists in a way which is linked to the story that
unfolds, but which is obviously not meant to be an accurate
depiction of that story . " 15 Lucy Stone McNeece cautions
against making the assumption that India Song is the mere
cinematographic adaptation of Le Vice-Consul. As she
explains, it produces a "new signifying structure organized
according to different principles"

{Art and Politics in

Marguerite Duras' India Cycle, p. 122 ) . 16
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In what Michel de Certeau refers to as a writing "en
cendres , " 17 India. Song accomplishes a rupture between the
visual and the auditory, which we will find pushed to its
extreme in Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert, a film
that in its own way stands as the re-citation and
irrevocable destruction of India Song. This break in India
Song that occurs between the visual and auditory is
effected, as we shall see, through a reliance on voice
over.
The discrepancy between the voices of the soundtrack
and the images seen on the screen produces an interference
of sorts that in turn creates an air of uncertainty for the
viewer. As Trista Selous explains:
Nothing is present, the images may refer to the
story, but they do not tell it, the story itself
is a reconstruction of something in the past, the
protagonists are dead. (The Other Woman, p. 13 6 )
Selous in fact sees the disconnection between sight and
sound as an impossibility of "visual representation of
where that knowledge might be"

(ibid.).

Duras' use of voice-over, a technique conventionally
reserved for commentaries in documentary-style films by
male voices,

subverts that tradition in this film in

several ways. First, and most obviously, there is no
unified, singular voice.

Instead, there are four principal

voices, two of which are female. In addition, other voices,
echoing those of the characters encountered in Le ViceConsul, are granted audible space. These voices include the
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beggar-woman, the Vice-Consul and Anne-Marie Stretter.
Furthermore, these voices are completely disembodied. The
viewer has absolutely no idea as to the identity of these
voies.
Whereas voice-over traditionally comprises a
commentary on the visual images on screen, in India Song,
these voices actually partake in a limited commentary since
they address one another without demonstrating a full
cognitive realization that there are spectators listening
to their dialogue. Indeed, they randomly "disseminate the
elements of narrative"

(Art and Politics, p. 131) .

The first two voices are feminine and hold an
"illogique" and "anarchique" memory of their own
relationship with each other. The fragmented recollection
of their rapport is juxtaposed with fragments of other
texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle to which the viewer does
not have access. What becomes readily apparent is Voice l's
attraction for Anne-Marie Stretter while Voice 2 remains
impassioned for the first voice. Their desires are deferred
and never requited during the course of the film as neither
voice obtains access to the object for which she pines.
This slippage underscores the impossibility of the story of
Le Vice-Consul.
While the two female voices are caught in a game of
desire, the two male voices demonstrate in a different way
the effects of this slippage of memory. Voice 3 has
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apparently forgotten the chronology of the story and asks
Voice 4 questions regarding events, people and places.
Voice 4 willingly supplies the missing information.
The destabilizing effects of Duras' technique of
voice-over are evident to the viewer upon hearing the
voices in the film and seeing the disconnection between
them and the images. As Madeleine Borgomano states, these
voices:
demeurent sans aucun lien avec l'histoire qui se
deroule sous nos yeux; elles ont l'air de
decouvrir, elles aussi, de regarder en meme temps
que nous les images, et de recolter autour
d'elles des bribes de vieux souvenirs .18
This strange sensation of the voices not really commenting
on the visual aspects of the film, that is, the failure of
the voices' remarks to coincide with the images on screen,
disrupts the continuity of the film and raises more
questions, as Susan Cohen observes:
Projecting towards something they barely
remember, they create a past not their own. Its
equivocal "truth" status results from the
impossibility of verification, from faulty
memory, from the implied interchangeability in
memory of knowing and reading. Did the speakers
"know" the events as witnesses? Were they told
the story? If they read it, what did they read,
Duras' novels or something else? In contrast to
classical techniques, Duras' manipulation of
narration undermines her speakers' authority.
Filtered through the disembodied voices, these
ambiguities open the play of intertextual
reference to the earlier works .19
The "impossibility of verification" and the "play of
intertextual reference" are the result of the circulation
of what I am calling hearsay in the cycle. The fragmentary,
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incomplete information possessed by the speakers stems from
the denial of access to the full story. The voices operate
within the circuit of hearsay, thereby perpetuating its
propagation. For example,

the second speaker states,

elle il avait tout quitte. En une nuit"
replies,

"Pour

(p. 14). Voice 1

"La nuit du bal?" before apparently reading from a

text:
Michael Richardson etait fiance a une jeune fille
de S. Thala. Lola Valerie Stein. Le mariage
devait avoir lieu a l'automne.
Puis il y a eu ce bal. Ce bal de S. Thala...(p.
15)
Another example of the hearsay staged by the speakers
occurs later in reference to the Europeans' sojourn in the
Delta of the Ganges where the beggar woman appears to have
followed them. This re-citation of Le Vice-Consul reads as
follows:
Voix 3: Elle devait suivre Anne-Marie Stretter.
Voix 4: L'invite dit qu'elle l'a suivi jusqu'au
portail. Qu'elle lui fait peur. II a dit: "Le
sourire sans fin fait peur." (p. 136)
While the use of these voices, in their number and
gender, coupled with their lack of information and their
inability to comment on the visual elements of the film,
ruptures the auditory aspects, the visual field itself
undergoes a breakdown of sorts.
The extremely slow movement of the camera is yet
another example that underscores the discontinuity of
various levels of the film. Here, Duras destabilizes the
viewer's sense of temporality by having the camera pause
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for minutes at a time in one position. The opening sunset,
for example,

lasts approximately ten minutes and the camera

remains focused on it for its duration.
When the camera does pan across the visual field,

it

does so extremely slowly, lending the film the impression
of having been shot in slow-motion. This sensation of slowmotion camera movement is doubled, in effect, since the
characters' movements appear equally drawn out. For
Borgomano, the characters' heavy movements give them the
appearance of being dead and empty, again figuring them in
terms of absence and alienation as Carol J. Murphy has
commented. Borgomano explains:
Leurs mouvements ont toujours l'air de venir de
tres loin et de rencontrer, dans leur
developpement, une terrible pesanteur. Leur danse
meme participe de ce caractere somnanbulique.
Nulle part nous n'avons 1'impression de voir des
vivants; ils sont devenus des automates, aux
mouvements difficiles, aux yeux vides.
(L'ecriture filmique de Marguerite Duras, p. 117)
As if to emphasize this emptiness and deadness, the
characters remain detached and distanced from one another.
They rarely interact and for the most part appear oblivious
of others' presence. For example, during a long sequence
they lie motionless on the floor: "Les trois corps aux yeux
fermes dorment"

(p. 40).

Coupled with this disruption of the conventional sense
of temporality is the use of frames and mirrors, which
serve to separate and distance while also amplifying,
creating an effect of mise en abime. Curiously, there is a
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notable absence of windows in the salon; in this way, the
salon remains completely cut off visually and physically
from the outside. Even when the camera ventures to the
exterior of the chateau, there is still the overwhelming
sense of the absolute detachment of the exterior from the
salon.
To conclude, India Song, while on one level cognizant
of other texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle, evidenced through
the use of hearsay in its fragmentary and unsubstantiated
forms, creates a new a narrative composed of "memoires
deformantes, creatives"

(p.

10

) that upholds the resistance

to closure found in the other texts. This porosity signals
not only the impossibility of achieving full access to the
story, but also the possibility that story has of
persisting and generating other narratives in its wake.
Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert
Whereas India Song is the recalling of the memory of
the ball where Anne-Marie Stretter first encountered the
disgraced Vice-Consul of Lahore, Son nom enacts the
obliteration of that memory. Through the progression of the
Lol cycle, the use of hearsay to engender new narratives
has become increasingly radicalized. What we have just seen
in India Song with the disjunction between the visual and
auditory fields becomes irrevocably ruptured in Son nom.
This film therefore involves the citation of the scream, an
utterance traced to Le Ravissement as the "mot-trou."
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Since we established in the first chapter that any sign,
any mark, can be cited and re-cited, we have been able to
view the hearsay and citation of the scream in such a way.
With this film we will see the breakdown of hearsay itself.
The title of the film itself is a citation from the
end of the reception in India Song:
Que crie-t-il?
Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert:
Toute la nuit dans Calcutta, il a crie ce nom
(Marguerite Duras, p. 63)
The repetition of this phrase and its inscription in the
title of the film alludes to the film as both reading and
destruction, as appropriation and effacement. As Madeleine
Borgomano explains there is a paradox inherent in the title
of the film, of Calcutta as desert, as deserted:
Pour accomplir la destruction 'capitale,' il
fallait faire disparaitre cette image, il fallait
que Calcutta devienne desert, pour que son nom
puisse resonner dans le vide, avant de s'effacer
dans la nuit de l'oubli. (L'ecriture filmique de
Marguerite Duras, p. 129)
This desertification occurs through the piercing cry of the
Vice-Consul. For Lucy Stone McNeese, Son nom, rather than a
destruction of the cycle, is more an epilogue,

"a

decomposition of spectacle" necessitated by the
"resignation to the impossibility of re-presenting the
story in an unified form"

(Art and Politics, p. 152). This

impossibility manifests itself through the irrevocable
rupture between the visual and the auditory. Save for the
final few minutes of the film, there are no characters
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visible on the screen. Duras leaves the visual field
deserted. The women who do appear near the film's end are
immobile and, in Borgomano's words,
pierre"

"memoires d'ombre et de

(L'ecriture filmique de Marguerite Duras, p. 130) .

This absence of characters in Son nom radicalizes the
disjuncture of sight and sound found initially in India
Song. In Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert, the
voices, repeating exactly the soundtrack of India Song,
relate instead the recit of a deserted story with music
remaining from a long deserted ball held at a deserted
chateau, found in ruins.
Furthermore, as Borgomano observes, the mirrors which
enabled the repetition of story in India Song are shattered
in Son nom, no longer reflecting nor repeating. Window
panes too are cracked, representing a destruction of their
previous function as frames, as repetition of what was
viewed within them:
Vitre, fenetres, miroir, tous ces procedes qui
servaient a decouper, a encadrer, a separer et
qui multipliaient a 1 'infini des distances,
d'emblee le film nouveau nous montre qu'il y
renonce, qu'il les brise, les detruit. {Ibid., p.
131)
The camera slowly moves through the chateau, periodically
pausing to focus on an object,

such as a doorway or the

staircase. The dim, dusk light contrasts remarkably with
the brightness that illuminated the same rooms of the
chateau in India Song when they were still intact. Here in
Son nom the eeriness of the poor lighting in the ruined
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rooms underscores the deadness of the story and the chateau
while at the same time blurring what would normally clearly
delineate frames and borders. At times during the film, the
camera ventures outside the chateau exploring its exterior
and the vegetation encroaching on its walkways and walls.
By traversing potential borders and by the broaching of
separations, such as doorways, between the interior and the
exterior, the camera itself reinforces the effacement of
India Song-.
The disjuncture between the visual -- the poorly lit
rooms with their broken mirrors and window panes, debris
and dust -- and the auditory renders the radicalization of
hearsay that was undertaken by India Song as extreme.
Furthermore, the lack of physicality of characters on
screen

juxtaposed with the soundtrack that re-cites that of

India Song radicalizes

the sight-sound rupture to such a

degree

that it signals its destruction. The cry of the

beggar

woman serves as an auditory frame for the film, as

it both opens and closes it. The replay of the sounds from
the ball, including snippets of "India Song," the upbeat,
jazzy blues, and a polyphony of indistinguishable voices of
ball guests re-cites scenes from Le Vice-Consul and India
Song,

the locus for which is now dead and in ruins,

eliminating therefore any attempt at a reconstruction of
the event.
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The visual conclusion of Son Nom de Venise dans
Calcutta desert suggests that there is still no termination
at all for the Lol V. Stein cycle. With the cry of the
beggar woman resonating across the screen, the film closes
with the camera peering out over the infinite horizon of
the sea, highlighted by the setting sun. While bringing the
film to a close, the scream marks the definitive rupture of
hearsay in that all that remains is what is heard. Since a
scream inhabits the borderline of speech, I view this
utterance as approaching speechlessness. Therefore, nothing
is articulated, or said anymore.
The Lol V. Stein Cycle and Hearsay
To briefly summarize the textual analyses,

I will

state that hearsay is placed into circulation by the crisis
in knowledge in each text. At the same time, hearsay
disseminates certain textual threads that cannot be
contained or controlled by the text or the narrator. This
is one of the anxiety-inducing effects of hearsay -- its
impact can be far-reaching and immeasurable. As a result,
the information cited and re-cited within the texts can
only be fragmentary at best since hearsay itself can
provide only a possibility of the reconstruction of the
event and not the verbatim copying of it, which is what the
narrators attempt. The reliance on hearsay to re-construct
or to recover the lost event guarantees the failure of the
narrative because the "true event" cannot ever be captured

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

and repeated. The shifts in narrative voice, which are a
direct result of the use of hearsay as a means of
attempting the story, call into question the authority of
the narrator and prevent the achievement of the narrative.
While the circulation of hearsay has been explored within
the individual texts themselves, hearsay is also found to
destabilize the relations among the different texts of the
Lol V. Stein cycle itself, an effect made possible because
it exceeds limits that would be imposed on i t .
Between one and another of the texts of the Lol cycle
there exists the citation and re-citation of certain
aspects of each. They cite each other in an attempt at re
writing Lol's story. Such citational practices among the
texts impede closure within each and therefore destabilizes
the entire cycle in general.
This sense of destabilization and lack of closure is
effected more precisely by means of a mise-en-abime of
citations. Lol's desire for a repetition and, therefore, a
remembering of the ball scene, coupled with the characters'
quest for knowledge of Lol's story, both of which remain
impossibilities -- impossible to be contained and
impossible to be fulfilled -- result in the citation of
traces, fragments of the lost event of the ball. Faced with
the impossibility of what is impossible to be said, yet
impossible to be closed off, contained, the narratives are
the reverberation and citation of fragments which approach
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the locus of the loss. Of course, the narratives cannot
reconstruct it or fill it in. Citationality among these
texts thus manifests itself on numerous levels, from the
physical pages of the texts themselves to the characters as
well as to other textual threads.
Physical evidence of what occurs among the texts can
be found in the lacunae of the pages of the texts
themselves. The spacing of the printed text in Le
Ravissement de Lol V. Stein results in numerous textless
sections, or blank spaces, separating portions of the
print. These gaps are re-cited in the other texts of the
cycle, most strikingly in L'amour. Furthermore, in India
Song there are auditory blanks between the utterances made
by the pairs of voices that constitute the dialogue(s).
These periods of silence in the film can be construed as
oral lacunae, re-citing in a way that of the written in the
other texts of the cycle.
Numerous feminist critics of Duras' works have
addressed the questions raised by the aforementioned
textual blanks. For Susan Cohen, Duras seems to "stage
silence on the page"

(Women and Discourse in the Fiction of

Marguerite Duras, p. 149) by leaving gaps between segments
of text. Marini contends that Duras' writing "creates
silence and empty space" that for Cohen and other feminists
indicates the invention of a new "feminine" syntax in which
silence is included as a component of speech. Xaviere
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Gauthier reads the blanks as the place of the woman, a view
shared by other feminists who state that the occurrence of
the blanks is the eruption of the feminine into the
construct of masculine language .20
Whereas critics such as Cohen and Gauthier celebrate
the blanks, as well as Duras' writing in general, as the
emergence of a new "feminine" syntax, which at last affords
space to woman, critics like Trista Selous, for example,
view these "visual silences" as the impossibility of
articulation.
The characters themselves are also subjected to this
citational practice and, as is expected with such
repetitions, they are deformed with each subsequent citing.
As I have mentioned previously, the most obvious example of
this is found, of course, in the character of Lol referred
to as Lola Valerie Stein, Lol V. Stein, Lol and, by the
time of L'Amour, simply "la femme." Michael Richardson,
Lol's fiance, who left the Casino ball with Anne-Marie
Stretter in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, is recalled as
Michael Richard in Le Vice-Consul, a member of the European
circle to which Anne-Marie Stretter belongs, as Michael
Richardson again in India Song and as "le voyageur" in
L'Amour.
Striking descriptions of Anne-Marie Stretter appear in
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Le Vice-Consul and in India
Song.

From Le Ravissement comes the following:
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Elle etait maigre. Elle devait 1'avoir toujours
ete. Elle avait vetu cette maigreur...d'une robe
noire a double fourreau de tulle egalement noir,
tres decolletee. (pp. 15-16)
Reference to Stretter's appearance is again made in Le
Vice-Consul:
Ce soir a Calcutta, 1'ambassadrice Anne-Marie
Stretter est pres du buffet, elle sourit, elle
est en noir, sa robe est a double fourreau de
tulle noir...Aux approches de la vieillesse, une
maigreur lui est venue, (p. 92)
Whereas the description of her dress is practically the
same, there is a discrepancy with regard to Stretter's
physical stature. In Le Ravissement, she is described as
"maigre," something she has likely always been. Yet, in Le
Vice-Consul this "maigreur" seems to have been brought on
by age. Here, direct reference is made to what could be
considered the source of descriptions of Stretter's
appearance, Le Ravissement. It is quite interesting to note
that each of the preceding descriptions of Stretter are
connected to a ball in the respective texts. It is, after
all, the locus of Lol's ravishing by her fiance and
Stretter and marks the event to which access remains
impossible.
Place names as well are cited and re-cited: S. Thala,
where Le Ravissement takes place becomes repeated as S.
Thala in L'amour, where, as I have commented earlier, the
town appears to have spread all the way to the beach,
swallowing up T. Beach from Le Ravissement where the Casino
ball occurred. The woman in L'amour comments, "Ici, c'est
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S. Thala jusqu'a la riviere"
cited by the man who adds,
S.

Thala"

(p. 15), which is subsequently-

"Apres la riviere, c'est encore

(p. 20). The S. Thala of L ’amour not only seems

to be a reconstruction of the S. Thala of Le Ravissement
but it also surpasses the boundary of the river, spilling
out beyond i t .
The hunger of the beggar woman and her vomiting which
occurs continously during her ten-year trek southward to
Calcutta,

"Elle vomit, s'efforce de vomir 1'enfant"

(p.

18) finds its reverberation in L'amour when the woman
announces,

"J'attends un enfant, j'ai envie de vomir"

(p.

23). The inability to control the story and the vomiting is
revealed in her next statement about it, "9 a ne sert a
rien,

9

a recommence"

(p. 23). The "9 a" that recommences can

in fact been seen to refer not only to the beggar woman's
pregnancy and vomiting, but also to the event itself,
underscoring its ability to begin again in a quite
different context.
Various narrative threads are also found to run across
and through the texts. For example, the ball scene in Le
Ravissement has certainly been "heard about" in Le ViceConsul though no direct mention of it is made within the
text. The mere (re-)appearance of Anne-Marie Stretter and
Michael Richard in the novel evokes an indirect
recollection of the ball scene where Michael Richard(son)
left Lol for Anne-Marie.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104

If Le Vice-Consul contains no apparent explicit memory
of Lol's ravishing at the ball, L'amour provides a clearer
citation of it, with the traveler's return to what is
presumably the ballroom of the Casino. Prior to his visit
to the Casino, reference is made to Lol's ravishing when
the traveler says to her,
C'etait votre age..."

"Dix-huit ans -- il ajoute --

(p. 110-11). He continues attempting

to cite the event of the ravishing,

"Quand pour la premiere

fois vous etes tombee malade -- il ajoute -- Apres un bal"
(p. 112). This elicits some response from the woman who
seems to recall "j'ai ete mariee avec un musicien, j 'ai eu
deux enfants..."

(p. 113), a citation of Le Ravissement in

which she had married Jean Bedford.
The traveler returns to the woman, who awakes upon his
arrival. She states simply,

"Vous etes alle demander"

(p.

132) . The traveler replies that he found the place "entre
les murs" and that "on voit aussi la porte par laquelle
nous sommes sortis...separes" (p. 132). This return to the
locked room where "il n'y a plus de bal"

(p. 127) fails to

recreate the scene of the ravishing, lost forever, but
allows it to once again take place by means of its re
citation .
The text of India Song contains an important citation
of the ball from Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein by the
first voice, who sounds as if she is reading directly from
a text:

"'Michael Richardson etait fiance a une jeune fille
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de S. Thala. Lola Valerie Stein. Le mariage devait avoir
lieu a 1'automne. Puis il y a eu ce bal. Ce bal de S.
Thala ' 11 (p. 15) . The line from this passage concerning the
wedding is a direct quotation from Le Ravissement (p. 12).
Another such occurrence is found pages later when the first
voice appears to again be reading from a text concerning
the Casino ball. This time she indicates the moment of
Lol's ravishing, when Richardson and Stretter left her
behind at the ball:
Derriere les plantes vertes du bar, elle les
regarde. Ce n'est qu'a 1'aurore...quand les
amants se dirigerent vers les portes du bal que
Lola Valerie Stein poussa un cri. (p. 36)
Here, I would like to note that in the written text of
India Song, Duras has placed the preceding two passages in
quotation marks, to lend an air of authority to the voices
which do not, however, seem to quite remember the story
they discuss. By reading the above passages in quotation
marks, one is led to believe that the voices are reading
directly from a text, as the notes suggest. Yet, these
notes fail to disclose from what text the voices read,
although the passage obviously recalls Le Ravissement.
Lol's cry emitted following her ravishing at the ball,
"Lol cria pour la premiere fois"

(Le Ravissement de Lol V.

Stein, p. 22) can be said to be cited in the cry of the
Vice-Consul which doubled that of the beggar woman's
"battambang" in Le Vice-Consul and in India Song. At the
end of the ambassador's reception in Le Vice-Consul, the
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Vice-Consul screams as he is excluded from the group of
Europeans. His cries merge smoothly into those of the
beggar woman. The cry also has its citation in L'amour:
"l'homme crie"

(p.

12

).

The inaccessibility of the origin, or the lack of
access to the event itself which is responsible for the
narrative cycle reveals itself as the "mot-trou" in Le
Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. The following passage, which
is arguably the most celebrated one from the entire Lol V.
Stein cycle and has been treated by the likes of Lacan,
Marini, Montrelay, among others,

forms the crux of the

cycle. It is what circulates throughout all of the texts by
means of hearsay.
Que serait-il? Lol ne va pas loin dans l'inconnu
sur lequel s'ouvre cet instant. Elle ne dispose
d'aucun souvenir meme imaginaire, elle n'a aucune
idee sur cet inconnu. Mais ce qu'elle croit,
c'est qu'elle devait y penetrer, que c'etait ce
qu'il lui fallait faire, que q'aurait ete pour
toujours, pour sa tete et pour son corps, leur
plus grande douleur et leur plus grande joie
confondues jusque dans leur definition devenue
unique mais innommable faute d'un mot. J'aime a
croire, comme je i'aime, que si Lol est
silencieuse dans la vie c'est qu'elle a
cru,l'espace d'un eclair, que ce mot pouvait
exister. Faute de son existence, elle se tait.
Q'aurait ete un mot-absence, un mot-trou, creuse
en son centre d'un trou, de ce trou ou tous les
autres mots auraient ete enterres. On n'aurait
pas pu le dire mais on aurait pu le faire
resonner. Immense, sans fin, un gong vide, il
aurait retenu ceux qui voulaient partir, il les
aurait convaincus de 1 'impossible, il les aurait
nommes, eux, l'avenir et 1'instant. Manquant, ce
mot, il gache tous les autres, les contamine,
c'est aussi le chien mort de la plage en plein
midi, ce trou de chair. Comment ont-ils ete
trouves les autres? Au decrochez-moi-qa de
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queiles aventures paralleles a celle de Lol V.
Stein etouffees dans l'oeuf, pietinees et des
massacres, oh! qu'il y en a, que d'inachevements
sanglants le long des horizons, amonceles, et
parmi eux, ce mot, qui n'existe pas, pourtant est
la: il vous attend au t o u m a n t du langage, il
vous defie, il n'a jamais servi, de le soulever,
de le faire surgir hors de son royaume perce de
toutes parts a travers lequel s'ecoulent la mer,
le sable, l'eternite du bal dans le cinema de Lol
V. Stein, (pp. 47-49).
The "mot-trou" is therefore impossible to (be) utter(ed),
since it does not exist, although "on aurait pu le faire
resonner" and it does reverberate, cited "sans fin" as a
sort of mise en abime "creuse en son centre d'un trou,"
contaminating all others through its incessant repetition.
Its reverberation or echoing erupts in Le Vice-Consul and
in L'amour in several ways. In Le Vice-Consul, this "mottrou" re-emerges first in the form of "Battambang.11 Sharon
Willis calls it a "perpetually displaced syllabic flow"
which "plies its way between presence and absence, life and
death,

'death in the midst of life, death following but

never catching up' -- the perpetually missed encounter"
(Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body, p. 70) .
The quest for the absent, non-existent word continues
and the "mot-trou" remains in circulation by means of
hearsay, the infinite citation of something that has always
already been heard. The beggar woman's cry of "Battambang"
is doubled in Lahore in Le Vice-Consul, particularly in the
previously discussed exchange between the Vice-Consul and
Anne-Marie Stretter.

It takes on more of an inarticulate
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quality, Anne-Marie Stretter finds herself unable to
express it,

"je ne sais pas comment le dire." The Vice-

Consul is similarly unable to address it. Saying, "Il n'est
pas important maintenant," he merely defers it yet again,
re-instating it into the circuit of hearsay, concluding
with,

"Je cherche le mot. Il y a un autre mot?" Achieving

access to this word, to the originary event will remain
impossible,

infinitely deferred save for traces, for the

hearsay erupting in and disrupting the texts of the cycle.
In L'amour, the word-hole of Le Ravissement -- "c'est
aussi le chien mort de la plage en plein midi" -- is
literally transformed into a dead dog on the beach of S.
Thala. In this example we read that the woman "cesse de
montrer, se detourne de tout, rentre dans le chien mort"
(p. 104). The incarnation of the absence-word as a dead dog
on a beach is but yet another manifestation of what Willis
calls a "circuit of repetition" and what I have developed
as hearsay.
The preceding pages offer but an indication of the
citationality functioning in the Lol cycle as hearsay,
operating within and across all the texts we have studied.
While some critics see the cycle in terms of a
cannabilization or an annulation of prior texts by the
subsequent texts of the cycle, Susan Cohen sees Duras'
rewriting as a means of opening and pluralizing each of the
texts. She refers to the intertextual citations as
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"conjugations" of previously appearing narrative elements
with new ones to create yet another narrative permutation
(Women and Discourse in the Works of Marguerite Duras, p.
63). I have argued that such conjugations are possible due
to the process of hearsay, of hearing and saying previously
heard information. We have found that hearsay operates
within each text, as a means of disseminating unverified
and unverifiable information in order to attempt the
narrative. However, the insistence and reliance on such a
citational practice serve to undermine the very narrative
that is being attempted. In addition, the authority of
narrative/narrator becomes questionable as it is revealed
that hearsay constitutes the text. The result, as we have
seen, is a failure of traditional textual production in
that the expected forms of closure are impeded and the
narrative remains an effort at, rather than an example of,
a complete and absolute narrative.
I contend that it is indeed the effects of hearsay
that propel the generation of "conjugations" or a plurality
of texts from Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. This becomes
increasingly apparent in the hearsay involving the "mottrou" which circulates among all the texts pointing to the
repeated and re-cited efforts to achieve access to the
originary event. The "mot-trou" appears initially in Le
Ravissement and, as I have previously stated, is re-cited
as the scream of the beggar woman and the Vice-Consul in Le
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Vice-Consul and the dead dog on the beach in L'amour. The
"mot-trou" persists in being re-cited as heard in the
resonating screams of India Song and ultimately as its
radicalized (in)articulation in Son Nom de Venise dans
Calcutta desert.
As the scope and impact of hearsay in general is
immeasurable, so too are its effects in narrative. Due to
the lack of closure of the texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle,
hearsay places into circulation,

in unlimited and

uniimitable contexts, certain textual threads of the
individual narratives, motivated in part by the
inaccessibility of the original event of Lol's ravishing.
The result is the dissemination of narrative elements,
which have been previously disclosed, within and between
the Lol texts. At the outside, hearsay seems to function
like the "gong vide" of the "mot-trou" whose reverbation is
continously felt but whose source is cut off and fallen
into the abyss of the repeating textual forms and fragments
of the cycle.
Notes
1. As mentioned in the introduction, these critics include
Sharon Willis, Jacques Lacan, Susan Cohen and Leslie Hill.
2. My understanding of narrative closure and resistance to
closure stems from the narrative theory practiced by Roland
Barthes, especially in S/Z (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1970). My use of the term narrative is similar, therefore,
to Barthes' notion of "scriptibilite." For a broader
discussion of narrative, see Peter Brooks, Reading for the
Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: A.A.
Knopf, 1984). See also Ross Chambers, Story and Situation
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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CHAPTER THREE
TESTIMONY: THE CASE OF MAURICE BLANCHOT'S RECITS
Introduct ion
As one of this century's most enigmatic yet prolific
writers, Maurice Blanchot has made immeasurable literary
and theoretical contributions to the domain of French
literature. His career as a writer stretches back some
sixty years to the early 193 0s when he first worked as a
journalist for Journal des Debats.

In addition to the

critical essays Blanchot produced during the 1940s, he also
wrote several fictional texts including his last novel, Le
Tres-Haut, and his first recit, L'arret de mort, both
published in 1948. The renouncement of the novel in favor
of the recit signalled a movement toward Blanchot's
exploration of the "space of literature," culminating with
1955's publication of L'espace litteraire, a crucial text
in his oeuvre.
The 1950s saw Blanchot embark on further critical
forays including essays written in response to Barthes,
Lacan and Levi-Strauss. In addition, the exploration of the
recit and its limits continued. From the 1960s on,
Blanchot's work became increasingly situated in the
experimental mode of fragmentary, plurivocal writing as
best exemplified in Le Pas au-dela, a text whose genre -literary or theoretical -- is impossible to determine.
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Finally, after having abandoned the recit form for years,
Blanchot published L'instant de ma mort in 1994.
Critics have isolated phases in Blanchot's work and
have a tendency to focus on the significance of his more
theoretical texts such as L'espace litteraire and
L'ecriture du desastre. I do not seek to ignore the
importance of these texts and indeed they play an important
role in anyone's reading of his fictional works, for in
them he establishes the framework within which he writes
his novels and recits.
Although Blanchot's critical contributions are quite
relevant to literary studies,

I choose, however, to focus

on three of his rScits, because of their staging of the
question of citationality. In terms of testimony, the
citational effects produced by La Folie du jour, L'arret de
mort and L'instant de ma mort problematize notions of
narrative.
Testimony: The Legal Tradition
Defined according to the Oxford English Dictionary as
"personal or documentary evidence or attestation in support
of a fact or statement," testimony can be any form of
evidence or proof, especially an open attestation,
acknowledgement or confession. Despite being commonly used
as an interchangeable term for evidence, testimony is
defined in criminal law usage as statements of witnesses
taken under oath or affirmation. It is the spoken word of
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witnesses and is considered evidence, although "evidence
may or may not be testimony, and in most cases, does
consist of more than testimony . " 1
In other words, the law stipulates that the witness
must be twice present, both during the alleged event(s) and
during subsequent court proceedings. Therefore, testimony
is admissible where it appears possible for the witness to
have first-hand or personal knowledge of the facts to which
s/he testifies. Considered "the eyes and ears of justice,"
the witness does not seem dependent for his/her information
on the statements of another witness who is unavailable for
testimony and absent during proceedings .2 The requirement
of first-hand information and the witness' presence clearly
distinguishes testimony from another function of
citationality, that of hearsay which is, as I have
discussed, generally inadmissible in court as it is
comprised of second-hand information considered unreliable.
At the time of an appearance during

court proceedings,

the witness must offer his/her spoken word under oath
according to a procedure known as the right of
confrontation. Due to the requirement that testimony must
be given with a live voice in the first person, other forms
of testimony, such as technological reproductions,
including audio and video recordings, for example, are
hardly ever allowed to take the place of
presence. A curious

the witness'

exception however is that some
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jurisdictions allow the introduction of a deposition, or
written record of the witness' statements outside of the
court, on the grounds that his/her presence is impossible
owing to good cause. Such an exception was recently made in
the case of President Clinton's testimony for the grand
jury investigating his involvement with Monica Lewinsky.
Obviously, testimony is more effective if given in
person rather than if read before the court because it is
live and therefore both immediate and direct. This notion
valorizes the witness' spoken word and as such once again
demonstrates the juridical privileging of the present and
the oral, the status of which will prove to be illusionary
once we explore the doubling of presence and the citational
nature of testimony.
While the general consensus is that bearing witness
will result in a few discrepancies in testimony due to the
time and space differential between the moment of
occurrence of the alleged event and the witness' re
presentation of that event before a court, other instances
of inaccuracy can be attributed in part to the commonly
used technique of embroidery. Unlike perjury, which is
deliberate untruthfulness under oath, embroidery involves
alteration of peripheral facts in order to strengthen a
case (Courtroom Testimony, p. 35). Facts which are not
necessarily material to the case are inserted and elicited
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in the testimony. Such a technique will come to bear
heavily on our reading of testimony as narrative and vice
versa.
Testimony As Narrative
As its definition suggests, testimony involves making
something public; that is, disclosing a secret, the
private. Such a notion suggests a transgression or bordercrossing.
In addition to rendering the private public, testimony
also makes what once was present, present again. This
doubling of presence raises two conditions: the possible
and the impossible. In Demeure: fiction et temoignage,
Jacques Derrida describes the possible as the necessity of
the witness' presence in order for the court to conduct
testimony procedure .3 Yet, this is, in a sense, rendered
impossible because the witness has already been present in
another time and another place, in that s/he was physically
present as a witness during the occurrence of the alleged
event(s). Testifying thus destroys its own condition of
possibility since testimony itself requires the witness to
be present and subsequently re-present. Following Derrida's
explanation, we see that the witness must have already
experienced the event and that that experience must be made
present again. In other words, two moments involving the
witness can be isolated, removed both temporally and
spatially from one another. The initial "moment of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

witness" is his/her presence during the alleged event,
which remains distanced from the "moment of bearing
witness," in which the witness becomes present again. This
requirement of and attempt at a double presence,
established by the procedure of testimony itself, denotes
that there is always already repetition or citation during
proceedings,

in spite, and as a result of the insistence on

a testimony that is live and spoken in the first person.
Testimony is neither immediate nor accurate since the
event it refers to has already been experienced.
Consequently, testimony is always a repetition. As Derrida
explains, when I say I will tell the truth, I say I will
repeat myself; I will re-cite and re-present my experience
{ibid.) . The lack of immediacy is clearly seen as resulting
from the temporal distance between the two moments of
witnessing, whereas the lack of accuracy stems from the
previously discussed technique of embroidery. According to
Derrida, who addresses the question of embroidery in terms
of its narrative elements,

"le temoin doit a la fois se

conformer a des criteres donnes et inventer, de facpon
quasi-poetique, les normes de son attestation..."

{ibid.,

p. 26). Despite the accepted use of this technique, which
for Derrida is not merely a technique but, in fact, the
constituting structure of testimony itself, authority is
granted to the witness due to the singularity of his/her
experience and testimony:

"11

faut me croire parce qu'il

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

faut me croire. Je suis irremplagable"

(ibid.). Derrida

elaborates:
Meme si nous avons ete plusieurs a participer a
un evenement, a assister a une scene, le temoin
ne peut temoigner que la ou il affirme qu'il
etait a une place unique et ou il pouvait
temoigner de cela et cela en un ici-maintenant,
c'est-a-dire en un instant pointu qui supporte
justement cette exemplarite, c'est-a-dire
irremplaqable. (Ibid.)
The uniqueness of each witness is made clear in the
preceding passage as each witness can testify from only a
specific position about what s/he experienced. Since
testimony depends upon the singularity of the witness and
his/her ability to testify in the first-person, it renders
each witness irreplaceable and testimony itself thus
becomes autobiographical in nature. Derrida adds, "Je ne
peux temoigner...qu'a

1

'instant ou ce dont je temoigne,

personne ne peut temoigner a ma place. Ce dont je temoigne
est d'abord, a
reserve"

1

'instant, mon secret, il reste a moi

(ibid., p. 32).

In Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and
Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem and Levinas, Susan
Handelman views testimony as:
An inevitable part of the language of the
survivor, one who comes from the "other" side
indeed - who must bring the indescribable to
description, who tries to say the unsayable, who
speaks for the impossible and says the
unthinkable by speaking his own vulnerability and
exposure .4
For her, the principle objective of testimony is to bear
witness for the other and not so much to confess what one
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has experienced. The witness who comes from the "other"
side, comes from this privileged position of singularity
where s/he cannot be replaced.
In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis and History, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub
seem to follow Derrida's notion of testimony as embroidery
in that, as a process, testimony is not so much a statement
of truth but a means of access to i t :
The emergence of the narrative which is being
listened to - and heard - is, therefore, the
process and the place wherein the cognizance, the
"knowing" of the event is given birth to as the
creation of knowledge de n o v o .5
Through her work as a practicing psychoanalyst eliciting
the testimonies of Holocaust survivors, Laub asserts that
bearing witness to a traumatic event involves the "process
by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his position
as a witness..."

(ibid., p. 85). Yet, this act both "makes

and breaks a promise: the promise of the testimony as a
realization of the truth"

(ibid., p. 91). For Laub, the

cognizance of the event fulfills the promise of a return to
the sane and normal. This promise however fails because,
despite a commitment to truth, the testimony cannot capture
or re-create it (ibid.) .
Felman and Laub's definition of testimony as the
"creation of knowledge" and the recognition of its
impossibility to capture the truth, or the event, provides
us with further evidence that allows us to consider all
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testimony as embroidery, as narrative, as inhabiting the
structure of fiction. However, it should be emphasized that
this does not disqualify testimony, or mean that all
testimony is simply fiction, rather that it is caught in
the paradox of citationality whereby what enables it also
disables i t .
The structural complicity that exists between fiction
and testimony is therefore self-evident. Although testimony
is not merely storytelling, but rather a re-citation, it
does possess narrative elements and even Laub's discussion
of testimony in which she employs words such as "narrator"
and "narrative" lends further support to this formulation.
Obviously, the act of testimony reflects the structure of
narrative/storytelling itself. There is necessarily
distance in time and space between the event and the
relation or the narration of that event. This complicitous
relationship is most apparent in the fiction of Maurice
Blanchot.
Testimony and Blanchot
In the case of Maurice Blanchot, testimony constitutes
the narrative comprising several of his fictional texts, or
recits, three of which I will analyze in this chapter in
terms of testimony as a function of citationality. Before
proceeding to these textual analyses, I will first discuss
what constitutes Blanchot's definition of recit in order to
facilitate an understanding of the connection between his
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work and testimony. In "Le Chant des Sirenes" from Le livre
a venir, Blanchot explicates his concept of recit.6
According to Blanchot, a recit must be comprised of several
different criteria. First, it must deal with a single event
which appears to be out of the ordinary, and, consequently,
is not subject to laws of ordinary time or reality.
Furthermore, the recit is not the exact relation or
disclosure of this unusual event as reported by the
narrator; it is not an account of the event, but the event
itself:
Le recit n'est pas le relation de 1'evenement,
mais cet evenement merae, l'approche de cet
evenement, le lieu ou celui-ci est appele a se
produire, evenement encore a venir et par la
puissance attirante, duquel le recit peut
esperer, lui aussi, se realiser...Le recit ...ne
'relate' que lui-meme et cette relation, en meme
temps qu'elle fait, produit ce qu'elle raconte.
(Le livre a venir, pp. 13-14)
Timothy Clark addresses the reflexive nature of the recit
inherent in this definition (in that the recit becomes the
event it narrates) by citing one of Blanchot's early
recits, L'attente I'oubli, in which the encounter that
forms the basis of the narrative is the encounter to which
it refers .7 A series of repetitions and quotations from
different parts of the text aids in disrupting narrative
time and the event narrated is therefore the narration as
event

(ibid.).
Since a recit is a re-citing or rather a r e d t-ing of

an event, it is undoubtedly testimonial. According to
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Blanchot, access to the event itself about which the
narrator-witness testifies is impossible due to the
problems of time and space which in turn lead to the
failure of conventional narrative. The witness'
inaccessibility to the event is additionally related to
what Blanchot calls the limit-experience; that is, the
impossible attempt to put into language what has not yet
been said and what cannot be said. In L'entretien infini,
Blanchot writes of the limit experience as something that
"Nous en parlons comme d'une experience et pourtant nous ne
pourrons jamais dire que nous l'avons eprouve...Experience
de la non-experience.

"8

As Gary Mole writes in Levinas,

Blanchot, Jabes: Figures of Estrangement:

"Beyond memory,

the event lies beyond representation (it cannot be re
presented, brought into the fictive present of the
recit)." 9 The recit attempts to be the relation of an event
but it becomes the event itself. The act of testimony
functions in similar manner, as an attempt to reconstitute
the present-ness of the event, but it fails structurally,
since the moment of the event's occurrence remains severed
temporally and spatially from the moment of bearing
witness.
In La Folie du jour, L'arret de mort and L'instant de
ma mort, the insistence on testimony, on forcing the
narrator to bear witness in order to achieve the narrative,
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results in its own failure, such that narrative closure
remains deferred and appears impossible.
Although the reasons for this failure are textspecific, the impossibility of achieving narrative can
generally be attributed,

in these works, to the effects of

citationality itself. The impact citationality produces on
narrative is such that it inhibits textual closure and
tends to collapse the text into citation and re-citation.
As I will reveal in my analysis of La Folie du jour, the
entirety of the text is the mere citation of itself as
citation, or rather a mise-en-abime of its own citation,
whereas in L'arret de mort the narrator's attempt to bear
witness by writing his testimony in the form of a book is
never completed or even able to be achieved. The testimony
that comprises L'instant de ma mort problematizes the
narrator's testimony about his own death. That narrator
thus becomes a first-person "impossibility," which
necessitates a shift to the third-person in order for him
to "accomplish" the text.
However, it is not just in these particular recits
that citationality figures in Blanchot's works. In fact, it
can be seen to function among and between several of his
texts, as I will examine in the following section, before
proceeding to an analysis of the aforementioned works.
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Citationality in Maurice Blanchot
The publishing history of several of Blanchot's texts
remains a curiosity, particularly in light of my discussion
of citationality. Different versions of the same text
appear as citations of that very text. A first example:
Thomas 1'obscur, a "roman" first published in 1941,
reappears in 1950 as a "nouvelle version" and no longer a
"roman." The preface to the new version reads as follows:
II y a pour tout ouvrage, une infinite de
variantes possibles. Aux pages intitulees Thomas
1'obscur, ecrites a partir de 1932, remises a
l'editeur en mai 1940, publiees en 1941, la
presente version n'ajoute rien, mais comme elle
leur ote beaucoup, on peut la dire autre et meme
nouvelle, mais aussi toute pareille, si, entre la
figure et ce qui en est ou s'en croit le centre,
l'on a raison de ne
pas distinguer, chaquefois
que la figure complete n'exprime elle-meme que la
recherche d'un centre imaginaire . 10
The preceding captures perhaps the essence of citation
itself in that any text can in its turn generate numerous
versions or citations

of

itself, each differentyet the

same, once its center

of

authority or origin isdisplaced

in the way Blanchot describes.
Some of Blanchot's texts, as indicated above, have
been published on separate occasions with textual
discrepancies. La Folie du jour, for example, made its
initial appearance in the literary journal Empedocle and
from the outset its very title problematized questions of
borders,

in the sense of interior/exterior and

origin/citation. In Parages, Derrida addresses the issue of
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the recit's title stating that it was indeed Andrzej
Warminski who informed him of the irregularities in its
appearance in the journal .11 On the cover page of
Empedocle, there is a listing of the table of contents
which includes Un Recit?, the title of a contribution by
Maurice Blanchot. This title appears to neatly cite two
instances found within the text of "Un recit?"

(La Folie du

jour, pp. 36 and 38). Yet, the table of contents page
reproduced inside the journal as well as the first page of
the recit itself reveal the loss of the question mark in
the title; it reads simply Un Recit. In 1973, this recit
was once again published and this particular re-citation of
the text involves a title change from Un Recit to La Folie
du jour with no other alterations to the text itself.
A third text of Blanchot which has appeared as two
versions of itself is L'arret de wort. This text was
originally published in 1948 with the notation "recit"
beneath its title. The second version of the text sees the
deletion of the word "recit" along with the last two pages
of the narrative.
In addition to the appearance of several versions or
citations of Blanchot's texts, there have also been
citations of or references to certain texts within others.
Although more of a faint echo which recalls the other text
by citing it without citing it, these instances do stand
out for one familiar with Blanchot's work as a whole. For

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127

example,

in L'instant de ma mort,

"ni 1'absence de crainte

et peut-etre deja le pas au-dela" cites the text Le Pas audela without directly or explicitly citing from it. By
means of this mention of its title, the text of Le Pas audela is at least potentially folded within that of
L'ins tant de ma mort.
In Le Pas au-dela, L'arret de mort is ever so subtly
cited on page 135, "Survive, not to live, not living, to
maintain oneself, without life, in a state of pure
supplement, movement of substitution for life, but rather
to arrest dying, arrest that does not arrest, making it on
the contrary, last . " 12 Obviously, while citing or recalling
L'arret de mort, this phrase also exploits the phrase as
not only a death sentence but also a halting, or arresting
("arret") of death and dying.
The preceding examples, although by no means
comprehensive, demonstrate the effects of citationality at
work amongst and between Blanchot's various texts. I will
now turn to the specific recits I intend to analyze.
La Folie du jour
One of Blanchot's early recits I have chosen to
analyze is La Folie du jour, a text which poses particular
problems concerning narrative as testimony, in that the
text is a citation of itself as testimony.
Mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the
discrepancies in the publishing history of La Folie du jour
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indicate the impact of citational effects on it from the
outset. The re-publication,

in 1973, of this text with its

new title, La Folie du jour, occurs with no other apparent
modifications to the text. As in the previous title(s) of
Un recit (?), this newly published title appears to be a
citation from within the text,

"...je fus convaincu que je

voyais face a face la folie du jour"

(p. 22). Derrida

reminds us however of the impossibility of determining if
the different titles of the recit are indeed citations from
the text, or if, instead, the textual instances of these
phrases "la folie du jour" and "un recit (?)" are citations
of the titles

{Parages, p. 131) . In other words, deciding

which appearance of these phrases is the origin or source
and which is its citation remains impossible. With the
indeterminacy of the function of the title as source or
citation of the in-text phrases, the recit poses itself as
problematic from the outset. In Blanchot: Extreme
Contemporary, Leslie Hill states,

"...Each proposed title

doubles both as a naming of the text and an integral part
of it, as an address to the text and a quotation from
i t . . . " 13 Indeed it is this very confounding of textual
borders springing from the indeterminacy of source and
citation that is exploited throughout the text.
The recit itself concerns of the testimony of the
narrator, who bears witness to his interrogators, an
opthamalogist and a psychiatrist, about the events in his

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129

life prior and subsequent to his admittance to hospital, a
move precipitated by the injury to his eyes. The emergence
of the narrator-witness' madness

("je suis devenu fou quand

ce coup m'a frappe, car c'est un enfer"

(p.1 1 )) apparently

precedes this incident while coinciding with "la folie du
monde" or the eruption of war:
Peu apres, la folie du monde se dechaina. Je fus
mis au mur comme beaucoup d'autres. Pourquoi?
Pour rien. Les fusils ne partirent pas...Le monde
hesita, puis reprit son equilibre. (p. 1 1 )
Here,

it is interesting to first note that in L'instant de

ma mort there is a citation of this autobiographical
passage in which the witness finds himself placed against
the wall of his house where he is to be executed by German
soldiers:

"Le nazi mit en rang ses hommes pour atteindre,

selon les regies, la cible humaine"

(L'instant de ma mort,

p. 9) . Additionally, in contrast to "la folie du monde,"
the madness of the narrator remained "sans temoin" and as
such, a secret yet to be disclosed, because it surfaced
during the concealing darkness of the night:
Or, j 'etais brule des pieds a la tete; la nuit
courais les rues,
je hurlais; le jour, je
travaillais tranquillement. (Ibid.)

je

The recit focuses on the non-event of the narrator's eye
injury,

"Je faillis perdre la vue, quelqu'un ayant ecrase

du verre sur

mes yeux"

in this text

where there is a play between and on

boundaries,

(p. 21). As in many other instances

it must be stated that the eye injury does not

quite blind the narrator; yet, it does not enable him to
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maintain his eyesight unharmed. He states,

"Je ne pouvais

ni regarder ni ne pas regarder; voir c'etait l'epouvante,
et cesser de voir me dechirer du front a la gorge"

(ibid.).

The narrator in fact only begins to see when his eyes
are bandaged. In his essay,

"The Trace of Trauma," Michael

Newman comments on the double meaning of "verre" as both
glass and lens. While it is glass that was crushed into the
narrator's eyes, nearly blinding him, it is "verre" in the
form of glass or a lens that enables him to see .14
Therefore, it can be stated that the crushing of glass in
his eyes harms them in such a way as to precipitate his
ability to clearly see.
What he sees, or experiences, is indeed the "folie du
jour":
A la longue, je fus convaincu que je voyais face
a face la folie du jour; telle etait la verite:
la lumiere devenait folie, la clarte avait perdu
tout bon sens. (p. 2 2 )
His initial vision of the "folie du jour" can be linked to
what Derrida calls the "principe de contamination"
(Parages, p. 256) . In fact, Derrida discusses the
exploitation of the word "jour" in this recit by reading
"jour" as synonymous to the law. The glass thrown into the
narrator's eyes induces the "sept jours ensemble, les sept
clartes capitales devenues la vivacite d'un seul instant"
(p. 22). It is in this phrase that Derrida finds oblique
connections to the law in Genesis and in the number seven,
the number of days in the week as well as the number of
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deadly sins. Yet, within this law, within this day resides
what defies juridical convention and what incites the
narrator:
Et si voir, c'etait le feu, j 'exigeais la
plenitude du feu, et si voir c'etait la contagion
de la folie, je desirais follement cette folie.
(pp. 22-23) .
This "feu" or "contagion de la folie" for which the
narrator yearns so intensely can indeed be viewed as that
"principe de contamination" inhabiting the law. In fact
this "contagion" is indeed the "loi de la loi du genre"
which ultimately inhibits compliance with it. According to
Derrida, the "principe de contamination" is actually "une
loi d'impurete, une economie du parasite” (Parages, p.
256). This contagion that contaminates the recit by
disrupting boundaries prevents it from abiding by the law
that prescribes how a text should function.
The parasitic economy marks what Emmanuel Levinas
describes in Sur Maurice Blanchot as "iteration infiniment
repetee de la folie desiree comme lumiere du jour et du
jour qui blesse l'oeil qui le cherche . " 15
Although not initially apparent, this infinite
repetition of the narrator's testimony eventually becomes
clear through the re-citation of the following opening
statement by the narrator:
Je suis ni savant ni ignorant. J'ai connu des
joies. C'est trop peu dire: je vis, et cette vie
me fait le plaisir le plus grand. Alors, la mort?
Quand je mourrai (peut-etre tout a l'heure), je
connaitrai un plaisir immense, (p. 9)
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It is only at the end of the text that we learn that this
opening corresponds to the statements made by the narrator
to his interrogators. Therefore, the discourse that
constitutes the text is actually an attempt to force a
narrative, a testimony, out of the narrator. His
interrogators tell him,

"Racontez-nous comment les choses

se sont passes 'au juste' ." (p. 36) . Their request for what
happened exactly, for all the facts - the truth - raises
two observations. First, it suggests that he is not giving
us the whole story, as the interrogators' surprise reveals
when he arrives at the end, prompting them to further
pressure him for the whole story, "Apres ce
commencement...vous en viendrez aux faits"

(p. 36). Second,

their demand presupposes that "un homme qui parle et
raisonne avec distinction, est toujours capable de raconter
des faits dont il se souvient"

(pp. 37-38). Yet, this

requirement that the narrator abide by the law and fully
complete his testimony remains couched in impossibility for
two reasons. First, the act of testimony, as I have
discussed, borders on the impossible of re-presenting what
was previously present. Second, the eye injury can be
viewed as constitutive of a non-event since the narrator
was not blinded. These reasons leave the recit as nothing
more than the recit of itself. As Levinas writes, it is the
iteration "d'un recit racontant ce recit meme"
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Blanchot, p. 59). In other words, the only thing r e d t-ed
is the re-citation of the recit itself.
This re-citation as testimony disrupts any clear sense
of temporality as well. In L'espace litteraire Blanchot
describes what can be viewed as the perpetual citationality
of writing as a function of "la fascination de
temps"

1

'absence du

{L'espace litteraire, p. 20). Thus we encounter in

La Folie du jour certain instances where references are
made to impending occurrences, yet any sense of their
actual passing is lost as it is revealed that the text is
already a re-citation. For example, the following phrase
appears in the opening passage of the text: "Quand je
mourrai,

(peut-etre tout a l'heure), je connaitrai un

plaisir immense"

(p. 9). Written in the future tense, this

phrase is rendered disruptive upon arrival at the "end" of
the text, where the text re-begins, with this phrase still
in the future tense. There is no understanding of when or
if "tout a l'heure" takes place, since what is read is
already a citation which at the end becomes re-cited again.
As Levinas states there is a:
Suppression du temps comme evenement dans le
temps. Ce rebondissement que la syntaxe tolere
n'est pas non-sens..."Peut-etre tout a l'heure" la parenthese de 1 'auteur suggere le retour
inevitable de l'heure, 1 'infaillibilite de
l'heure juste. {Sur Maurice Blanchot, p. 59)
This impending arrival of "tout a l'heure" is never
achieved in effect because of a mise-en-ahime of citations;
the narrative folds back on itself infinitely so that there
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is never a first recit ("sans fin. sans commencement, sans
avenir, " L'espace litteraire, p. 21), but there is always a
recommencement,

infinitely,

"Cela n'est pas, mais revient,

vient comme deja et toujours passe de sorte que je ne le
connais pas, mais le reconnais"

(ibid.).

The preceding example in the future tense demonstrates
the impact that citationality, in the form of testimony,
has on temporality, the disjointedness or disjunction that
occurs between a present and a past or a present and a
future. If an utterance can always already be repeated, it
never just occurs. Another striking example is found midway
through the recit when the narrator interjects in the
present,

"Tout cela etait reel, notez-le"

(p. 20). Yet,

since the end of the text only marks its re-beginning, the
temporality of this intercedent as a present is skewed. To
recall, the act of testimony, the moment of bearing
witness,

is dependent upon the here and now, the presence

of the witness who offers testimony orally. This has
previously been shown to be problematic as testimony itself
is a re-citation of the moment of the witness, when the
events/facts to which the witness testifies were first
experienced. Yet in La Folie du jour, the here and now, the
presence of the witness and his testimony,

is even further

removed from its initial presence during the moment of the
witness due to the citational effects of mise-en-abime.
Additionally,

curiously, the recit is always already a re
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citation in which the narrator offers his testimony to the
doctors,

including references to the doctors themselves.

This detachment, the narrator's participation in, yet
distance from, the interrogation disrupts further the
temporality of the text. How can he participate in the
testimony, offering his story, yet at the same time talk
about the goings-on related to his "present" act of bearing
witness? Any real sense of narrative time is skewed as it
becomes impossible to ascertain the moment of the doctor's
interjections since the recit has been re-cited en-sibime,
thereby repeating itself countless times. The testimony
that constitutes the text of La Folie du jour is revealed
through the interrogatory nature of the recit itself,
presented as a story forced out of the narrator by his
interrogators. The questioning which marks the
interrogation persists throughout the text as the
interrogators search for "un savoir invisible dont personne
n'avait la preuve"

(p. 27).

The narrator remains unable to provide the lacking
evidence, proof, or truth -- to complete the story: "je dus
reconnaitre que je n'etais pas capable de former un recit
avec ces evenements"

(p. 37) to the satisfaction of the

interrogators who search for the whole truth, the whole
story. The testimony of the narrator-witness'
involvement/response to the interrogators becomes part of
the testimony that forms the recit itself. In other words,
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aspects of the interrogation that force and draw out the
testimony are incorporated into that very testimony.
Midway through the recit, there is the appearance of a
curious interjection that seemingly marks a movement toward
the end of the narrator's testimony,

"Voici qu'elle arrive,

me disais-je, la fin vient, quelque chose arrive, la fin
commence"

(p. 19). Despite the narrator's attestation that

the end was beginning, the only thing beginning, or even
happening, that emerges in La Folie du jour is its own rebeginning.
Although the narrator claims to recount "les faits"
and "un evenement vrai," his announcement of the end of the
recit remains a surprise for all precisely because the
recit is clearly no longer a recit at all; there is no
beginning, there is no end. When the interrogators request
the story with the real facts,

("Racontez-nous comment les

choses se sont passees 'au juste'"
eagerly begins again ("Un recit?"

(p. 36)), the narrator
(ibid.)), with what turns

out to have always already begun:
Je commengai: Je ne suis ni savant ni ignorant.
J'ai connu des joies. C'est trop peu dire. Je
leur racontai l'histoire toute entiere qu'ils
ecoutaient, me semble-t-il, avec interet, du
moins au debut. Mais la fin fut pour nous une
commune surprise." (pp. 36-7)
In what Derrida terms the chiasmic double invagination of
the borders, the story quite simply folds back on itself
(Parages, p. 132). As we have seen, the opening statements
reappear at the end of the recit only to be reinscribed in
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the recit again. The leading edge of the text becomes just
a fragment that is in its turn just a quotation of its
quotation and the text ends exactly where it begins: "Je ne
suis ni savant ni ignorant..." With all these citations
punctuating the text, the original source of the
performance, of the event, becomes difficult if not
impossible to identify.
What we have seen in La Folie du jour is a textual
destabilization occurring to such a degree that
conventional linear narration and narrative become
disrupted. The narrative rupture of temporality and
linearity and the break between the double presences of the
narrator-witness bring about the text's re-citation of
itself as citation.
L'arret de mort
If La Folie du jour demonstrates the difficulty and
possible impossibility of recit-ing, of developing a
narrative that does not stall as a web of citations,
L'arret de mort then renders this difficulty absolute
through the interminable testimony of the narrator who
shows himself incapable of terminating the narration he has
set into motion.
First published in 1948, this recit, like La Folie du
jour, has a curious publishing history. The first
publication of the text includes a sort of cryptic
epilogue: a two-paragraph page at the end of the recit. In
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subsequent printings of L'arret de mort, this final section
no longer appears. The deletion of the final page
accompanies the elimination of the word recit which
initially appeared just beneath the title. From the outset,
therefore, the text has been doubled, with the appearance
and subsequent deletion of recit and the last page. We
shall see that this act of doubling operates within the
pages of the text as well.
The narrator of the text devotes the beginning of the
recit to the testimony regarding his attempt to achieve his
testimony of events to which he was a witness in 1938. The
recit opens as follows:
Ces evenements me sont arrives en 1938. J'eprouve
a en parler la plus grande gene. Plusieurs fois
deja, j'ai tente de leur donner une forme ecrite.
Si j'ai ecrit des livres, c'est que j'ai espere
par des livres mettre fin a tout cela. (p. 7)
This initial documentation of several previously failed
attempts at bearing witness stands as evidence itself of
the continuation of the rupture seen in La Folie du jour
where the event becomes the recit and the r e d t-ing is the
event as it collapses into its citation and re-citation.
Here, rather than the entirety of the text posing as a
citation of itself, failing to achieve textual closure, the
recit of L'arret de mort reveals the perpetual commencement
of the narrator's testimony -- "plusieurs fois deja -- with
the hope of being at last able to "mettre fin a tout cela."
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However, as the title suggests, the testimony of the
recit is an "arret de mort" or a "death sentence." Yet, the
"arret de mort," read literally, is also just that -- an
"arret" or a halting or arresting of death. Extending this
double connotation of the title to the narrator's
predicament as witness prepared to "livrer un secret"
enables us to comment on the nature of bearing witness in
this text. The narrator finds himself compelled, even
condemned, to tell his story, promising that even "les
paroles, qui ne devraient pas etre ecrites, seront
ecrites," (p.
verite"

8

) because he says,

"je n'ai pas peur de la

(p. 7).

Despite this commitment on the part of the witnessnarrator to testify and thereby succumb to the testimonial
imperative, he finds himself incapable of following
through:
Cependant je dois le rappeler, une fois je
reussis a donner une forme a ces evenements....
Mais, quand elle fut ecrite, je la relus.
Aussitot je detruisis le manuscrit. (p. 8 )
The narrator's r e d t-ing is interrupted and halted with
each successive attempt, so that the beginning of his
testimony has already begun and its ending is never ending.
In Parages, Derrida equates "1'arret de mort" with
"pas de mort," or, as stated previously, with an arresting
or halting of death.

"Pas" also signifies "step" in that

"1 'arret de mort" is also a step toward death in addition
to being a halting or negation of that step. Derrida then

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

extends this notion of "pas de mort," as derived from the
recit's title, to a "pas de recit," as ample textual
evidence illustrates. In other words, just as L'arret de
mort is a "pas de recit," a step or movement toward
accomplishing the recit, it is also simultaneously a
halting of that very movement in that the recit is never
accomplished and the narrator is never able to "mettre fin
a tout cela."
Textually, this "arret de mort" as a "pas de recit"
manifests itself as the continual dying yet the
impossibility of death of the narrator and his friend J.,
whom the entirety of the first half of the text concerns.
Disease stricken for a decade, J. persists in living. As
the narrator states:
Normalement, elle aurait du etre morte depuis
longtemps. Mais, non seulement elle n'etait pas
morte, elle avait continue a vivre, a aimer, a
rire, a courir par la ville comme quelqu'un que
la maladie ne pouvait atteindre. (p. 13)
Yet, J. places her doctor in a bind between life and death
as well when she informs him,
etes un meurtrier"

"Si vous ne me tuez pas, vous

(p. 29), a citation the narrator is able

to attribute to Kafka. Yet, contrary to everyone's opinion,
J. miraculously defies death. Her survival right at the
brink of death contradicts even the predictions of her
doctor of whom the narrator says that "il la tenait pour
morte depuis 1936"

(ibid.).
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In a manner similar to J.'s survival at the limit, or
borderline, between dying and death itself, the death of
the

narrator has

beenimminent as well for quite some time

and

there are in

factseveral references in the text to the

doctor's predictions of his death:
"Comme vous devriez etre
mort depuis deux ans,
tout ce que vous reste a vivre est sumombre." II
venait de m'octroyer six mois de survie et il y a
de cela sept ans. (p. 14)
While the narrator, however, does remain alive, what does
come to pass in the text is J.'s death and inexplicable
resurrection:
Tout de suite apres, elle me dit d'une voix basse
et rapide: "Vite, une piqure." (Elle n'en avait,
depuis la nuit, jamais reclame.) Je pris une
grosse seringue, j'y reunis deux doses de
morphine et deux doses de pantopon, ce qui
faisait quatre doses de stupefiants. Le liquide
fut assez lent a penetrer, mais, voyant ce que je
faisais, elle resta tres calme. Elle ne bougea
plus a aucun moment. Deux ou trois minutes plus
tard, son pouls se deregla, il frappa un coup
violent, s'arreta, puis se remit a battre
lourdement pour s'arreter a nouveau, cela
plusieurs fois, enfin il devint extremement
rapide et miniscule, et "s'eparpilla comme du
sable."
Je n'ai aucun moyen d'en ecrire davantage. Je pourrais
ajouter que, pendant ces instants, J. continua a
me regarder avec le meme regard affectueux et
consentant et que ce regard dure encore, mais ce
n'est malheureusement pas sur. De tout le reste,
je ne veux rien dire. Les histoires avec le
medecin me sont devenues indifferentes. Moi-meme,
je ne vois rien d'important dans le fait que
cette jeune fille qui etait morte, a mon appel
revint a la vie...Il faut que ceci soit entendu:
je n'ai rien raconte d'extraordinaire ni meme de
surprenant. L'extraordinaire commence au moment
ou je m'arrete. Mais je ne suis plus maitre d'en
parler. (pp. 51-53)
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In this passage, J. actually undergoes an "arret de mort."
Not only has she been living suspended between death and
dying, condemned by an "arret de mort," or a death
sentence, but she has also managed to bring about an
"arret" or stop to her death, preventing it from becoming a
decisive finality. In Maurice Blanchot: L'Ancien,
1'effroyablement ancien, Roger LaPorte comments on this
preceding passage:
Cet evenement... recuse son nom et tout nom: plus
vieux que tout passe, tout proche, voire imminent
--perpetuellement imminent -- il n'accede pas a
la presence 'elle-meme,' il ne deviendra jamais
present, et c'est pourquoi J, 1'heroine de
L'arret de mort, condamnee a mort par les
medecins, en vient a agoniser, son pouls
's'eparpille comme du sable,' mais 1'arret du
coeur est indefiniment differe.16
Her survival, or infinitely differed death, also brings
about the "arret," or halting, of the narrator's testimony,
rendering it impossible and leaving the narrator "plus
maitre d'en parler" because he no longer has any "moyen
d'en ecrire davantage" having arrived himself at the very
limits of testimony and r e d t-ing. As the narrator states,
"L'extraordinaire commence au moment ou je m'arrete."
In effect, this passage marks the moment where the
narrator does indeed stop himself and his testimony. This
break within the narrative of L'arret de mort is even
visible in the text itself since the last line of the
previously cited passage precedes just over one page of
blank space before the story resumes. Here, the "arret de
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mort" or death sentence for the r e d t erupts in this blank
space where the r e d t falters and skips a beat. Yet, this
blank space is in turn halted and is the halting of death
of L'arret de mort. In Parages, Derrida elaborates on this
passage:
Comme cela etait defini, indefini, dans le
passage de Le pas au-dela, l'arret de mort n'est
pas seulement la decision arretant 1'ind^cidable;
il arrete aussi la mort en la suspendant, il
l'interrompt ou la differe dans le sursaut d'une
survie. Mais alors ce qui suspend ou retient la
mort cela meme lui rend toute sa puissance
d'indecidabilite...Comme la mort, l'arret reste
(s'arrete, s'arreste) indecidable. (Parages, p.
159)
The text however resumes subsequent to this passage and
lacuna without any further reference to J. and other
aspects that constitute the "first r e d t " of L'arret de
mort. As Derrida observes, the last passage of the first
part of the text marks "la bordure inferieure ou finale du
'premier' des deux 'recits' intitules L'arret de mort.
Cette bordure externe peut aussi etre consideree comme un
pli interieur"

(ibid., p. 158).

The (re)commencement of the story raises with it
numerous questions as nothing in the text itself announces
the start of a different or new r e d t .

The testimony begins

again:
Je continuerai cette histoire, mais maintenant,
je prendrai quelques precautions. Ces precautions
ne sont pas faites pour jeter un voile sur la
verite. La verite sera dite, tout ce qui s'est
passe d'important sera dit. Mais tout ne s'est
pas encore passe, (p. 54)
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Although this is announced as a continuation of the same
story, it apparently has no recollection of what preceded
it; there lack, obviously, any narrative threads that would
normally stitch the two parts together. As a result, many
elements remain in suspense between the double stories:
characters, narrator, narrative time, story. One must
wonder, for example, what story is continuing. Is it one
which preceded the "first" one? Is it even related by the
same narrator?
Of course, the use of the future tense in the opening
passage of the "second recit," cited above, is quite
striking itself for its disruption of temporality. As
Derrida suggests, what the narrator promises to tell has
not yet happened; it will not yet be situated in the past.
It is as if:
le recit serait done la cause -- disons aussi la
chose -- de cela m§me qu'il semble raconter.
Recit comme cause et non comme relation d'un
evenement... La chose est le recit. (Parages, p.
189)
With the r e d t-ing of the recit presented as the event of
the recit itself, the text deals with the non-presentation
of the event:
Ce qui se recite ici, cela aura ete cette non
presentation de 1'evenement, sa presence sans
presence, son avoir-lieu sans avoir-lieu, etc.
{Ibid.)
Since the narrator arrived at the very limits of narrative
and testimony in the first recit, he now is faced with
necessity of taking precautions to tell the story, yet the
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story still remains suspended between its possibility and
its impossibility. Incapable of being recounted, the recit
necessarily stopped itself right on the very threshold of
the event it undertook to recount. Derrida explains:
L'arret de mort est done aussi la decision
interdictrice qui arrete L'arret de mort au bord
de 1'evenement qu'il n'a pas le droit de
raconter, mais qui, aussi bien met en oeuvre, le
fait raconter, le decide a raconter depuis ce
suspens interdicteur, le fait repartir vers le
recit impossible, pour raconter (ce) qu'il ne
racontera pas. Ce texte commente le titre...mais
le titre enonce aussi 1'impossibility du
texte...Sa condition de possibilite et
d'impossibility. (Ibid., p. 172)
In conclusion, then, what is at stake in L'arret de mort is
the problematization of the testimony of an event that
defies its own articulation. The title of the text itself
announces the suspension of the narrative between its
failure or collapse as an impossibility, as subjected to a
death sentence, and its possibility, as the halting of that
collapse. In any case, efforts by the narrator-witness to
testify are starts and stops and can never be fulfilled.
L'instant de ma mort
The impossible possibility raised by the title of the
recit L'instant de ma mort problematizes from the outset
the testimony offered by the witness-narrator. As
previously discussed, testimony involves making something
twice present in view of the requisite temporal spacing
between the two presences. In other words, the first
presence, that moment of the witness-event precedes the
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moment of the testimony itself -- the moment of bearing
witness. The stipulation that a witness have first-hand or
personal knowledge renders testimony autobiographical in
nature, resulting in first-person narration. Given the
status of the personal in testimony, one clearly sees how
potentially problematic a recit such as L'instant de ma
mort is since it proposes in its title to talk about one's
own death. The impossibility of the possible arises when
the witness offers testimony about his death. According to
the rules of testimony, as I have previously discussed,

"I"

am the only one capable of testifying, because "I" am the
only one in the position of possessing first-hand personal
knowledge of my experience of that event. Each witness is
irreplaceable. However,

in the case of "my" death,

"I" can

not say "I died" or "I am dead." In Demeure: fiction et
temoignage, Derrida elucidates on the particularities posed
by considering the case of death and testimony. There is a
place/instance where there is no witness for the witness.
No one can testify about someone else's death because it
was not something experienced by that person. Yet, the
person who dies obviously cannot testify, cannot make it,
the experience, and her/him-self re-present. Derrida refers
to this unique situation as the impossible possibility of
the sentence "Je suis mort." He writes:
Je ne peux pas dire, de bon sens, je ne devrais
pas pouvoir dire: je mourus ou je suis
mort...S'il y a un lieu ou une instance ou il n'y
a pas de temoin pour le temoin, ou personne n'est
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temoin pour le temoin, ce serait bien la mort.
(Demeure: fiction et temoignage, p. 55)
The possibility of this phrase,

"je suis mort," lies in

death itself. It is quite possible, even inevitable, to
die. The catch is the impossibility of the enunciation "Je
suis mort"

(p. 31).

Whereas Derrida has written of the impossibility of
bearing witness to one's own death and the enunciation "I
am dead," Natalie Sarraute in L'usage de la parole
addressed related issues of speaking about death.17 She
cites the story of Tchaikovsky who, prior to his death,
uttered,

"I am dying." More interesting than his cognizance

of what was happening is the fact that he stated "I am
dying" not in his native tongue of Russian, but rather in
the foreign language of German. For Sarraute, this
represents the impossibility of conceiving of one's own
death as anything but "other"

(ibid., p. 78). Indeed, it is

the very otherness of the experience that prohibits one
from discussing it in the familiar, in one's native
language.
Sarraute's observation coupled with Derrida's notion
of the impossible possibility of testifying to "1'instant
de ma mort" bears heavily on Blanchot's recit. Although
L'instant de ma mort is not written in the language of the
"other" as was Tchaikovsky's statement, the effects of
attempting to enunciate the impossible reverberate
throughout the text.
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Faced with the aforementioned impossibility; that is,
the presentation of testimony about one's death, the
narrator must make a compensation for it in his text. As
one would expect, following the juridical definition of
testimony, the moment of bearing witness registers in the
first-person. However, the moment of the witnessexperience,

the impossible "instant de ma mort," is carried

out through the third-person. This experience-limit of
attempting to bear witness about one's own death deals with
the limit of language itself, of attempting to put into
words what has not yet been said because it cannot be said;
it is indeed Blanchot's "sentiment inanalysable" of a
"legerete que je ne saurais traduire..."

(p. 16).

This impossibility forces a rupture in the subjectwitness which occurs in the opening passage of the text:
Je me souviens d'un jeune homme - un homme encore
jeune - empeche de mourir par la mort meme - et
peut-etre l'erreur de 1'injustice, (p. 7)
This rupture manifests itself not through the use of a
foreign language, as was the case just referred to
concerning Tchaikovsky, but through a lapse from first- to
third-person which enables the "I" to discuss the "self"
through the detachment of a "he," or "un jeune homme." The
narrator can only attempt a discussion of this event
through a split or a fissure between the two moments of the
witness outlined earlier in this chapter.
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In addition to the preceding passage, L'instant
contains other instances which serve to demonstrate further
the rupture between the moment of testimony, of "je," and
the moment of the "lived" experience of what should have
been and, in a sense, was his death. The most notable of
these occurrences involves the use of the first-person to
describe or introduce evidence of events belonging to that
moment of death. This is not surprising considering that
such textual instances find the testimony at its most
unstable as the limits of the limit-experience are
approached. What is interesting about these examples is
that the narrator is able to testify from the position of
"je" about the "jeune homme" because he himself had been in
the position of a witness. Yet, it is this "sentiment
inanalysable"

(p. 17) which marked his death and "changea

ce qui lui restait d'existence"

(ibid.) creating an

irrevocable rupture between the moment of the event and the
moment of testimony. This first emerges when the lieutenant
positions the witness against the wall for his execution:
Je sais - le sais-je - que celui que visaient
deja les Allemands, n'attendant plus que 1'ordre
final, eprouve alors un sentiment de legerete
extraordinaire, une sorte de beatitude... (p. 10)
This "senciment de legerete" upon which the recit is
constructed is the closest articulation for the witness of
the feeling of death encountering death. With the
indescribable on the verge of taking place, the narrator
poses the question,

"la rencontre de la mort et de la
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mort?"

(ibid.). The question mark that terminates this

phrase accentuates the uncertainty and, ultimately, the
impossibility of attempting to articulate that which
remains impossible to be articulated, situated right at the
limits of experience and bearing witness about one's own
death.
Apparently making an effort to address the questions
of this "sentiment" the narrator-witness adds:
A sa place, je ne chercherai pas a analyser ce
sentiment de legerete. Il etait peut-etre tout a
coup invincible. Mort - immortel. Peut-etre
l'extase. Plutot le sentiment de compassion pour
l'humanite souffrante, le bonheur de n'etre pas
immortel ni eternel. Desormais il fut lie a la
mort, par une amitie subreptice." (p. 11)
Allowed to flee by the Russian soldiers who had already
assumed the firing squad formation for his seemingly
imminent execution, the narrator retreated "toujours dans
le sentiment de legerete" to the woods for an indeterminate
amount of time

(p. 12). After having regained "le sens du

reel," all that the narrator-witness discovers upon
emerging from the woods "post-mortem" is the remains of
people and animals

("...il apprit que trois jeunes

gens...avaient ete abattus. Meme les chevaux
gonfles...attestaient une guerre qui avait dure."

(ibid.))

as well as the still burning fires of the farms. The
narrator-witness' brutal return to the post-war world is
underscored by an interesting inversion. The witness who
should have died has survived and people who should still
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be alive were, for no apparent reason, killed. Further
compounding the senselessness of the war is the fact that
all the surrounding farms were destroyed by fire and yet
the chateau of the narrator was spared ("Tout brulait, sauf
le Chateau"

(p. 15)).

The unjust destruction of local farms marks the
narrator's entrance into a period of survival escaping his
comprehension:

"Alors commenga sans doute pour le jeune

homme le tourment de 1'injustice"
injustice is
is,

(p. 16). This torment of

indeed the veritable torment of survival. It

in other words, the burden of living with the fact that

one is living due to social status and class. Being spared
the firing squad's bullets does not enable the narrator to
overcome this torment of injustice, for although he was
spared at the last moment from certain death, the escape
from death has in a sense left him dead ("la rencontre de
la mort et de la mort?" and "Mort - immortel"). The
deadness inhabiting him stemming from the experience of
senselessly not having been killed is clearly demonstrated
in the following passage:
Demeurant cependant, au moment ou la fusillade
n'etait plus qu'en attente, le sentiment de
legerete que je ne saurais traduire: libere de la
vie? l'infini qui s'ouvre? Ni bonheur ni malheur.
Ni 1'absence de crainte et peut-etre deja le pas
au-dela. Je sais, j 'imagine que ce sentiment
inanalysable changea ce qui lui restait
d'existence. Comme si la mort hors de lui ne
pouvait desormais que se heurter a la mort en
lui. "Je suis vivant. Non, tu es mort". (pp. 1617)
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There are several points I would like to make in view of
this passage. First, the "sentiment de legerete" incapable
of being analyzed earlier is now pronounced untranslatable,
and certain indeterminacy surrounds any attempt to define
it. Untranslatable, the "sentiment" remains inaccessible in
its otherness. Additionally, the reference to "pas au-dela"
is a direct citation of Blanchot's plurivocal text of the
same name in which Blanchot explicates his concept of the
Neuter ("il"). Gerald Bruns describes this notion as
involving the other in the same and as always in
displacement, which appears to be how the rupture in the
witness-narrator functions.18 Furthermore, the final
sentence of this excerpt is set off in quotation marks.
This provides yet another example indicating that the
narrator as witness cannot access the event of the limitexperience in terms of "I."
For Gary Mole, this inaccessibility is also revealed
through a certain paralysis of the witness-narrator.

In

fact, he reads L'instant as a double event of passivity
situated on two levels. The first is the level of the
story: the witness does not seek escape; indeed, he is
"passive, frozen before the firing squad, a real-fictive
event, real because supposedly experienced, fictive because
related"

{Levinas, Blanchot, Jabes: Figures of

Estrangement, p. 164). Ample evidence of the narrator's
passivity abounds in the text which, moreover, can be read
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as the inevitable rupture of temporality and the loss of a
"sens du reel." Numerous times in the text words are used
to suggest immobility and fixedness.
Second, the repeated use of the word "demeurer" and
its various forms provides an excellent example of this
passivity which in turn disrupts any real sense of time.
"Les Allemands restaient en ordre, prets a demeurer ainsi
dans une immobilite qui arretait le temps"
demeura abrite..."

(p. 12)

("il

(p. 12); "Demeurait cependant...le

sentiment..."(p. 16); "Seul demeure le sentiment..."(p.
2 0 )) .

In contrast to the immobility denoted by the
appearance of "demeurer" in the text, the passage of time
remains indeterminate and this disrupts the progression of
the r e d t. Examples are found in the following statements:
"Apres combien de temps"

(p. 13) and "En realite, combien

de temps s'etait-il ecoule?"

(ibid.) .

The passivity/immobility permeates the relation of the
event and the fluid indeterminacy of the "sentiment de
legerete," described repeatedly as "inanalysable" and
defined as "ni bonheur ni malheur." Despite its
indeterminate status, the "sentiment" is the only thing
that remains at the recit's conclusion,
mort desormais toujours en instance"

"1'instant de ma

(p. 20).

The narrator's acceptance of his impending fate,
according to Mole, occurs because "the relating is the
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experience, the narrator passive before his own event, the
recit itself, deprived of his "'i'" in remembering his
"'self'"

(ibid.).

Because the event lies beyond representation it cannot
be brought into the fictive present of the recit, it cannot
be r e d t-ed and therefore necessarily remains "ce sentiment
inanalysable." Thus, the attempted relation of an event is
impossible and the relating, the testimony, in turn becomes
the event.
Conclusion
In concluding this chapter,

I will provide a brief

recapitulation of my discussion of testimony. First, I have
figured testimony itself as a mode of citationality
differing from that of hearsay. With testimony, the law
stipulates the first-person presentation of facts pertinent
to the case that only that witness in particular has
experienced. The fact that the witness maintains privileged
access to this information renders him/her irreplaceable
and therefore unique, an important consideration in
L'instant de ma mort. With the presentation of the
testimony, there is the problematization of the presence of
the witness, who was first present during the event's
occurrence and who re-presents him/herself in an effort to
re-present the event as testimony. This doubling points to
the citational effects of testimony, which we have examined
in terms of Maurice Blanchot's recits.
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In La Folie du jour, for example, we find a text that
is merely the mise-en-ablme of itself as a citation. The
text as testimony is already cut off from the initial
moment of the witness and event and therefore, can only be
the citation of the moment of bearing witness.
L'arret de mort problematizes the attempt at testimony
through the narrator's perpetual recommencement of his
testimony, a testimony that remains interminable. The
aporia which Derrida considers to be the "pas de Blanchot,"
where each step toward completion of the testimony is also
the negation of that movement, leaves the narrator-witness
suspended between dying and death, as the title indicates.
It is in this recit that the rupture becomes definite, that
the possibility of testimony becomes impossible to achieve.
L'instant de ma mort radicalizes the

testimony to such

an extent that it remains necessarily an impossible
possibility. In other words, the narrator-witness finds
himself placed in the impossible positionof attempting to
testify about his own death.
The following chapter on Derrida's polyvocal texts
marks a departure from these chapters on Duras' and
Blanchot's texts where we have explored the textual
implications of the citational modes of hearsay and
testimony. In Derrida's work, we will discover how
conference is employed as a response to the effects of
citationality.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONFERENCE: THE POLYLOGUES OF JACQUES DERRIDA
Introduct ion
The previous chapters on Duras and Blanchot have
considered their works as the instanciation of two
functions of citationality. Both hearsay and testimony
enter into operation as citational practices that disrupt
and destabilize narrative progression. The insistence on
hearsay in the Lol V. Stein cycle demonstrates, for
example, the impossibility of containing textual threads
with the result that a plurality of other "texts" is
engendered. In Blanchot's recits, testimony problematizes
narrative progression to such an extent that it renders
narrative impossible.
In this chapter I will focus on Derrida's polyvocal
texts to discuss how he radicalizes the question of
citationality through what I will call the "conference" of
his polylogues. These texts establish a new discourse which
is neither fiction nor criticism yet stands as something of
each, on the borderline between the two, functioning
therefore like the hymen he describes in "La Double seance"
and other texts. The conference he enacts to accomplish
these polylogues results in an irrevocable rupture of
boundaries. My use of the term "conference," as in the case
of my other terms "hearsay" and "testimony," arises out of
Jacques Derrida's work on citationality. Therefore, my
158
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analysis of Derrida's polyvocal texts is indebted to his
concept of citationality. This chapter then marks a shift
in my project from using Derrida's work on citationality to
enable my analyses in the previous chapters to reading him
as another object of analysis which renders him a
practitioner of citationality in the same way as Duras and
Blanchot.
Conference
In the legal sense of the term, conference refers to a
formal meeting or colloquy invoked in order to address a
matter of serious consequence. In juridical proceedings in
the courtroom, a conference takes place secretly. Its
purpose is to allow a meeting between the judge and lawyers
to clarify technicalities of the law or the proceedings in
progress. Additionally, the judge may use the forum of a
conference to admonish lawyers. Occasionally, the judge may
call a recess of the proceedings and summon the lawyers
into his chambers to conduct a conference in secret. The
closed doors obviously prevent the jury or others in the
courtroom from being privy to what is discussed.
I choose to use this term of conference in my
discussion of these texts because of what it suggests about
the polyvocal and the way it accounts for how Derrida calls
into question issues of authority, property and origin
while deconstructing the boundaries that traditionally
regulate them. Whereas a conference, in the conventional
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sense, subscribes to a certain set of rules governing its
procedure, Derrida uses the format of the conference to
deconstruct that very system. He effectuates this by
demonstrating that the conference, while subject to laws
regulating it, cannot indeed be contained by those laws.
The subject of the conference will always overrun or exceed
its parameters. Derrida's polylogues carry this out through
their exploitation of a plurality of voices.
The three polylogues I have chosen to discuss in this
chapter are "Restitutions," Feu la cendre and Droit de
regards. What I see as a practice of conference in these
texts developed out of various cases of "double session" in
other texts by Derrida, notably "La Double seance," Glas
and "Envois." The notion of a double session refers to a
writing informed by indecision and instability as denoted
by the hymen:
L'hymen, confusion entre le present et le non
present, avec toutes les indifferences qu'elle
commode entre toutes les series de
contraires...produit un effet de milieu (milieu
comme element enveloppant les deux termes a la
fois: milieu se tenant entre les deux termes).
Operation qui "a la fois" met la confusion
"entre" les contraires et se tient "entre" les
contraires. (La Dissemination, p. 261)
The "double seance" therefore is what functions in two
places at once; it is a writing that "opere en deux lieux
absolument differents, meme s'ils ne sont separes que d'un
voile, a la fois traverse et non traverse, entr'ouvert"
(ibid., p. 273). The "indecidabilite" invoked by the
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concept of the hymen comes into play in the three
polylogues discussed in this chapter. Through a blurring of
borders that delineate fiction from criticism, these texts
situate themselves on that very boundary and in so doing
play out the rule of the hymen. They are at once fictional
texts and critical texts and yet they are neither one nor
the other. While functioning in the sense of the hymen,
these texts also call into question "conference."
"Restitutions"
An aspect of the secrecy surrounding a conference is
that it allows only the participants themselves to be privy
to each other's identity. If others, who are actually not
part of the conference, heard the voices of the
participants,

they would not be able to restitute these

voices to the people they see. Indeed, it is this
undecidability which Derrida exploits in "Restitutions."
This text comprises the final section of La. Verite en
peinture, a title which cites Cezanne who promised: "Je
vous dois la verite en peinture, et je vous la dirai."1 The
performative nature of this utterance is explored by
Derrida throughout the text, as he reveals the ultimate
impossibility of fulfilling such a promise and successfully
restituting a work of art. Cezanne's affirmation
underscores Heidegger's assertion that art "lets truth
originate" and "is the spring that leaps to the truth of
beings in the work."2 Indeed, according to Heidegger, the
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very nature of truth is "aletheia" a "devoilement" or
"unconcealment," an event where the truth is disclosed. In
Is There Truth in Art?, Herman Rapaport describes the work
of art according to Heidegger's principle of "aletheia." He
writes,

"...the work of art is not something to be

pragmatically adjudicated in terms of fixed principles
wherein its correspondence to the world is deemed true or
false..."3 Therefore, the question turns on the
(im)possibility of performing the act that Cezanne
promised, on restituting the truth in painting. In order to
accomplish his exploration of the problematic of
restitution, Derrida orchestrates a "double session" in the
form of a conference that questions this very concept,
especially in its relation to issues of property and
propriety.
Described in the note which opens the text,
"Restitutions" is a polylogue "a n + 1 voix - feminine"

(La

Verite en peinture, p. 2 92). However, in spite of Derrida's
attestation as to the number and gender of the speakers,
the difficulty in determining how this is configured
becomes immediately evident in the text.
The first voice of "Restitutions" commences the
proceedings, which seem to have already begun,
pourtant"

"Et

(p. 293). This first speaker decides that there

should be more than two participants present for there to
be a conference,

"Mais il faudrait atteindre d'etre plus de
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deux pour commencer"

(ibid.) . The second speaker agrees,

"Pour appareiller plutot, et meme plus de trois," at which
time the first speaker adds,

"Les voila. Je commence..."

(ibid.).
Although this opening passage clearly indicates the
participation of more than three speakers, there still
remains a certain level of indeterminacy as to the exact
number of participants. However, throughout La Verite en
peinture there is a constant emphasis on the number four.
As Derrida writes in "Passe-partout," which functions as
the introductory section,
de la peinture"

"J'ecris ici quatre fois autour

(ibid., p. 14) addressing four different

aspects relating to the question of truth in painting:
"Parergon," "+ R (par dessus le marche)," "Cartouches" and
"Restitutions." These four essays "autour de la peinture"
frame the question of painting just as paintings themselves
are framed on four sides.

"Restitutions," as the fourth

essay, weaves together the threads of the previous three in
the form of a polylogue. The three ("n") find themselves
supplemented by "1 voix, qui se trouve etre de femme"
(ibid., p. 15). Yet, as explained in "Passe-partout" each
"se divise, par greffe et contamination de toutes les
autres, et vous n'en aurez jamais fini de traduire"

(ibid.,

p. 5) .
This doubling and contamination functions to such an
extent in "Restitutions" that it is impossible to
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determine which of the voices is female. The following
example chosen somewhat at random from the text fails to
syntactically disclose the gender of the speaker(s) as a
female:

"Je suis pour le moment interesse a la

correspondance entre Meyer Schapiro et Martin Heidegger"
{ibid., p. 309). What we can ascertain from this example is
that this particular speaker is definitely not the female
voice of the group.

"Je suis...interesse" reveals that the

speaker in question is male since there is no feminine
ending to indicate the "je" as female. In the case cited
below, one speaker addresses the others, as clearly shown
in the use of the direct object pronoun "vous" and the
plural agreement:

"Je vous vois choques, dans votre

deference, par la scene"

{ibid., p. 335). Once again, the

presence of a female participant cannot be determined
syntactically, since the agreement of "choques" with "vous"
indicates simply a plurality of speakers. Yet another
example of this type surfaces later in the text: "Vous
paraissez aussi trop surs de ce que vous appelez interne"
{ibid., p. 377). There also remains a question as to the
exact number of conference participants, since there is the
tardy arrival of another speaker,
viens d'entendre..."

"J'arrive en retard. Je

{ibid., p. 333). While there is a

tendency to assume that "'n' + 1" voices equals four,
because of the predominance of that number in La Verite en
peinture, there can still be no certainty as to the number
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peinture, there can still be no certainty as to the number
of speakers.
Even if one of the excerpts cited above did indeed
disclose the gender of the speaker in question as female,
an uncertainty of gender would still exist throughout the
text for the very reason that the participants speak in no
clearly determined order. One loses very quickly any sense
of who is speaking any given time. In other words, it is
impossible to track any particular speaker.
In spite of those uncertainties, what does become
evident is that Derrida himself is one of the participants:
Pour ma part, j 'ai souvent traite, en tous sens,
de la marche et, c'est a peu pres le meme mot, le
meme sens, de la marque et des Marges dont j 'ai
fait un titre. Pas meme en fut un autre. Ai-je
alors parle des pieds? J'en suis pas sur...(p.
301)
Obviously the "je" in question must be Derrida, the
author/signatory of both Marges and Pas. This raises the
question as to the identity of the other participants. It
is quite possible given the evidence in "Restitutions" that
Derrida has actually engaged in a discussion with himself
or even "revenants" that have haunted his own readings of
Heidegger and Schapiro. Since the text deals with the
attempt to place the owner of the empty shoes of Van Gogh's
paintings back into those very shoes, Derrida views the
shoes as haunted by ghosts ("revenants") that persist in
returning, in coming back ("revenir") . The opening passage
in fact attests to this haunting,

"Or nous avons bien la
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une histoire de fantoraes" (ibid., p. 293). Just as Derrida
refers to Heidegger's projection of a peasant owner into
the shoes as his hallucination or fantasy, Derrida perhaps
projects his other voices, including a feminine one, into
the polylogue.
In any case, what is readily apparent in
"Restitutions" is the fact that Derrida effects a
deconstruction of the logic of restituting works of art.
Having already established that "Restitutions" is a
conference in which the restitution of the speakers' voices
is rendered impossible,
that discussion,

I will summarize how the topic of

that of restituting the work of art,

involves a reading of "The Origin of

the Work of Art, " by

philosopher Martin Heidegger and "Still Life as a Personal
Object" by art historian Meyer Schapiro. Both of these
essays address a

series of paintings of shoes by Van Gogh

and seem to take

as their object the restitution of these

painted shoes.
"Restitutions" invokes therefore a double session
between the Schapiro and Heidegger texts and indeed, in so
doing, establishes a mise-en-abime of the text; that is, a
conference of an indeterminate number of speakers set on a
"dialogue"

(to which Heidegger never agreed and in which he

never took part)

of a painting of shoes considered first as

real shoes outside of the painting, then, as objects in the
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painting and finally, as the painting itself, in their
truth as painting.
This "effet de milieu" produced by the hymen comes
into play in "Restitutions" through or as the figure of the
shoes in Van Gogh's painting. Moreover, as Herman Rapaport
elucidates,

the hymen, while marking the difference between

difference and non-difference, effaces it at the same time.
Rapaport contends that the shoes function as the hymen and
themselves stage a double session insofar as they are a
pair, although perhaps not matching, and thus are
inherently divided, split, double and so forth (Is There
Truth in Art?, pp. 99-100).
By taking the figure of the shoes as the hymen,
Derrida allows them to demonstrate how Heidegger's and
Schapiro's claims about the painting fall prey to issues of
indecidability, itself a function of the hymen. In fact,
their essays are based, after all, on a "celebre tableau de
Van Gogh" which Heidegger never identifies and which
remains unidentifiable for Schapiro,

since there were a

series of such paintings of peasant shoes. The fact that
Heidegger did not name or identify which painting in
particular is the "famous painting of Van Gogh" renders
impossible the attempt to ascertain to which one he
referred. Needless to say, Schapiro reproaches Heidegger
for not naming and specifying it. As a result, Schapiro
commences a movement to recall or to restitute the real
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shoes, a movement which carries him beyond the frame of the
painting of shoes:
They are clearly pictures of the artist's own
shoes, net the shoes of a peasant... Later in
Arles he represented, as he wrote in a letter of
August 1888 to his brother "une paire de vieux
souliers," which are evidently his own...4
t

Derrida adds that Schapiro is thus "tire hors du tableau,
ce qui suppose un trou dans la toile"

("Restitutions," p.

305) .
This "trou dans la toile," through which both
Heidegger and Schapiro pass in their quest to re-attach the
shoes of the Van Gogh painting to the "real feet" of a
"real" proprietor, obviously raises questions of borders
and framing as addressed in "Restitutions." Indeed, it is
the parergonal structure of Derrida's text that provides
the textual space for the playing out of the double session
of the shoes. In La Verite de la peinture, Derrida writes:
Un parergon vient contre, a cote et en plus de
1'ergon, du travail fait, du fait, de l'oeuvre
mais il ne tombe pas a cote, il touche et
coopere, depuis un certain dehors, au-dedans de
1'operation. Ni simplement dehors ni simplement
dedans. Comme un accessoire qu'on est oblige
d'accueillir au bord, a bord. {Ibid., p. 61)
As the border, as that which is presumed to delimit the
interior, the text, from its exterior, from that which is
not considered a part of it, the parergon is simultaneously
interior and exterior to the text. Certainly, the parergon
is not limited to the concept of the frame and Derrida
ascertains this by citing, after Kant, the example of a
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statue upon which clothing is placed such that the statue,
or ergon, relates to the parergon, or clothing, by means of
the idea of an accessory. In other words, one can consider
the clothing as non-essential, as something at once part of
the statue and not. The accessory nature of the parergon
underscores its detachability from both the ergon and its
"milieu."
As for the Van Gogh painting presumably in question,
the parergon takes the form of both the frame and
shoe(lace) and disrupts any potentially fixed demarcation
between interior and exterior:
Et l'externe ne reste jamais dehors. Il y va ici
d'une decision quant au cadre, a ce qui separe
1 'interne de l'externe, par une bordure elle-meme
double en son trait et ajointant ce qu'elle
partage. II y va de tous les interets engages
dans le proces de ce partage. La logique du
parergon ici a 1'oeuvre ote a cet egard toute
securite. D'autant plus que le parergon a peutetre ici la forme de ce lacet (dedans-dehors) a
moitie defait dans le tableau, il figure aussi le
rapport du tableau a son dehors. Le tableau est
pris dans le lacet qu'il semble pourtant
comprendre comrae sa partie. (Ibid., pp. 377-78)
The partially undone lace represents the "trou dans la
toile," mentioned above, which allows access to the outside
of the painting by leading Heidegger and Schapiro to
formulate opinions as to the shoes' proprietor. Moreover,
Heidegger's attribution is "not essential - thus
detachable. Schapiro contends Heidegger has ignored mimesis
- not real shoes in the painting," explains Rapaport

(Is

There Truth in Art?, p. 138). In fact the lace weaves in
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and out of the eyelets, emerging exterior to the shoe only
to disappear as it passes under the leather of the shoe,
and by extension behind the canvas. For Rapaport,

the shoes

carry out a double session that "deconstructs the
difference of inferiority (what is proper or attachable to
the shoes) and exteriority (what is merely outside, or
detachable from the shoes)"

{ibid., p. 160) .

The effects of the double session become even more
apparent as "Restitutions" calls into question both
Heidegger's and Schapiro's blind assumptions regarding the
proprietorship of the shoes and their desire to name, to
re-attach and restitute the shoes to a real subject,
thereby returning them to their source of origin and
detaching them from their painted form. Derrida discloses
an elemental assumption made by both Schapiro and Heidegger
which enables them to consider the rightful owner of the
shoes. The fact that they have no doubt that the two shoes
depicted by Van Gogh automatically form a pair is crucial
to their pursuit of the shoes' proprietor and makes Derrida
wonder whether "Schapiro et Heidegger ne se hatent pas de
faire la paire pour se rassurer" despite the
phenomenological impossibility of discerning whether the
shoes actually constitute a pair {ibid., p. 302). This in
turn opens the detached, empty shoes to a sort of haunting
by their subject-owner and forces one to ask,
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de savoir quel pas de revenant, citadin ou paysan, vient
encore les hanter"

(ibid., p. 295) .

Described in "Restitutions" as a "pathetic fantasmic"
attribution of the shoes in the painting to a peasant
woman, Heidegger's essay reveals this so-called
"hallucinogenic" projection of a pair of peasant shoes on
to a peasant woman immediately subsequent to a peculiar
break in the progression of "The Origin of the Work of
Art;" that of: "And yet -" (p. 163) :
From the dark of opening of the worn insides of
shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares
forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of shoes
there is accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge
through the far-spreading and ever-uniform
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the
leather lie the dampness and richness of the
soil. (Ibid.)
This passage expresses essentially the apparent refusal on
the part of Heidegger to entertain the detachment of the
shoes from their owner. His inability to accept the shoes
as they are, that is, as painted objects, results in the
projection of the peasant woman into the painting and into
the shoes. The detachment of the shoes from their owner, as
evidence in "Restitutions" demonstrates, can be considered
doubled because it involves the shoes removed not only from
the feet of a presumed subject-wearer, but also from
reality -- they are but painted objects or a representation
of shoes. Yet Heidegger appears driven to concoct and
reconstitute the story behind the shoes and their alleged
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owner -- a peasant woman -- an assertion for which Schapiro
reproaches him.
Schapiro himself falls prey to the same trap by making
his own assumptions concerning the proprietor of the shoes.
Proclaiming Heidegger's belief that the shoes are a peasant
woman's to be a case of error and false testimony, he moves
forward with his assertion that the shoes in the painting
are actually those of the artist himself. This allegation
prompts Derrida to inquire,
des chaussures

"Que fait-on quand on attribue

(reelles) au signataire presume d'une

peinture dont on presume qu'elle represente ces memes
chaussures?"

(p. 3 03).

Another aspect of the Heidegger-Schapiro essays
brought to light during the conference and revealing a lack
of decidability is the question of gender, in that both the
subject-owner and the shoes are doubled as masculine and
feminine. They are neither one nor the other but are
figured as bisexual. This doubling of sex occurs on several
levels. First, regarding the subject-owner of the shoes, in
that Heidegger unwittingly designates the wearer of the
real shoes outside of the painting initially as masculine,
or, at the very least, he accords an indeterminate gender
to the owner ("une paire de chaussures de paysan"). Second,
Heidegger later transforms, without warning, the sex of the
proprietor from male to female, to "la paysanne." Within
his own discourse there operates a certain indeterminacy
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that, as the conference participants note, Schapiro never
addresses,

ignoring instead this doubling of gender in "The

Origin of the Work of Art." Third, there is, of course, no
question for Schapiro as to the gender of the shoes' owner;
he insists that they are not only the shoes of a man, but a
city dweller, Van Gogh himself.
Apart from the difference of opinion over the shoes'
owner, an indeterminacy of gender also emerges with respect
to the notion of fetishism evoked by the shoes and is
another instance of doubling of gender in the conference.
Derrida indeed wonders whether they themselves can be
attributed to a particular sex, whether there exists:
une equivalence symbolique entre le pretendu
'symbole' 'chaussure' et tel ou tel organe
genital ou si seule une syntaxe differentielle et
idiomatique pouvait arreter la bisexualite, lui
conferer telle valeur entrainante ou dominante,
etc. (p. 349)
As explained by Derrida, the form of the shoe corresponds
at once to both the male and female genitalia,

"allonges,

solides ou fermes sur une surface, creux ou concaves de
1'autre"

(p. 307). This parergonal quality of the shoe's

form, where sex, among other things, is doubled, promotes
an indeterminacy that haunts the polylogue.

Indeed, the

double session staged through the figure of the shoes
allows Derrida to carry out his critique of the concept of
restitution. In fact, his insistence on the "n + 1 voix"
formula to structure "Restitutions" plays on an
indeterminacy evident in any conference. By demonstrating
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the difficulty of attributing, or restituting,

the voices,

disembodied from their "owners," Derrida deconstructs the
logic of restitution. The voices participating in this
conference on the shoes of Van Gogh's paintings in the end
remain disembodied,

and like the shoes, unable to be

restituted. The pluralization of voices used to invoke a
conference opens the text to allow the dissemination of
doubling. This doubling is obviously set in abime since it
involves pairs of shoes

(owned by Van Gogh or a peasant

woman) doubled by the pair formed by Heidegger and
Schapiro. These pairs are pluralized (doubled again) by the
already doubled (fourth) essay of "Restitutions" which
pluralizes its own voices. This essay of course commences
as already split or double with two initial speakers
waiting for the arrival of others.
As we have seen in "Restitutions," both Heidegger and
Schapiro propose to unveil truth. Yet their essays unveil
the fact that the restitution or re-attachment of shoes to
their owner, to their source or origin,
Derrida reveals in this text is the,

is impossible. What

"Deconstruction of the

difference between what frames and what is framed, with the
result that the painting by Van Gogh becomes an abyssal
mimetology...of frames upon/within frames"

(Is There Truth

in Art?, p. 23). He accomplishes this because the polylogue
or conference that constitutes "Restitutions" mimics the
Heidegger-Schapiro "dialogue" and places it within the
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abyss it forms by framing again the painting(s) of Van
Gogh.
Feu la cendre
Feu la cendre is comprised of a polylogue of an
indeterminate number of voices on the right-hand pages,
offset by "Animadversiones," which runs intermittently
throughout the text on the facing left-hand pages. Meaning
"observations" or "assessments," "Animadversiones"
additionally recalls the now defunct journal Anima in which
Derrida first published his polylogue treating the concept
of ashes or cinders. In Feu la cendre the "Animadversiones"
are indeed a gathering of citations apropos of cinders
taken from other texts by Derrida such as Glas, La Carte
postale and La Dissemination. In addition, although there
is no direct reference made to it, this text alludes to
Telepathie. Schibboleth, a text published in homage to Paul
Celan in 1986 was not yet published when Feu la cendre
appeared, but that text also addresses cinders,

"il y a la

cendre, peut-etre, mais une cendre n'est p a s . " 5
By placing the "Animadversiones" on the facing pages
of the polylogue, Derrida demonstrates the disseminative
quality of cinders as trace. For Ned Lukacher, the text's
English translator, this construction of Feu la cendre
"destabilizes the genealogical inquiry into antecedents and
consequences in the very act of posing it. When did the
gathering of cinders begin?"

(p. 7). In other words, by
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grafting these citations on the facing pages from the
polylogue, Derrida underscores the impossibility of being
able to determine which part preceded and gave rise to the
other, the "Animadversiones" or the polylogue. Such a
textual graft, where two discourses are bound side by side,
establish reverberations which Jonathan Culler compares to
a tympanum which both divides and acts as a sounding board
creating vibrations between the two texts (On
Deconstruction, p. 136). This construction, as Lukacher
explains, belies what questions the text seems to be
addressing, those concerning the origin.
A special 1987 edition of Feu la cendre included an
audio cassette recording by Derrida and Carole Bouquet
vocalizing the written text. As Derrida cautions in his
prologue, the recording of one male voice and one female
voice does not imply that this text is a duet. In an effort
to emphasize the irreducibility of Feu la cendre to a oneon-one conversation, the recording ("gramaphonie") makes
reference periodically to "une autre voix," itself a voice
possibly present during the proceedings and quite possibly
the silent voice of the other. Therefore rather than
reducing the number of voices, the nuances of the recording
allow a multiplicity of voices to be engendered. Yet, even
allowing for the plurivocality, there is always a call for
another voice.
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While the recording is of a male and a female voice,
the written text contains other grammar-based gender
markers that remain inaudible in the recording. Such
markers are writing-based so that they become imperceptible
when the text is vocalized. An example is found in the
sentence,

"J'en suis presque sure," where there is

agreement between the subject "je" and the adjective
modifying it,

"sure"

(p. 35). The addition of the "e" to

belie the feminine gender of the speaker does not affect
pronunciation in any way, although it is visually marked.
Such a strategy allows Derrida to further problematize the
relationship of speech to writing. As he states in the
prologue to Feu la cendre, the inaudibility of written
gender markers "aggrave une certaine indecision entre
I'ecriture et la voix," an indecision which is already in
place in the phrase "il y a la cendre" since "la" must be
considered both with and without the legible but inaudible
accent mark (p.

8

).

In the text itself the citations gathered for this
project attest to the long-term haunting to which Derrida
has been subjected by the phrase "Il y a la cendre," upon
his text focuses. For Derrida,

"la cendre" provides the

means for him to discuss his conception of the trace. In
Schibboleth,

for example, he even writes,

"Trace ou

cendre," suggesting the effectiveness of "cendre" in
portraying the breadth of meanings he attributes to "trace"
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(Schibboleth, p. 67). One must therefore be careful here to
not limit a consideration of the trace to the word
"cendre," for this word is by no means the only one which
allows access to a conceptualization of Derrida's notion of
the trace. However,

it can be said that, "cendre," as

disclosed in this text, best approaches an understanding of
the trace.
Lukacher explains in his introduction to the English
translation of Feu la. cendre:
Cinder is at once the best name for the absence
of a truly proper name for that which holds all
beings and entities in presence, and by the same
token just another name that cannot begin to
assess its distance or proximity to the final
proper name (or names) of the truth of Being,
whose very existence remains undecidable. (p. l)
Cinders therefore offer Derrida a paradigm for the trace,
which, he writes,

"n'est pas, comme certains l'ont

cru,...la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon dans le
sable, le sillage dans la mer...mais la cendre"

(p. 27).

If the cinder allows for an understanding of trace,
then the conference Derrida employs in Feu la cendre plays
out the nuances of the cinder as trace by problematizing
questions of origin. This stems from the cinder's post
incineration status.
In fact, as that which remains after the burning, the
remains of the remainder, the cinder raises numerous
questions related to origin and proper name, difference,
the holocaust and mourning as well as their dissemination
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and citation. The cinder as trace marks absence in such a
way that it is a "reste de ce qui n'est pas, pour ne
rappeler au fond friable d'elle que non-etre ou impr£sence"
(p. 23) . This effacement, where the trace marks, erases
itself only to re-inscribe itself: "... voila une matiere visible mais lisible a peine - qui ne renvoyant qu'a ellem§me ne fait plus trace, a moins qu'elle ne trace qu'en
perdant la trace qu'elle reste a peine"

(p. 27).

Unlike smoke which also remains after fire, after the
burning, as its by-product, ultimately dissipating, the
cinder is not completely dispersed. Instead, the cinder
remains as a material that can be touched and frittered
away. In its post-pyrification fragility, the cinder is
infinitely divisible. Each cinder can fall away and thus
yield to numerous other cinders and resultingly become the
cinder of its cinders. This disseminative incineration
serves to prevent the return to the cinder; it in fact
defers any access to it. This is much the same as the
conference itself, which is composed of a plurality of
voices that can neither be traced throughout the conference
nor restituted to their bodies, their point of origin.
Of course, the distinction must be made between the
word "ash" and "cinder" in English. As the translator of
Feu la cendre, Lukacher chooses the word "cinder" which he
describes as a "very fragile entity that falls to dust;
[yet], cinders also name the resilience and intractability
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of what is most delicate and most vulnerable"

(Cinders, p.

2). Cinders smolder; they can still be burning and
therefore evoke Derrida's notion of "restance."
The word "cinder" is even a cinder of the cinder
itself, for this common name cannot grant access to the
proper name ("Cinder," the Other, the Being) hidden within
i t . This deferral holds implications for any attempt at
gaining access to the proper name whose locus we would
presume to be at the origin of language itself:
Je comprends que la cendre n'est rien qui soit au
monde, rien qui reste comme un etant. Elle est
l'etre, plutot, qu'il y a - c'est un nom de
l'etre qu'il y a la mais qui, se donnant, n'est
rien, reste au-dela de tout ce qui est, reste
imprononqable pour rendre possible le dire alors
qu'il n'est rien. (p. 57)
The cinder then signals the possibility of language without
being able to name the conditions that allow it. According
to Lukacher, it names therefore neither truth nor its
impossibility. He writes:
Because we do not know whether or not there is a
final proper name of Being, we will always hear a
residual, silent promise of the name. (Cinders,
p. 7)
The smoldering cinders that are the name/trace of the
proper name are always there; yet the naming of that proper
name is impossible. The conference functions similarly in
that the voices participating cannot be named; they remain
necessarily disembodied.
In De 1'esprit: Heidegger et la. question, Derrida
elucidates on that text's relation to Feu la cendre by
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discussing the primordial beginning of language. He
accomplishes this by reading Heidegger's "On the Way to
Language," in which Heidegger refers to the spirit as a
flame that glows and shines .6 Additionally, Heidegger makes
reference to the delicacy of the relation between language
and truth. His concept of "Ereignis" is described by
Lukacher as a "double movement in which language is incised
by the withdrawal of the unnameable otherness of its origin
and is thereby set into its own proper nature"

(Cinders, p.

2). This anticipates Derrida's notion of the cinder as a
trace that effaces itself as it makes itself present. In
the polylogue, this occurs on the level of the participants
in the conference. At times, a particular voice, the female
voice, for example, makes itself recognizable through the
gender markers of written language. Yet, the instant this
voice becomes "present," it becomes lost again.
Corresponding to the undecidability of which voice is
speaking when is the question of origin. Again, we find
that the matters discussed in the conference are played out
by the very (citational) act of the conference itself. For
example, in Feu la cendre Derrida makes allusion to Hegel's
notion of "Klang" as found in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.
For Hegel, the "Klang" is a ringing noise at the origin of
language itself. In Derrida's terms, a cinder burns at the
origin between speech and Klang. Before it enters
meaningfulness,

"il y a la cendre" is initially a ringing
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sound, similar to glas. This almost pre-linguistic sound
reverberates like the "unnameable otherness" discussed by
Heidegger and located at the origin.
The "difference" that is the "beginning" of language
takes place in Feu la cendre by means of the word "la" as
it functions in the sentence "II y a la cendre." Throughout
the text, there is an oscillation operating within this
word. At times read and considered without the accent mark
as the definite feminine article "la cendre," "the cinder,"
it suggests equally the word "there" or "la" when the
"accent grave" is in place. Lukacher suggests that it
inscribes the trace of something beyond itself that remains
always inaccessible. As such, it is what is there and is
not. It makes itself present only to withdraw again. Double
and divided,

"la" operates as this silent undecidability.

The format of the conference functions in much the same
manner and the fact that the topic of the conference
focuses on the phrase "il y a la cendre" sets the entire
project in abime while simultaneously deconstructing the
ontological concepts related to it.
The phrase "Il y a" functions in a manner similar to
"Es gibt" in German since both phrases carry the meaning of
the "there-ness" of the being as a type of presence. The
English formulation of the phrase "il y a," "there is/are,"
is misleading since it has the sense of the verb "to be."
This shifts the emphasis from the "there-ness" to "being"
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as in the essence of the entity- In the sentence "Il y a la
cendre," for example, the (non-)being of cinders remains
indeterminate and indeterminable.
The question of origin resurfaces in Feu la cendre
through the problematization of the word
"s'androgynocident," which is played out in the conference
with the undecidability of origin and gender. In his essay
"La Pharmacie de Platon," Derrida regards the back room as
the site of origin, prior to the emergence of difference
and oppositions like speech and language

as well as gender

difference .7 This is the place where the

cinders

"s'androgynocident," a neologism of Derrida's that combines
the French words for androgynous and genocide and whose
oral form evokes the word "cendre." This

neologism emerges

from the verb "s'andrent," which carries

the same

pronunciation as "cendres" and suggests the primordial predifferentiation of gender. The verb "s'androgynocident"
denotes as well genocide as in the Holocaust, where all
burns and only cinders remain. In Feu la cendre, the
cinders are the citations of the conference and they remain
severed from their origin. Once irrecovably detached and
grafted in a new context, that of Feu la cendre, they take
on another meaning and function differently. Because they
are now what remains, yet also what differs, they cannot be
restituted or re-attached to their various sources.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

Another way in which the conference problematizes the
question of origin is through its insistence on the
undecidability of the very word precipitating the
conference itself: "cendre." Although the feminine "la
cendre" plays an important role in Feu la cendre, the
gender of "cendre" remains indeterminate. This stems from
the conference participants' vacillation between "la" and
"la." The reference to "la Cendre" as "Cendrillon"
("Cinderella") of the fairy tale recalls the passage in
which Cinderella is covered in ashes and mocked by her
stepsisters. Yet the instability of what is "there" or what
is present at any given moment propels the movement away
from "la" to "la" which effaces the gender, the "she" of
"la cendre."
In addition to the conference disclosing the "cinder"
as female at times and as the trace of what remains
subsequent to the fire which burned at the origin, the
speakers also address, or are addressed by citations, other
voices, gathered in the "Animadversiones," taken from "La
Pharmacie de Platon" as twice published in Tel Quel and La
Dissemination. In the version of the essay from Tel Quel,
Derrida writes,

"Aussitot que tu auras lu et relu cette

lettre, brule-la . " 8 However, the version that appeared in
La Dissemination, contains the phrase "il y a la cendre"
appearing immediately after the imperative "Brule-la." It
reads as follows: "Vite, un double...graphite...carbone...
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relu cette lettre...brule-la. II y a la cendre"

(La

Dissemination, p. 213). In terms of the letter, or "envoi,"
the message cannot reach its destination without being
burned, without already being a trace or cinders.
Referred to as the "mission impossible" a veiled
reference to the television program where an audiotape
self-destructs, reduced to cinders in a puff of smoke, the
following phrase stands for the cinder of "toutes nos
etymologies perdues." This cinder "ne dit pas ce qu'elle
est mais ce qu'elle fut"

(p. 19). The passe simple verb

form "fut" is quite similar to "fut" the imparfait form of
the subjunctive of the verb "to be." The emphasis placed on
the word "fut," meaning "departed" in the sense of "passed
away," holds interesting implications for this particular
text, in that cinders are what remain after the burning,
the fire. Signifying what was once, or what is now dearly
departed,

"fut" suggests mourning following the holocaust:

...discretement ecartee, la dissemination phrase
ainsi en cinq mots ce qui pour le feu se destine
a la dispersion sans retour, la pyrification de
qui ne reste pas et ne revient a personne. (p.
23)
The discussion on the holocaust in fact occupies the
majority of the "Animadversiones." For Derrida, as Lukacher
explains, the holocaust, or "brule-tout," is "entirely
other, non-present and outside the theorizable limits of
ontology,
nonmemory"

leaving only the cinder traces of an absolute
(p. 13).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

What destabilizes the text as the conference on
(access to) the origin of language, of holocaust, of gender
difference is the insistence on the conference format
itself with its indeterminate voices and its play between
oral and written connotations inherent in the phrase "il y
a la cendre." The conference that constitutes Feu la cendre
explores the deconstruction of ontological questions raised
by the undecidability of that phrase.
Stitching together the citations or cinders, which
function themselves as voices in the conference, from La
Carte postale, La Dissemination and Glas on the left-hand
pages and the voices in conference on the right-hand pages,
Derrida demonstrates that each cinder can always generate,
or fritter away into, more cinders. Yet, in spite of the
disseminative quality of cinders, the access to the origin
of those cinders, in their pre-incineration state cannot be
gained or achieved. Whereas "Restitutions" demonstrated
through its conference the ultimate failure of the
performance of presenting the truth, Feu la cendre
similarly discloses the inability of accessing the Other,
of naming the name at the origin.
Droit de regards
The third of the polylogues I will discuss is
Droit de regards, a text found to pose questions relating
to the visual in a similar manner to "Restitutions."
However,

instead of addressing the question of restituting
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the shoes of Van Gogh's painting to their "rightful" owner,
Derrida here provides the written text, in the form of a
conference, to accompany a photo-essay by Belgian
photographer Marie-Frangoise Plissart. Her "photo-roman" is
in fact a series of black and white photos capturing
various episodes in the personal lives of several
"characters." Plissart's text of photos leaves its story
open to interpretation and waiting to be constructed, even,
by those who dare to "regard" it in the same way as the
photographer.
In Droit de regards, Derrida's conference is appended
to the "roman-photo" and was released with it in the same
book under the same title thereby immediately raising
questions of the parergonal that are also played out within
the "roman-photo." As appendix or accessory to the photos,
Derrida's text problematizes the way it informs a reading
of the photos. This is carried out through the effects the
polylogue has on them. Droit de regards is less a viewing,
or looking, of this photography in terms of voyeurism, than
it is a reading and a questioning of the laws that
determine what such a reading entails,

"Au lieu du

spectacle, les voila qui instituent un lecteur ou une
lectrice, et au lieu du voyeurisme l'exegese"

(p. v ) .

Initially what is at stake in Droit de regards is the
question of "genre" as in the double connotation of both
"genre" and "gender." In terms of genre, or rather the
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attribution of the text(s) to the genre "proper" to
it/them, Droit de regards escapes any clear cut
delineation, teetering instead on the borderline between
various genres. The subheading "roman-photo" indicates, for
example, the impossibility of categorizing the photos,
which are neither a novel nor merely photographs. Not
unlike a "nouveau roman,

11

the work lacks a progressive

linear form as one would find in conventional narrative
forms. Yet, because it does present a grouping of photos
with recurring characters,

indicative, therefore, of

narrative elements, the photos must be viewed as something
more than "just" photography.
For this reason, Derrida insists on the "generique"
elements of the photos. Related to the word "genre," forms
of which these photos exceed,

"generique" refers to the

written text ("credits") that is an appendix to, say, a
film, but more importantly to the generating aspects
inherent in the photo-text. In this sense,

"generique" is

the way in which this series of photos continually
generates new and divergent narrative threads:
Il nous a semble qu'il n'y avait, dans cette
centaine de pages, que des generiques, une suite
de generiques dans lesquels on passe comme d'une
piece a 1'autre. Les photographies generatrices,
l'une incluse dans 1 'autre, sont a la fois plus
grandes et plus petites que toute leur suite, (p.
ii)
These narrative threads reveal a playing out of gender
issues, in what Derrida calls "une partie de dames." For,
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of the eight characters photographed, all but one are
female. Yet, problems associated with (in)determinacy arise
here as a translation issue, since the French word for the
game piece,

"une dame" is the equivalent of "King" in

English. The translation of the term "dame" as "king" in
English, therefore, finds the question of decidability
always in suspense between itself and gender and itself and
language. This play of sexual difference evidenced in
Derrida's metaphorical usage of the game terms "partie de
dames" and "dame" is not limited, however, to a simple
question of gender difference in translation.
The indeterminacy of gender is best exemplified in the
figure of the "she-male" who appears midway through the
"roman-photo." Attired in black with a shaved head and
angular facial features, this (wo)man is masculinized to
such an extent that, from a distance, her gender is in
question.

It is perhaps not without coincidence that she is

the character who wields the pen as a writing subject and
remains detached and objective in the narrative series
constituting the photos.
Since Derrida reads the photos in terms of a boardgame
and the characters in those photos as "dames," this allows
his consideration not only of gender but also of spacing or
movement reflecting the indeterminacy and fluidity of the
photo series. The issues of genre and gender are in fact
indeterminate and perhaps indeterminable, because they
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hinge on a certain mobility, or play, which impedes the
designation of fixed meaning. Indeed, the ever-shifting
positions, sexual, authorial and otherwise, serve to call
into question genre, in the sense of gender as well as in
the sense of literary genre.
In addition to the mobility of verbal play in the
text, there is also a mobility of the images or the visual.
In fact, the positions that shift usually involve the
sexual positions of the female lovers photographed placed
on top of one another and then lying next to one another.
The shifts evident in the ever-changing physical
positioning of the photographed subjects, occur also with
authorial voice which remains indeterminate both in the
"roman-photo" and in Derrida's conference. Throughout the
text(s) the constant re-positioning of subjectivity and
voice reveals disunity as an effect of the play in
Plissart's and Derrida's work. In the "roman-photo," for
example, the shifts in photographic subject echo the shifts
in photographer, displaying a multiple subjective
perspective. At times, the various photographers are
themselves folded into the series of photographs making it
obvious that there is an indeterminate number of shooting
subjects. In fact, several shots reveal different female
characters holding cameras and shooting various other
characters, placing "en abime" Plissart's work as
photographer and destabilizing her own authority as unified
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subject controlling all the shots. Of course, the
photographing characters are photographed simultaneously by
other photographers whose identity remains undisclosed.
Such a technique, or a maneuvering, on the part of Plissart
gives the impression that the reader encounters the
narrative from the perspective of any number of charactersubj ects.
Derrida, of course, employs much the same technique in
his contribution. A conference, after all, is the assembly
of persons for a meeting or discussion on a particular
topic and necessarily entails an exchange where a
multiplicity of voices comes into play. In Droit de
regards, the number of voices participating in the
discussion is never specified; indeed, the shifts from "tu"
to "vous" deny any such determination, as the following
passage indicates,

"Vous ne saurez jamais, toi non plus,

toutes les histoires, ni meme en totalite l'une seulement
des histoires que je me suis encore racontees"

(p. iii).

Although there is an indeterminate number of
participants in the conference, there is definitely at
times the ability to determine the gender of some of those
speakers. Syntactically, this is revealed several times
during the text in phrases such as, "Je te vois pensive et
aussi indecise"

(p. iv) where there is agreement made with

adjectives indicative of a female participant.
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In spite of the designation of gender, which I was
unable to determine in "Restitutions," Droit de regards
functions in much the same way as the other texts by
preventing a clear understanding of who is speaking when.
It is impossible to track the order in which the conference
participants speak. Occasionally, gender identification
becomes possible, as in the example cited above; yet, the
instant it comes into focus, it is lost again.
The above-described shifts between narrative voices
and perspectives in the photo-text and in Derrida's
parergonal text underscore an explicit resistance to
determining "one" story; there are a plurality of stories
that perpetually slip in and out of focus. This lack of
univocity reinforces the notion that "il y a des recits
impossibles,
racontable"

illisibles ou interdits...tout cela n'est pas
(p. iii).

In "Deposition" David Wills reads such remarks
regarding forbidden texts as a commentary on the state of
reading in general at a time when certain texts and genres
are taboo and off-limits:
...there is a profound modification in respect of
reading, the politics of reading, reading as a
political act...Right of Inspection questions the
logic of a written text in apposition to a
photographic text, it questions that logic in
terms of the law, or institutional restraint. It
seeks therefore to perform "looking" as, and to
transform "looking" into, a type of reading .9
Carried out only through the discourse of the polylogue,
this text undertakes a deconstruction of the law of
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looking. As Derrida writes,

"tu es libre mais il y a des

regies. II y a la loi qui assigne le droit de regard, tu
dois observer ces regies qui a leur tour te surveillent"
(p. ii). This law grants one the right to look; it allows
a certain level of freedom, of mobility, as on the game
board, but it still attempts to regulate that movement, a
regulation which this text calls into question. Derrida
explains:
On ne peut que lire. Je repete, il n'y a que du
regard et du droit de regard dans cette oeuvre,
mais comme tout y fait la guerre en vue du droit,
on n'y releve que des lignes de demarcation, des
marques, des limites, des bordures, et des traces
de debordement. (p. ix)
Just as the photo series itself questions the law of genre,
which would regulate and clearly demarcate the status of
what one reads/sees, the conference, as an accessory,
parergonal to the photo series, raises similar questions.
The indeterminacy informing the conference results in a
plurality of perspectives that can be read with or without
the photo text.
Conclusion
Derrida's polylogues,

"Restitutions," Feu la cendre

and Droit de regards offer an approach to the question of
citationality that differs from that of both Duras and
Blanchot. Previously I have used Derrida's work on
citationality to read Duras and Blanchot in terms of
hearsay and testimony, respectively. In this chapter I have
conducted a reading of Derrida as an object of my analysis.
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This maneuver folds Derrida into my practice of
citationality and makes his work part of that practice and
not just a means of access to it.
What I have found through my reading of Derrida's
polylogues is the insistence on conference as means of
problematizing issues of borders, origin and genre. As a
conventionally oral mode of communication, conference, in
the juridical sense, subscribes to certain regulatory
codes. Derrida's texts reveal the deconstruction of these
codes and boundaries with an emphasis on the undecidability
of a plurality of ever-pluralizing voices.
With citationality, in general, there is always the
potential to break the conventions that govern how a
conference is conducted and the regulations that limit its
content and function. In terms of conference, therefore,
there exists a certain level of undecidability that impedes
interpretation and restitution. One of the citational
effects we have seen in this chapter is the mise-en-abime
of conference topics without any means of accessing what
would be considered to be the origin.
In "Restitutions," for example, we saw the conference
as a means of demonstrating the impossibility of
restituting, of delivering the truth in a work of art.
Feu la cendre with its double conference taking place on
facing pages of the text problematizes the question of
origin as the vacillation between the left-hand pages and
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the right-hand pages underscores the inability to determine
which conference precedes the other. This reflects the
indeterminacy in the phrase around which the text centers,
"Il y a la cendre." Finally, the "photo-roman" Droit de
regards uses conference to play with genre in such a way as
to render the gender of the characters and the genre of the
text(s)

itself as blurred.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BEARING WITNESS: CULTURAL SITES OF CITATIONALITY
Introduction
The previous chapters have focused exclusively on a
discussion of the implications of citationality as found in
the texts of Duras, Blanchot and Derrida. I have examined
citationality as a condition of the law of iterability,
according to which there exists the potential inherent in
any sign to cite and to be cited, to overrun the borders
which appear to contain it and to come to function in a
plurality of new contexts.
This potential for a sign to break from its "present"
context and to be re-cited in a new one holds particular
implications for the so-called performative utterance,
which is a speech act that performs the act of what is
uttered. To accomplish this, the performative subscribes to
certain conventions and codes which regulate its use.
However, as Derrida has shown, iterability enables any
utterance to be detached from its source or origin, thereby
irrevocably severing it. Furthermore, Derrida has
demonstrated the condition of potential failure for any
performative utterance.
This principle of iterability,

from which

citationality stems, raises important questions, which I
have addressed in the previous chapters. Among these
questions are certainly those related to origin, since
196
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citational effects are such that the origin, especially in
the sense of the originary event, always already escapes
accessibility. With the means of access severed, there
remains the infinite dissemination of its traces, as
citations, or even as cinders, as previously seen, in a
movement that attempts the recuperation of the origin or
originary event.
Another element called into question by the function
of citationality is that of property. This relates to the
signatory of an utterance, or the so-called "proprietor" of
an utterance. In terms of performative speech acts, the
signatory or proprietor enters into what can be considered
a contractual agreement, committing him/her-self to act in
good faith and fulfill the promise of the performative.
Owing to its disseminative character, citationality
produces effects that result in the crossing of borders as
well. In general,

this involves a movement from the private

sphere to the public sphere instigated by the enactment of
bearing witness, of disclosing a secret.
These questions relating to origin, property and
borders between private and public have been raised
throughout my discussion of hearsay, testimony and
conference and have been shown to problematize the texts
which insist on these citational modes. These fundamental
issues have become pertinent in other contexts,
particularly the political and cultural realms, where there
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has been, in recent times, what can be considered a
"crisis" of citationality.
I attribute this crisis to changes in what constitutes
the private and the public. The status of the private has
been altered by the advent of the internet and the
proliferation of media. Related to the blurring of
boundaries between private and public spheres is the
increased secularization of "confession." This
traditionally religious act of bearing witness is no longer
confined to the private disclosure of a testimony to a
priest. Instead, confessional acts have moved out of the
church and into the secular, public domain as evidenced by
certain television programs. Another possible explanation
of the citation crisis involves the altered status of the
printed text. This change stems directly from rapid
advances in technology, particularly in video and
telecommunications. These examples are but a few of the
possible explanations contributing to what I view as a
general crisis in citation. These changes,

in the private

and public spheres, confession and the printed text, raise
the very questions about citationality that I have already
addressed in this project. Therefore, the relevance of
questions stemming from citational practices such as
hearsay, testimony and conference and the increasing crisis
related to the status of citation in other textual forms
explicates the shift this chapter makes to discuss
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citationality in the broader context of cultural studies.
This shift allows the exploration of politically and
sociologically pertinent "texts" in terms of my project.
Textual forms I will discuss in this chapter include
Latin American testimonio, Holocaust survivors'
testimonies, President Clinton's impeachment and television
talk shows. To begin, I will consider the Latin American
tradition of testimonio. Since it quotes the idea of
testimony but its function and purposes differ in important
respects from the work of Maurice Blanchot,

I feel

compelled to devote some attention to this "genre"
considered unique to Latin American studies. I will also
address the highly politicized debate this genre has
provoked in the United States over multicultural studies.
After discussing testimonio, I will explore the rise in
interest in another manifestation of testimony, that of
Holocaust survivors. The rise in interest in documenting
survivors' testimonies has been enabled by technological
advances which have engendered such projects as Yale
University's Video Archives for Holocaust Survivors and
paradoxically, have allowed what I consider a
personalization of testimonies, in that the videotape
attributes a face to the testimony.
Next, I will turn to the Clinton and Lewinsky scandal.
The investigation and impeachment trial elicited a double
confession from Clinton, in addition to the differing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

200

testimonies, and thus "truths," by him and Lewinsky.
Independent counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation raised
questions of truth and perjury indispensable in any
consideration of acts of bearing witness. This allows us to
investigate citationality as a political and legal
practice.
After discussing the Clinton matter, I will turn to
talk shows, a phenomenon that has exploded in popularity
and interest over the last decade. Questions of bearing
witness are particularly evident in this context since what
is at stake with regard to television talk shows is not
only citational effects such as border-crossing between the
public and private, but also the doubling of witness and
event. As I will discuss, talk shows operate, in effect, as
explicit citations of juridical proceedings, granting
authenticity and credibility to the show. Yet, implied
claims of credibility are called into question with
allegations of collective perjury on the part of these
shows and their producers.
Before proceeding to the examination of these cultural
and political instances involving acts of bearing witness,
I will review the principles associated with the
performative utterance since they bear heavily on questions
of iterability and citationality. In what David Wills
describes as the signatory utterance, the performative
utterance deals with the universal human acts of
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witnessing, promising and relating experiences of faith.1
The performative's relation to witnessing stems from its
definition as an utterance which produces meaning through
the carrying out, or enactment, of what it states. It is
according to Judith Butler a "coincidence of signifying and
enacting"

("Burning Acts: Injurious Speech," p. 150). The

utterance gains meaning, in other words, when it coincides
with the performance of a ritualized act, such as the words
"I do" spoken during a wedding ceremony or "I hereby
declare..." to officially launch a ship while smashing a
bottle of champagne over i t .
Austin, of course, was either unable to or unsure of
how to treat cases which did not conform to his model and
therefore sought to exclude such cases with the aim of
"temporarily" eliminating potential problems. Admittedly,
he did qualify this exclusion as provisional or temporary,
but that does not however compensate for this maneuver.
Furthermore, Austin's description of these cases as
"parasitical" and "etoliations" of the normal or standard
use of language is equally problematic.
In my first chapter, I traced Derrida's line of
argument as seen primarily in "Signature Evenement
Contexte" and "Limited Inc a b c..." where he refutes
Austin's and Searle's claims of the "deviant" nature of the
examples of performative utterance and the necessity of
eliminating them from discussion.
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To briefly summarize, Derrida reads such cases of
parasitical discourse not as exceptions to the rule of
performative but rather as necessary possibilities that
hold true for any and all performatives, as possibilities
that constitute the rule. If such a plethora of "nonserious" and "parasitical" utterances is possible, then
these cases should not, and moreover, cannot be dismissed
as aberrations delimited from so-called serious uses of
language. As Derrida contends,

(the) failure, parasiting

and non-serious are but instances of what is possible for
any utterance and mark. In fact, he insists that this
condition of possibility is inscribed in each and every
mark and is the condition of iterability or citationality
of language in general.
This law of iterability informs the performative in
ways other than the exclusion of certain types of
utterance. Indeed, one of the reasons adduced by Austin in
delimiting the category of the non-serious is the misuse or
misfire of otherwise "legitimate" performatives, meaning
the carrying out of the performative in bad faith, with
poor or questionable intentions. As discussed earlier,
Austin's requirement that both speaker and receiver impart
purely good intentions in the enactment of the performative
presupposes a determinacy as well as the ability of
interlocutors to be fully present throughout the
performance of the performative. Additionally, these
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stipulations institute a set of boundaries that seek to
limit each performative in such a way as to prohibit its
citation. Yet, interestingly enough, each case of a
performative is already the citation of another, because
its obeys pre-established conventions that regulate its
enactment. Therefore, the putative singularity of the
occurrence of the performative is actually but the citation
of another performative, itself a citation. The iterable
structure of performatives must be recognized. Just as each
instance of a performative is the citation of a preceding
one, each performative, in fact, every sign, is subject to
being iterated or cited. As stated previously, any mark can
be subjected to a disseminative process, whereby it can be
lifted, or stolen, and carried into a different context to
function in a different manner. Once grafted into a new
context, the mark has been repeated and altered. This
condition of possibility enables the breaching and
broaching of borders supposed to separate contexts. Whereas
Austin's conception of the performative maintains a
delineation between felicitous and non-felicitous
utterances based in part on the fully present and involved
interlocutors acting in good faith, iterability or
citationality recognizes the possibility of dissemination
and graft that resists closure by borders. If we accept
these principles of citationality, we can then view various
cases of performative, such as witnessing and promising, in
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those terms. This in turn provides the space for my
addressing questions related to the boundaries between the
public and private and truth and falsehood. As I mentioned
earlier in this chapter, these questions have become
increasingly important in recent times, as evidenced by the
proliferation of cases of bearing witness and testimony.
Generally, acts of witnessing involve the attempt to
gain access to the truth, to the originary event. The fact
that witnesses in the American courtroom must swear on the
Bible to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth" shows quite clearly that the desire for the
revelation of the truth serves as the impetus for bearing
witness. In the chapter on Maurice Blanchot, I have
explained that the law requires that the witness be present
in the courtroom to testify. Bearing witness is normally
conducted live, in the first-person, as if the "presence"
of the witness to the truth ensures its veracity, an idea
that can be traced back to Aristotle's privileging of
speech for its proximity to the soul and, therefore, to the
"word," or logos, the "truth" in its purest possible state.
Since the witness is present during the proceedings
and delivers testimony live and in his/her own voice,
witnessing is generally considered a moment of truth that
is pure and unmediated. Such an act presumably offers the
most direct access to the truth that is conceivable
without external influence or technological intervention.
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Taking this desire for a lack of technological influence in
conventional matters of testimony into consideration,

it is

all the more pertinent that the increased contemporary
interest in acts of bearing witness is occurring in a
highly mediated context.
Although the reasons for the proliferation of acts of
bearing witness are not necessarily clear or
distinguishable, one possibility is the incredibly rapid
technologization of society in recent years. Obviously, the
result of these advances in technology is an increased
reliance on automation which produces a reduction in the
amount of contact and interaction with other human beings.
One example is found in the evolution in banking procedures
in the last decade that have placed an increased reliance
on technology coinciding with the reduction in direct
contact with bank employees. Other examples include the
automation of telecommunications and the explosion of on
line markets. Although these technological advances
facilitate business operations, they minimize interaction
with others.
In addition to reducing human contact, technological
advances also serve to produce a general sense of anxiety
or mistrust for what is received or accomplished
electronically. For example, there exists a general
suspicion about the use of automatic teller machines for
making deposits.
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I view this minimized contact, produced by a greater
reliance on automation and technology and the accompanying
general anxiety regarding that reliance as an enabling
condition for our renewed interest in pure moments of
bearing witness, where we presume to have access to the
truth devoid of mediation. Yet, paradoxically,

this

interest in "pre-technological" moments that characterize
acts of witnessing is actualized, or fulfilled, precisely
because of technology. This in turn generates even more
interest in such testimonies since its mediatisation grants
greater and seemingly more direct access to them. President
Clinton's depositions and impeachment trial, for example,
were aired live on national television. Talk shows,
obviously, enable the presentation of nearly daily acts of
witnessing through the use of technology that broadcasts
these moments nationwide. Holocaust survivors' testimonies
are recorded on videocassette in an effort to document
their stories before no survivors remain. The indigenous
Latin Americans who supply their testimonio through a
journalist or anthropologist benefit from the technology
that enables their work's dissemination to the policy
makers in the United States, in particular, where pressure
can be applied to effect change in their native countries.
Latin American Testimonio
Testimonio emerged as a recognizable literary form in
the sixties, a period defined by movements of national
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liberation and armed struggles against oppression in Latin
America. In general terms, the testimonio is a bearing
witness, a first-person narrative differing from
autobiography and other citational forms owing to its
explicit politicization. As representative of a particular
group or class with certain political or ideological
concerns to be advanced, the witness stands as one of many,
a singular instance of a plural. Singular in that any one
witness, as we have explored in the chapter on Maurice
Blanchot, is irreplaceable and not interchangeable; no one
else can occupy the place of any particular witness except
the witness in question. Plural, or universal, in the sense
that, as far as testimonio is concerned, the witness
becomes the voice of the numerous oppressed and
disenfranchised of the witness's community who have been
denied a voice, who do not and cannot speak. Paradoxically,
however, once the witness is empowered with speech s/he in
a sense loses status as the subaltern or other, which
necessitated the urgent struggle to find a voice, and
enters the sphere of the privileged. In In Other Worlds,
Gayatri Spivak has argued that the subaltern cannot speak.2
For illustrative purposes, let us take the case of Richard
Rodriguez whose well-received autobiography Hunger of
Memory, recounts the education and assimilation of a
Mexican-American born into the working-class immigrant
section of Sacramento. His ascent to the middle class
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involves the mastery of English and the anglicization of
his name from Ricardo Rodriguez. In Spivak's
conceptualization of the term subaltern, Rodriguez is no
longer to be considered as such. His transformation, his
anglicization, enables him to speak but not from the place
of the other.
Yet,

testimonio does enable a vocalization of the

plight of the oppressed in Latin America. Textual
production of such acts of witnessing involves a movement
into the "literary." In fact, the Cuban publishing house,
Casa de las Americas, accorded formal status to the
testimonio as a bona fide literary genre with its award,
beginning in 1970, of an annual prize in this category.
Obviously,

testimonio is not directed to members of the

group to which the witness belongs, since these people, as
impoverished and marginalized, constitute the greatest
percentage of illiterates in Latin America. According to
John Beverley in Against Literature, the literary, as
understood in terms of high culture, epitomizes the
European and colonial ideologies and remains inaccessible
to the majority of indigenous people.3
Testimonio like other citational forms of narrative,
is by no means a genre born out of a vacuum. Beverley
reveals that testimonio grew out of a rich tradition of
first-person and documentary type writings. He cites, for
example, colonial era "cronicas," war diaries, nationalist
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essays, etc., as testimonial-type texts that provided the
ground work for the emergence of testimonio. Indeed,
Beverley claims that all Latin American writing occurring
post-Conquest is testimonial

(Against Literature, p. 19).

For him, the legal connotation carried in the word
testimonio is essential so that it maintains a distinction
from oral history (ibid.). Testimonio implies, therefore, a
certain veracity given to the account as if the witness
narrator were under oath to divulge the truth as in the
courtroom or in the sense of religious acts of confession,
or bearing witness. Because it lacks this connotation, oral
history allows for a less rigorous insistence on accuracy,
truth and authenticity.
With the recognition of testimonio as a literary
genre, and its resulting dissemination beyond regional and
international borders, it is obvious that testimonio, an
act of bearing witness to the suffering of the misaligned
group, serves to advance their socio-political cause.
Through this dissemination emerging out of technological
advances in communication,

testimonio is received in the

First World countries where its readers are in a position
to apply pressure on their leaders and various humanitarian
organizations to effectuate foreign policy changes that
would ameliorate the oppressed's situation.
Such is the case of the most well-known testimonio of
Rigoberta Menchu, first published in 1977 and subsequently
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translated and released in English as I, Rigoberta Menchu.
Menchu bears witness to the atrocities inflicted upon her
and her community in Guatemala. As a Mayan Indian of the
western Quiche highlands of Guatemala, Menchu is a member
of the indigenous population that remains cut off
ethnically, culturally and linguistically from the socalled "ladinos," or fair-skinned, Spanish speaking Latin
Americans of European descent who maintain political and
economic power in the region.
Menchu's testimonio was told to Elisabeth BurgosDebray, an anthropologist who invited Menchu to meet with
her in Paris so she could record her story. Burgos'
introduction to the text stands as her testimony to the
testimony she received from Menchu. In this introduction,
Burgos bears witness, in effect, to her work with Menchu
and to the bond forged between them during the week Menchu
spent with her. She also discusses her role as editor of
the transcript. This job involved grouping various segments
of the interviews by theme and then placing them in
individual chapters. During this project, Burgos decided to
delete her questions and comments so that the testimonio
would read as a monologue, giving the illusion of no
outside interference or mediation in Menchu's story. In
addition, Burgos acknowledged making corrections to
Menchu's speech since Menchu still had not acquired an
advanced level of proficiency in Spanish, the language in
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which they worked. She writes that it "would have been
artificial to leave them uncorrected and it would have made
Rigoberta look 'picturesque'. . ."4
It is precisely Burgos' role as editor that
problematizes the question of testimonio in general.
Indeed, according to Craft in Novels of Testimony and
Resistance from Central America, the level of intervention
on the part of the editor becomes a serious concern as the
potential exists for "cvercorrection" of the testimony,
which would result in the overpowering mark of the
interlocutor on the project.5 The fact that the witness, as
a marginalized and often illiterate party, must rely on a
journalist or anthropologist, a member of the educated
elite, as an interlocutor poses certain problems. Critics
such as Elzbieta Sklodowska have called into question the
mediation that enables testimony to take place. In the case
of Burgos and Menchu, for example, the editing undertaken
by Burgos to make the testimony publishable threatens the
integrity of the text and raises the question of exactly
how much of the text is really Menchu and how much is
Burgos.6 Doris Sommer, however, views the mediation in
terms of a solidarity and complicity between recorder and
witness. According to Sommer, the mediation results in a
destabilization of the roles of oppressor, as recorder, and
witness, as oppressed, rather than a reaffirmation of the
boundaries between the two.7
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It is my contention that such boundaries are called
into question through the recording of testimonio by
another party. The author-ity of the witness is
destabilized, especially in the case of Menchu because of
the extensive editing on the part of Burgos. What is at
stake in this case is the issue of property and
proprietorship, one of the effects produced by such a
practice of citation, a structural issue that obtains in
any utterance, but that comes into explicit focus in the
case of testimonio.
While there are questions as to the intervention of
the editor-recorder and its potential to alter the
witness's testimonio, questions have also arisen regarding
the truthfulness and accuracy of the witness's story. As we
will see, these concerns have played out in the United
States as a conservative attack on multicultural studies
where Rigoberta Menchu's text seems to have sparked the
debate.
In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis and History, Dori Laub relates her
experience as one of several interviewers for the Video
Archive for Holocaust Testimony at Yale. She recalls a
session with a woman bearing witness to her incarceration
in Auschwitz. During the interview, the woman recalled her
work at the camp as well as the Auschwitz uprising.
Subsequent to her testimony, a fellow interviewer, a
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historian, called into question her account of the uprising
because of the incompleteness of her knowledge of the
event. The historian saw these limitations as inaccuracies,
as perhaps an indication of a lack of veracity of her
alleged experiences at Auschwitz. For Laub, however, these
limits simply demonstrate that an eyewitness, any witness,
cannot have a totalizing experience and certainly not
achieve a totalizing testimony to that event.8 Instead of
questioning the witness's authenticity, Laub respects the
limits of knowledge, stating that they do not detract from
the importance or significance of what the witness is
saying.
A similar question of validity has arisen in the case
of Rigoberta Menchu. David Stoll, an anthropologist at
Middlebury College, has released the findings of his
research in and around the Quiche Highlands where Menchu
has spent much of her life. According to Stoll, Menchu's
life-testimony is replete with historical inaccuracies and
grave exaggerations of the hardships and tragedies she and
her family were said to have suffered at the hands of the
"ladinos" and the Guatemalan Army.9 Menchu's account, for
example, of the torture and burning death of her brother
along with other prisoners in the town square of Chajul may
not be historically accurate. Stoll claims to have
interviewed inhabitants of that town who say that was never
any such public torture death there. Stoll also disputes
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Menchu's descriptions of her childhood working on the
"finku," or plantations. His research indicates that Menchu
was perhaps a bit more privileged than others and actually
spent her childhood at a Catholic boarding school,
receiving thereby an 8th grade education and never setting
foot on a "finku"

{ibid.).

Stoll apparently has quite a few critics who see his
work as a right-wing attempt to discredit Menchu and thus
silence her and her supporters working to gain justice from
the Guatemalan Army and the "ladinos." In addition to
discrediting Menchu, Stoll and his supporters are placing
multicultural studies in jeopardy, since their claims of
perjury in her case result in a movement against the use of
such "political" texts in the classroom. Menchu's accounts
of army atrocities against the impoverished and indigenous
people of Guatemala are seen as indispensable to the
movement seeking to rid Guatemala of such abuses of power
and human rights violations.
David Levine, a political science professor at the
University of Michigan finds it alarming that scholars are
willing to overlook untruths and inaccuracies when it comes
to a figure like Rigoberta Menchu. His concern is in
response to Stoll's critics who claim that regardless of
his research findings, regardless of alleged problems with
her testimony, they will continue to vaunt the importance
of her work and they will persist in using it in the
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classroom where it has gained the status as the epitome of
its genre as testimonio (ibid., p. A16) .
This situation echoes that mentioned earlier involving
the Auschwitz survivor whose lack of complete story and
details led one interviewer to call into question her
entire testimony. In the case of Menchu, the discrepancies
between historical fact and her account of these events
have also jeopardized her presumed authority as witness and
have led some, notably Stoll, to discredit the entirety of
her work. Others, like Allen Carey-Webb, of Western
Michigan University, remind Menchu's critics of the
importance of realizing that even if there are
discrepancies, even if the murder of her brother did not
occur as she claims, the indisputable fact is that the
Guatemalan Army did murder people like her brother and the
indigenes have been oppressed (ibid.). Being able to speak,
to bear witness to these hardships is crucial in provoking
change and the importance of granting the marginalized a
voice cannot be disputed, so rarely are they able to speak.
What has become clear from the polemic based on questions
regarding the veracity of Menchu's testimony is that those
of the opposing positions inhabit the same space of
testimony which is at once truth and fiction.
To conclude,

I will state that advances in

telecommunications have opened a political discourse on
testimonio by allowing such texts to be disseminated beyond
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the borders of Latin America into industrialized firstworld countries. This dissemination, generated by
technological advances, stimulated by a general desire for
pre-technological, non-mediated instances of bearing
witness. Yet, in the case of Latin American testimonials,
the witnesses act of bearing witness is highly mediated.
The fact that these indigenous, oppressed people testify to
the intellectual elite of first-world countries raises
questions regarding the author-ity and proper-ty of these
testimonios.
These issues notwithstanding, the citation of
testimonio in this country has sparked a highly politicized
debate on the status of multicultural studies. Although the
ramifications of conservative movements to discredit the
testimonios of indigenous Americans such as Menchu have not
yet been determined,

it can be said that the practice of

testimonio and its citation in the United States has
allowed the voice of these people to finally be heard.
Holocaust Survivors' Testimonies
As we have already seen in the previous section, the
increased demand for pure acts of bearing witness is in
partial response to the increasingly mediatised age in
which we live. The paradox, of course, is that this
interest in accessing acts of bearing witness thrives
because of that same increased mediatisation which allows
for a rapid dissemination of testimonies while collapsing
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borders between the private and public spheres. One of the
functions of bearing witness is to make sense out of a
traumatic event suffered by the witness. The Holocaust
stands as the traumatic event that defies its eventhood, an
event, in the words of Dori Laub, without witnesses.
In "Truth and Testimony: The Process and the
Struggle," in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, Laub calls
the Holocaust the event that produced no witnesses for a
couple of reasons. First, the extermination of its victims
left literally few witnesses. The Holocaust sought to
eliminate any potential witnesses through the execution of
Hitler's plan. Those who did manage to survive in the
concentration camps had undergone such dehumanizing
psychological trauma that their capacity to bear witness to
what they had lived through and experienced was severely
reduced. Witnesses, however, do exist among the survivors
of the Holocaust. Some critics even consider those who did
not survive the concentration camps as witnesses too.
Indeed, the testimonies they left in the form of
concentration camp diaries, poetry and art attest to their
desire to bear witness by leaving a record of what they
were experiencing even as they were dying.10
That experience, that event, is presumably tidily
summarized in the word "holocaust." Yet, even the use of
the Greek word "holocaust," meaning "burnt ashes," seems
quite inadequate to express the horrors it constituted.
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Decades later, we are still struggling in our attempt both
to come to terms with what transpired and to represent i t .
This has led to a movement, especially in recent years, of
bearing witness, of testifying to the horrors of the
Holocaust in an effort to speak that which remains
unspeakable and which can never be fully represented.
The purposes served by bearing witness to various
aspects of the Holocaust are multiple. First, the catharsis
stimulated by witnessing carries with it a distinct
therapeutic value. Dori Laub writes that it offers a way
for the witness to begin healing, since most survivors were
initially left unable to speak, still reeling from the
trauma they underwent at the hands of the Nazis

(Testimony:

Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and
History, p. 131) .
The psychological scars were so severe that many
survivors repressed memories of the Holocaust and did not
even speak to their families of their experiences for years
following the end of World War II. Instead, they began to
strive for some semblance of normalcy and acted as if none
of those horrors had ever taken place. Dori Laub recounts
her work with one survivor in particular whose family had
never heard him speak at all about that period of his life.
Once a survivor regains access to these experiences,
bearing witness commences and for some it never ceases.
Primo Levi, for example, whose Survival at Auschwitz is one
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of the best known testimonies of the Holocaust, devoted the
rest of his life to testifying about his experience as a
Holocaust survivor.11 His writings, both fictional and nonfictional, treat various aspects of the Holocaust and as
such allowed Levi the opportunity to work out on paper a
sort of survivor's therapy. In a therapeutic sense,
therefore, testifying enables the survivor to attempt to
come to terms with the significance of the experience.
Because the Holocaust is unfathomable, bearing witness
also serves to reaffirm what was experienced. It renders
the Holocaust, which seems so unimaginable and so far
removed from reality, real. Testifying concretizes the
lived experience of the survivors, which in numerous cases
had been repressed. As Dori Laub has remarked, one of the
greatest fears of survivors is that nobody will believe
them and their testimony, that history will not accept
their claims and allegations of their trauma. As one
survivor stated, she felt the need to survive, to live one
day more than Hitler so she could tell her story ("-Truth
and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle," in Trauma:
Explorations in Memory, p. 67). Just as surviving enables
one to testify, so too does testifying enable one to
survive.
The very real fear common to all of the victims was
that there would be no survivors and that, if there were
survivors, they would not be heard or listened to. This can
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be seen as a result of the dehumanization to which the Jews
were subjected. As we have seen in the previous section on
the Latin American testimonio, bearing witness is an act of
empowerment since it grants a voice to witnesses who, as
members of a defined community, have been marginalized and
oppressed, to the point of genocide in the case of Jews, at
the hands of those maintaining a position of power over
them. The methodical extermination program instituted by
the Third Reich commenced with the dehumanization of those
marked as members of inferior communities. This was
accomplished first by cutting off contact and communication
with those on the outside, thereby eliminating the
necessary interlocutors required for witnessing to take
place.
So silenced, the victims of the Holocaust became
dehumanized; having lost their voice and, having been
denied the right to speak, the survivors emerged from the
concentration camps believing they have no right to possess
a voice. They felt they were not worthy to speak or to be
listened to. The incomprehensible structure of the event
that silenced its victims through genocide and through the
removal of their voices produced, in this sense, no
witnesses, as Laub has stated (Testimony: Crises of
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History.). The
Holocaust extinguished the possibility of address, of
communication. The reduction to silence persisted following
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the liberation of the camps for the previously mentioned
reasons.
Laub's research has revealed that survivors feel they
belong to a secret community, membership of which hinges on
possession of a secret that can never be divulged. They
feel they are sworn to silence. The reasons for this
feeling can be attributed first to the magnitude of the
trauma inflicted upon the survivors on whom the earlier
mentioned sense of unworthiness to speak bears heavily.
Along with this is the additional feeling that those
outside of the event would not believe them. Furthermore,
even if the so-called outsiders were to believe and to
accept their stories, survivors feel no one could ever know
the "real" truth. Because the scope of the Holocaust is so
far-reaching,

so incredibly traumatic, no one individual

account could ever fully explain what really happened. For
this reason, the Holocaust defies its eventhood and escapes
reality.
There can never be, therefore, any totalizing
testimony which could subsume the event. Although documents
and other historical records exist, the knowing, as Laub
describes it, is born during witnessing (ibid.) . Yet, this
knowing can never be totalizing. It is constituted only by
the accumulation of singular instances provided by each
survivor-witness. In fact, the survivor testimonies
comprise the main record of what took place at the hand of
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the Nazis. These testimonies, made possible when the
survivor regains access to his/her voice, allow the
repossession of the act of witnessing through which the
event crystallizes and comes into existence. The re
presentation of the event by the witness brings the event
to the real, according reality to it not only for the
outsiders but also for the survivors themselves, as Dori
Laub asserts in her work with such survivors

(ibid.) .

This function of bearing witness belongs to what can
be considered the more "affirmative" side of iterability.
Because of iterability, in fact, witnessing is able to keep
the past alive, by bringing it into the reality of the
present. Testimony, as previously discussed,

involves the

attempt to re-present the event or lived experience, an act
which makes it much more than just restituting the past. If
it were simply a matter of reminiscing or restituting, the
event-experience would remain anchored in the past with the
potential to be forgotten. Through iterability, the
previously present moment of the witness

(in the past) is

re-presented and ensures that it will always be remembered
and that the survivors will always live on. While keeping
the past alive, witnessing as a function of citationality
also allows the witnesses to reconcile themselves to their
trauma, which is therapeutically significant.
In fact, the therapeutic significance of witnessing
for these survivors is indisputable. Their repossession of
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voice and the act of witnessing itself has been made
possible by the growing movement to document their
testimonies. As stated earlier,

I attribute this increasing

interest in recording these acts of testimony by Holocaust
survivors to an impossible attempt and a collective need,
to process and fully represent this event defying its
eventhood. The extreme privacy that is the singularity of
each witness' experience moves into the public sphere with
the enactment of testimony. In the case of the Yale Video
Archive for Holocaust survivors, this border crossing from
the private to the public is highly mediatised. The
witnesses testify on camera before a panel of interviewers,
including historians, psychologists and anthropologists.
The videotaping, a public, mediatised disclosure of
testimony, paradoxically marks what I view as a movement to
the personal. I have explained how technological advances
have provoked a change in the status of the printed text,
allowing its more rapid circulation, but perhaps more
importantly, allowing other media, such as videotaping, to
supersede its usage. This is precisely the case with the
Yale project. It is my contention that the preference for
video documentation of the testimonies underscores the
interest in the return to the "purely" personal non
mediated act of bearing witness. Unlike the printed text in
which the testimony is detached in numerous ways from the
witness, the video text reinstates the connection between
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story and witness, thereby providing the illusion of a
truly personal testimony. The video assigns a face to the
witnessing which serves to (re-)personalize the already
intensely personal testimony. The Video Archive brings into
focus again the paradox of every testimony which stems from
its iterable function. Once uttered, testimony becomes
technologized; this is because iterability, or
repeatability, involves a certain automation which allows
for the repetition or citation of the utterance. Yet, with
the increased movement to a pre-technological, pure moment
of personal testimony, there is a multiplication of the
effects of technology, as in the case of the Yale project.
Clinton and Lewinsky: Truth and Testimony
The technological advances that have facilitated the
Yale project have played an important role in other
contexts, most notably that of the Clinton impeachment.
The case of President Clinton's trial raised the very
questions that my project has addressed in the preceding
chapters on Duras and Blanchot in particular. In fact, the
reliance on hearsay and testimony as functions of
citationality in the narratives of those writers has been
played out in the contemporary political and public spheres
related to the Clinton and Lewinsky scandal.
If we recall, the hearsay and testimony that inform
the Duras and Blanchot fictions emerge out of an
overwhelming movement in favor of accessing the truth. In
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Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle, for example, the attempt to re
present the event which generates the texts remains just
that: an attempt to access the origin, the truth of Lol's
ravishing. The impossibility of achieving access results,
as we have seen, in the propagation of hearsay which
circulates beyond the limits of Le Ravissement de Lol V.
Stein, engendering a plurality of other texts.
The Blanchot recits focus on the attempt to achieve
testimony, or first-person disclosure of the event
witnessed. Like the Duras cycle of texts, the recits
purport to re-present the event, by doubling the presence
of the witness. However, the originary event, or moment of
the witness, cannot be re-presented. With the two moments,
event and testimony, severed from one another, the recits
become the events themselves. Obviously, the Duras and
Blanchot texts demonstrate the problematization of bearing
witness, of telling or re-presenting the whole truth
thought to lie "beyond performance," beyond the act of
bearing witness.
These problematic realities of bearing witness -doubling of presence, collapse of boundaries between
private and public, etc. -- have been staged in the very
public and political context of the Clinton trial. As
stated previously, this case functions not unlike the cases
of Duras and Blanchot which are marked by the movement to
access the originary event, or the truth, deemed to lie
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beyond the "present" act of witnessing. In the Clinton
case, of course, the plurality of overwhelmingly mediatized
citational acts, or re-tellings, attempting to access the
originary event are problematized by that very event
thought to be at the origin. The problematic of the origin
or source of the Clinton affair stems from questions of the
private sphere as well as questions of what constitutes
sexual relations. The event at the heart of the trial -sexual contact between Clinton and Monica Lewinsky,
normally a private activity with relatively insignificant
implications beyond the closed doors which presumably
contain it -- fails to correspond accordingly to the degree
and level of public and political attention it generated.
With the relative insignificance of their private and
personal activities inaccessible, the array of its
mediations -- congressional hearings, depositions,
testimonies and the impeachment trial -- became the event
itself, as in Elanchot's recits. Since iterability involves
a technologization, it is, in effect, an automated
repetition functioning beyond the control of the law and
exceeding boundaries, especially those between the public
and private.
In the Clinton case, the private became the public to
such a degree that Clinton even opted to offer a national
confession to the American people in which he proceeded to
apologize and ask for forgiveness, despite the fact that
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confessions normally are carried out in secret and are
thought to be pure, pre-mediatized moments of witnessing.
As explained previously, there is recently an increased
movement in favor of such pre-technological moments of
bearing witness with the paradox being that such moments
are already technological and mediatized. Morevover,
Clinton's confession was purely "mediatic," aired directly
on national television.
Although any act of witnessing involves a
transgression from the private to the public and a certain
degree of mediatization, the borders that would normally
delineate the two spheres is overrun; and, once the
borderline is overrun, control or containment of the
information becomes impossible. Here, in the case of a
public figure such as President Clinton, the movement from
private to public becomes extreme and the debate over the
private lives of public officials renewed. Interestingly,
Clinton's aides conducted polls of Americans in order to
determine how politically threatening the scandal would be
for Clinton. Repeatedly, these polls revealed that the
public is much more willing to forgive adultery than
perjury. This can be attributed in part to the fact that
adultery is a private act whereas perjury is by nature a
public commission, having already been situated in the
public sphere of the courtroom.
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Another aspect related to the question of public and
private that surfaced during the Clinton impeachment was
the level of public access to the legal proceedings. Not
only did the testimony become public within the courtroom,
the traditional setting for such acts of witnessing, but it
also took place live on national television, overrunning
even the presumed boundaries of the courtroom. The
increasing mediatization of society, considered with the
general blurring of boundaries between the private and
public

(especially public figures) results not only in a

greater interest in acts of bearing witness, but also in
the increased access to such events. As seen in the example
of Clinton's confession, such acts rely on technology and
always involve a certain mediatization, even when they are
thought to be devoid of media.
In addition to calling into question the boundaries
delineating the private and public spheres, the problematic
of the original event in the Clinton case involves the
definition of "sexual relations." The indeterminacy of this
definition obfuscated an understanding of what it was
exactly that occurred between Clinton and Lewinsky.
In fact, much deliberation ensued during Clinton's
1998 deposition in the Paula Jones sexual harassment case
over an acceptable definition of the phrase "sexual
relations." The judge in the case ultimately ruled that
"sexual relations" signified that the person deposed
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engages in or causes sexual contact with another, with the
intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. According to the
judge's definition, this contact excludes sexual
intercourse. The attempt to access and re-present the
originary event of the entire impeachment proceedings
resulted in multiple and differing re-tellings. All of
these citations failed to perform successfully what they
purported to do: to present the truth by re-presenting the
event generating those re-tellings.
An early mediation of the originary event occurred
during the deposition in the Paula Jones case when Clinton
denied having had sex with Monica Lewinsky. When questioned
days later during a conference at the White House, Clinton
again asserted that he had not had "sexual relations with
that woman... These allegations are false."
On August 17th, Clinton appeared again before a grand
jury, this time to give testimony in reference to the
Monica Lewinsky issue for which prosecutors were
investigating the possibility of charging him with perjury
and obstruction of justice in light of Lewinsky's testimony
of August 6th. During the proceedings of Clinton's
testimony, the prosecutors for the Office of the
Independent Counsel emphasized repeatedly that the law
stipulates that the witness's appearance for a deposition
or testimony entails taking a sworn oath to officially and
legally commence the proceedings. This oath is, of course,
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a promise on the part of the witness to tell the whole
truth and nothing but the truth. As one who is unique and
irreplaceable, who possesses knowledge from a perspective
that no one else can have, and who has taken an oath to be
completely and utterly truthful, a witness enjoys a certain
level of authority and credibility. Yet, as we have seen in
the Blanchot chapter on testimony, there is always a
certain "embroidery" of truth and fiction that the witness
stitches together.
By stating one's name at the opening of the testimony
proceedings, the witness, in effect, offers an oral
signature to his/her testimony and, coupled with the oath,
is held accountable and responsible for what takes place as
a performative. According to Austin's definition of
performative, this would suggest good intentions on the
part of the speaker to fulfill his/her promise to be fully
truthful. The witness is assumed to act in good faith in
order to uphold the oath to which s/he swore.
During the course of his four hour-long testimony, Clinton
was repeatedly questioned about the previous statements he
had made under oath "to tell the whole truth" for his
deposition. Sections regarding the definition of "sexual
relations" were cited as well as conversations he had had
prior to the deposition which he re-presented during the
deposition and which Lewinsky also re-presented during her
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testimony and which Clinton then re-cited again during his
testimony.
In advance of his testimony, Clinton entered into the
record a signed statement in which he admitted having
conducted himself inappropriately with Lewinsky yet denied
having had sexual intercourse with her. In fact, he denied
having had "sexual relations" with her in the strict sense
of the phrases used during the deposition. His argument was
that he did not cause, in the sense of forcing, contact
with Lewinsky; therefore, this definition did not apply to
his encounters with her. To avoid answering directly "yes"
or "no" to the more explicit questions relating directly to
those encounters, Clinton reverted to this statement in an
attempt to protect himself from self-incrimination. This
maneuver, in effect, helped to impede access to the origin,
since it maintained an indeterminacy about the nature of
the activity engaged in by Clinton and Lewinsky.
Another point re-cited from the deposition was the
statement made by Clinton's lawyer, Robert Bennett, who
said that there was no sexual relationship between Clinton
and Lewinsky. This statement obviously contradicted the new
truth emerging subsequent to Lewinsky's testimony. At this
point in the proceedings, Clinton's testimony collapsed
into a game of semantics in that the prosecutors disputed
the truthfulness of Bennett's statement with Clinton.
Clinton testified that, if taken literally, at the present
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and in that moment, when Bennett uttered those words, then
he spoke accurately and truthfully. Because at that instant
and for some time prior to that moment, there were indeed
no sexual encounters with Lewinsky. Such contact had been
terminated by Clinton some time before the deposition. The
veracity of the statement therefore hinged on the
interpretation of the word "is." Understood in the present
tense, the use of "is" speaks of the then-present moment of
the deposition without making any reference to any past
moments, thereby rendering the statement true.
The matter of Lewinsky's affidavit in regard to the
Jones case arose as well during the testimony. It was in
this legally binding paper validated by Lewinsky's own
signature that she denied having had an affair with
Clinton. In response to questions concerning the
truthfulness of her statement, Clinton explained that the
phrase "sexual relationship" or "affair" as used by
Lewinsky and as most likely understood by the majority of
Americans would imply "sexual intercourse." This affidavit
is therefore truthful in that Lewinsky was not bound to the
context of a deposition in which Clinton had been placed,
which in turn forced him to adhere to a strict definition
as issued by the judge.
The question of context reveals the iterability of any
sign. This is to say, of course, that any sign has the
capacity to be brought to function and have meaning in a
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plurality of different contexts. Therefore, for Lewinsky,
and in her affidavit,

the definition of "sexual

relationship" would operate differently -- although
presumably still truthfully -- from the definition to which
Clinton was bound by the judge in the deposition and which
was still being called to function in the different context
of his testimony.
Yet another aspect of the Clinton affair relates to
the status of truth and perjury. In fact, Kenneth Starr's
investigation into Clinton's alleged illegal activities
raised questions of what constitutes truth and perjury in
the context of Clinton's statements taken under oath before
a grand jury. This again involves the problematization of
borders. In terms of truth and fiction, these borders
become indistinguishable, leaving it impossible to decide
where truth ends and fiction begins.
Clinton's responses to questions referring to
statements and testimonies by others at times contradicted
others' versions. Yet, testimony is itself the presentation
of first-hand knowledge and experiences by the witness who
occupies a place that no other can possibly take. It seems
to become a question of perspective then, as Clinton
himself alluded to in his testimony, when he stated that
the truth for one person might differ from another's
understanding or experience of the "same event." In other
words, no two people see the same thing nor define it in
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the same way; but, according to Clinton, that should not
suggest that one person is necessarily committing an act of
perjury.
Yet, the "truth" that emerged during Clinton's
testimony seemed to contradict the "truth" he propagated
for months prior to this moment. The argument can certainly
be made that Clinton's statements to his friends,

family

and staff in which he denied a sexual relationship with
Lewinsky were not necessarily lies -- indeed, if we adhere
to the definition that Clinton feels most Americans would
intend by that phrase, then he did not lie when he said
there was no sexual intercourse with Lewinsky. Yet, he was
not entirely truthful either. For his denial of a sexual
relationship denies the non-intercourse aspects of his
"inappropriate relationship" with her. Therefore, what is
at stake here is the question of truth and perjury. If
Clinton was not completely truthful does that mean he
perjured himself? Does not disclosing the "full truth"
render one a liar? How can the truth be determined when one
is treading the border we think firmly exists to utterly
demarcate truth and lies?
Although the answers to these questions are not
clearly evident, they demonstrate the problematic inherent
in the act of testimony and in the practice of taking a
witness at his/her word because of the oath sworn which
commences the testimony. The performative status of bearing
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witness, of swearing to tell the truth, is called into
question if we recall that the access to the moment of the
event, to the truth that lies beyond the performance
constituting the moment of testimony, is impossible. Of
course, the question of a totalizing truth arises as well.
The truth unveiled during Clinton's four hours of
testimony contradicted, as mentioned earlier, the "truth"
Clinton presented to those nearest to him for the months
preceding this event. His family, friends and aides had
supported him during this time, accepting him at his word
and granting him an almost privileged status of authority
due in part to his position as president and as political
leader of the United States, a position for which he had
taken an oath, according to which he would honor and uphold
the laws and duties of that office.
Only when Lewinsky's lawyers had worked out an
immunity deal with Starr, did Clinton issue a "truth"
different from that of "I did not have sexual relations
with that woman, Monica Lewinsky" amounting to an admission
of an inappropriate relationship with her.
Another function of witnessing as a technological,
mediatized iteration is that it has the potential to be
cited and re-cited in such a way that it exceeds its
boundaries.

In a similar manner to the citationality at

work in the Duras and Blanchot texts, the Clinton affair
resulted in a plurality of iterations so that much of the
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testimony, in fact, re-cited previously cited statements,
thereby placing it en ajbfme. The testimony within which the
deposition was framed also framed Lewinsky's affidavit as
well as pre-deposition conversations, encounters and
contact with not only Lewinsky but other friends, staff and
aides.
The testimony, as is usual, is a citation, a
repetition of witness and event testified to, a double
presence of witness during event and subsequent testimony.
In the Clinton case this became complicated by the
"presence" of Clinton during the alleged events, during
deposition and during the testimony, all of which was re
cited further during the testimony.
We have seen in this section how the case of the
Clinton's impeachment has played out questions of truth and
origin through the multiple testimonies it generated. The
mediatization of these acts of witnessing problematized the
borders delineating public and private as well as veracity
and fiction.
Bearing Witness on Television Talk Shows
In the preceding section on the Clinton-Lewinsky
affair, I discussed how the truthfulness of Clinton's
testimony was called into question by a multiplicity of
highly mediatized re-tellings, or acts of witnessing. In
this final example,

I have chosen to discuss a purely

"mediatic" event that parodies the staging of questions of
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truth and testimony: the immensely popular television talk
shows. These shows run the gamut from Oprah Winfrey, with
its recent interest in reawakening the spiritual self in
all of its viewers to the notorious Jerry Springer Show,
with its bellicose guests and bloodthirsty audience incited
by topics about secret adulterous affairs where the guilty
parties confront each other.
Despite the incredible range of talk show styles and
themes, the common thread that stitches them together is
that of witnessing. All of these programs entice their
spectators with specially selected guests to bear witness
to the particular topic for that show. In fact, the
proliferation of talk shows has engendered a plethora of
guests making appearances to divulge various secrets about
their personal lives, which has directly resulted in a
renewed interest in the "memoir" or "confessional text."
Such a crossing of boundaries, whereby regular Americans
relate on national television the deepest and darkest
secrets of their private lives pertains directly to the
function of citationality which calls into question
conventional limits and boundaries that attempt to control
the dissemination of information by keeping it in its
proper place. Talk shows by their very nature - - o n
national television where an entire country has access to
them -- exceed these limitations.
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In what I view, therefore, as a citation of the
courtroom, talk shows appear to mimic this structure and
the legal proceedings implicated in testimony and bearing
witness. First, the guests appear as witnesses to divulge,
in a truthful manner, their secrets before a live audience
just as the courtroom witness does. Recent topics have
involved questions of paternity, out-of-control teens and
their mothers, secret affairs and crushes. Guest-witnesses
supposedly reveal all, bearing witness from their very
unique places, testimony that at times conflicts with that
of the potential father in question or the teenage daughter
who appears with the initial guest-witness.
Resolution is sometimes sought on these shows between
the guests. The Montel Williams and Maury Povich shows, in
particular, appear especially serious about finding an
acceptable solution for their guests in conflict and quite
often arrange for an "expert witness" to appear. In
general, these experts are counselors and psychologists,
even nutritionists for shows on obese teens. They first
address in general the theme of the show before turning to
deal specifically with the guests sharing the stage with
them. Interestingly, when the services of the professionals
are offered to certain guests, there is a reversion to the
private sphere as guests and experts go backstage to
discuss in an intimate setting the issues in question.
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The guest-witnesses and expert witnesses appearing on
stage face the audience and remain separated physically
from them just as in a courtroom. The audience in the talk
show studio, however, fulfills, in a sense, the role of
jury. That the audience members behave similarly to a jury
becomes quite clear when we consider that the applause and
jeers directed at various guests indicate a sort of verdict
the audience has made regarding those guests. Occasionally,
shows such as Ricki Lake actually allow the audience to
hand down a verdict to its guests. The topics of these
shows appear to deal with relationship issues, such as "To
Dump, Or Not To Dump?" At times, rather than taking a mass
vote from the spectators, a panel, or jury, is selected
from the studio audience. After hearing the testimonies of
the witnesses, they present their verdict to the guests who
are presumably supposed to abide by i t .
If the audience functions as jury, then, the talk show
host, by extension, carries out the role of judge, or even,
prosecutor, to keep the audience and guests under control
and to direct questions to them. Yet, maintaining a certain
decorum is not always of primary concern. Since these
programs depend on the nature of their topics and the
personality of their guests to captivate audiences, some
talk shows have resorted to such levels of outrageousness
that violent outbursts amongst the guests occur regularly,
with the added incitement of the spectators.
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As mentioned earlier, the talk show presents its
guests as witnesses who, as such, are granted a special
credibility by the spectators. The talk show, after all,
creates this air of authenticity by publicizing,
periodically,

the steps and background checks to which

potential guests must submit in order to be considered for
an appearance on television. With control measures in
place, the show's producers weed through the pool of
applicants to select the best ones for the program. The
fact that these shows air on national network television
with a live studio audience affords an additional
legitimacy to the shows and plays off the viewers'
willingness to suspend disbelief.
The guests themselves represent a cross-section of
ordinary Americans who could easily be our neighbors, or
even ourselves. The facility with which viewers are able to
identify with the guests for their ordinariness makes it
easier to accept the word of the guests as true. After all,
what would be served by an average person making an
appearance on the Maury Povich Show in order to concoct a
story that is untruthful? Furthermore, with the pre-show
interview and selection process it seems that producers
would have eliminated any such "false" guest.
Of course, the allure of talk shows lies exactly in
the transformation of the seemingly ordinary into the
extraordinary. The appearance of an anonymous, regular

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241

American, who would normally never be on network
television, entices and fascinates the viewer. This can be
attributed to the simple reason that the guest's testimony
is so outrageous or shocking, that the viewer takes
pleasure in realizing that s/he would never do any such
thing.
With its inherent legitimacy -- live audience, major
network airing, expert witnesses, ordinary and authentic
guests -- the "realness" of the talk show has been accepted
as a given. However, it is this very anonymity of guests
taken from Anywhere, U.S.A. that provides for the deception
of viewers who are so willing to accept as true the guests
and their statements. Allegations have in fact surfaced
recently that some of these unscrupulous talk shows have
resorted to hiring actors to play the role of guests. The
shows' producers provide these actors scripts based on the
chosen topic for the show and allot the actors time to
rehearse their lines prior to taping. These reports of paid
guest-actors and carefully scripted and rehearsed shows
surfaced when some of these actors came forward to bear
witness to their experiences and to confess to what they
had done for these shows. This testimony about the
"testimony" they willingly and falsely presented on the
talk shows, citations themselves of the courtroom, offers
an excellent example of the function of citationality.
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As parodies of traditional modes of testimony or legal
proceedings, talk shows inhabit the space of the event that
carries the potential of iterability with it. Every event,
or utterance, from the simplest to the most outrageous,
gives rise in its wake to that possibility. Once the space
of iterability is opened, citations, parody, mimicry and
recontextualizations, all of which are already
mediatizations, multiply beyond control. The "out of
control" nature of talk shows is structurally the same as
Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle and Blanchot's recits where
hearsay and testimony, as citational modes, function beyond
attempts to limit them and allow the citational and
dissemination of events and utterances ad infini turn.
The phenomenon is set further en abime when the guests
appear in order to tout recently published books that stand
as their memoirs or life-testimonies. For instance, on a
recently aired talk show, a woman promoted her book as a
sort of confessional text, or tell-all, that publicly
disclosed her incestuous relationship with her father. On
Regis and Cathy Lee, a veterinary psychologist, who makes
periodic appearances on the show in the capacity of an
animal care specialist, appeared on this occasion for the
sole purpose of promoting his newly published book entitled
Memoirs of a Pet Therapist.
In a final twist, as the Jenny Jones Show tragedy has
demonstrated, another "originally real" event occurs,
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thereby returning the show to the courtroom on which it
was modeled. In fact, the talk show industry is, of course,
still reeling from the involvement of this show in a very
real tragedy. As pressure mounts to supply the national
viewing audience with ever more guests who share tales ever
more outrageous, some shows have come under fire with
allegations of setting up guests with the "ambush, " as it
is known in the industry. The Jenny Jones Show, in
particular, has borne the brunt of such criticism since the
taping of an episode in 1995 that resulted in the murder of
one guest by another. The topic of that particular program
was 11Surprise Crushes." The show was set up in such a way
that guests, who had a secret crush on someone they knew,
were invited to reveal their interest publicly, which
would, of course, be certain to provoke intense reactions
from the studio audience while bolstering ratings on the
network televising the show. This type of program functions
by misleading the other guest, on whom the initial guest
has the secret crush, into appearing on the show, by
convincing him/her of a false and innocuous topic. Duped in
such a way, this person is totally unaware of what is going
to transpire, which adds to the outrageously scandalous
nature of making a private crush public on national
television in front of a live audience. To further create a
scandal, these ambushes involve at times a homosexual
guest, a practice which raises its own questions about the
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homophobia some of these shows exploit and which I
unfortunately will not be able to address here.
On the now-infamous ambush episode of the Jenny Jones
Show, Scott Amedure appeared to reveal his crush on his
friend Jonathan Schmitz. Apparently, Schmitz had a history
of mental illness and the humiliation of being implicated
in a gay crush proved too much for him to handle. Three
days following the taping of the show, Schmitz murdered
Amedure. As a result, Amedure's family sued the show and in
May 1999 they were awarded a $25 million settlement by a
jury. Although for some it seems unthinkable that a show be
held responsible for a criminal act committed by a guest
following a show, the Amedure family lawyers successfully
showed that the producers did not sufficiently check
Schmitz's history to determine if he would be emotionally
fit to withstand such a public disclosure of a crush,
particularly a gay one.
While we can directly attribute these developments of
paid actors and off-the-air tragedies to the increased
competition these shows face, which forces them to have
wilder and wilder topics and guests, it calls into question
the authenticity to which these shows lay claim as models
of the courtroom and testimony. Unfortunately,

in the case

of Jenny Jones, the secret crush ambush on national
television has led the show's producers and host straight

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

into the very real courtroom in Michigan where the jury
decided the show was liable.
Conclusion
The preceding sections of this chapter have revealed
the significant effects of bearing witness and testimony as
a mode of citationality in various cultural contexts. What
is at stake in all of these instances are questions of
borders, origins and property. In terms of citationality,
the movement from the private to the public and from the
voiceless to the voiced is necessary in order to achieve
the act of witnessing and therefore demonstrates the
impossibility of maintaining the boundaries that presumably
limit and control the dissemination of information.
Additionally, bearing witness problematizes the
conceptualization of presence through its doubling of the
presence of witness during the event and during the
testimony.
To conclude, these instances of bearing witness
demonstrate what was previously seen in the Blanchot and
Duras chapters where reality and its mediation as testimony
are placed in abime. The logic of iterability reveals a
complicity between truth and fiction, between reality and
media. The crisis of citationality seen in the public and
"mediatic" domain underscores the problematic of the
questions that citationality raises. In my study I have
addressed these questions first in the fictional texts of
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Duras and Blanchot and subsequently in several
philosophical polylogues by Jacques Derrida. In this
chapter, I address these questions as a problematic of this
turn of the twentieth century, as the culture is undergoing
a technological and media revolution.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation,

I have discussed the

implications of various modes of citationality. I began
this discussion by tracing the relevant theoretical
approaches indispensable to the development of my analysis
of the practice of citationality. I established the
theoretical framework for this project, therefore, through
my reading of Jacques Derrida's work on the concepts of
iterability and citationality. It is from this perspective
that I examined what I consider to be the citational modes
of hearsay, testimony and conference. The juridical
connotations of these terms raise pertinent questions
relating to the status of the performative utterance
especially in terms of presence, origin and property.
In the Duras chapter,

I analyzed the Lol V. Stein

cycle of texts which I found to function through a reliance
on hearsay which emerges in the seminal text of the cycle,
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. From this narrative and its
insistence on hearsay, the generation of other texts
commences. Each of these texts persists,

in its turn,

in

the propagation of hearsay not only as a means of
attempting to recover the originary,

"true" event, but also

as a response to the impossibility of obtaining access to
i t. What I contend is that the cycle is marked by the
progressive radicalization of hearsay. While much of what
constitutes the hearsay in the early texts of the cycle is
247
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eventually filtered out of circulation, the scream or cry
remains in a state of dissemination. In my opinion, the
scream in the cycle functions as the (in)articulation of
the "mot-trou," an impossible word which, if it existed,
would be able to name the unnameable that lies at the
origin. Since this word remains an impossible possibility,
the scream comes to reverberate as its trace. With the last
text of the cycle, Son Nom de Venise dans Calcutta dSsert,
the scream is all that is still heard where nothing is said
anymore.
Chapter three focused on the use and function of
testimony in three recits by Maurice Blanchot. In a similar
manner to the radicalization of hearsay in the Duras texts,
the Blanchot narratives problematize testimony as a
performance purporting to gain access to the truth, to the
moment of the event. Since testimony requires the
impossible re-presentation of this event, I show the impact
of these attempts to testify on fiction.
The polylogues of Jacques Derrida function slightly
differently than the narratives of Duras and Blanchot.
Derrida's reliance on what I view as conference enables the
deconstruction of the logic of restitution, of origin and
presence and of genre. The conferences that constitute
these polylogues operate in such a way as to play with the
limits of genre imposed on texts.
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Since the citational modes operating in the chapters
on Duras, Blanchot and Derrida raise questions
contemporarily relevant to other textual forms, I expanded
my topic. The decision to address the political and
sociological implications of these questions stemming from
the attempt to achieve access to a truth, or originary
event allows me to situate acts of bearing witness in other
pertinent contexts and thereby leaves my analysis of a
practice of citationality open for further discussion.
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